Blue Book

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***Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.***

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Introduction

The following briefs will get your debating off to a great start. There are 12 cases, each with a 1st Affirmative and 2nd Affirmative speech. The Negative briefs will help guide you in developing negative strategies for your debate rounds. These briefs are at your disposal as you debate.

Two things need mentioning. First, don’t be lazy just because this is all mapped out for you. By all means, do *not* simply read from these briefs. Nothing bores a judge more than the monotone rattling of a list of evidence. Like an editor of a magazine, cut the pieces down as you see fit. Add your own voice to the speeches and elaborate when you see the need. Feel free to rewrite these briefs (without, of course, deviating from the meaning of the sources) to make them *your* speech.

Second, don’t stop here. Most debaters will become familiar with these briefs, and all debaters will quickly have arguments against them. The champion debaters are ones that go above and beyond spoon-fed evidence. The champs develop unique cases – perhaps a few different ones to use at tournaments – and they pick up a Wall Street Journal on the way and incorporate the latest evidence.

This is one reason Monument Publishing publishes *Blue Book Advanced* and the *Midseason Supplement* (see back of this book). We continue researching and writing cases for you to always stay current in the latest news and trends for this year's topic.

We are sure you will have some debaters take the easy road and read line-by-line these briefs. Perhaps you can con some friend into doing debate with these briefs. "All you have to do is read these – you can do it!" If this section of the Blue Book is what is needed to initiate a blooming debater, than its mission has been accomplished.

But we urge you to use these briefs as a tool, not a crutch. You should have a blast developing your own briefs and learning everything there is to learn about NATO and world politics.

THAT'S ALL FOLKS: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING NATO

NATO was once a vital part of US and Western European foreign policy, guaranteeing the security and freedom of Western democracies. But times have changed. Today the benefits of abolishing NATO outweigh the risks of continuing it. That's why my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and RESOLUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*)*

Abolish**:** "to end an activity or custom officially" (*Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, 2006,* [*http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=176&dict=CALD*](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=176&dict=CALD)*)*

B. Analysis

We will present a goals/criteria case today in which we will show that officially ending NATO would better meet the objectives that Western governments set for NATO than does the continuation of NATO itself. At the end of the round if you find that ending NATO would better achieve the benefits NATO claims for itself, then an Affirmative ballot will be justified.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: The Status Quo is committed to perpetuation and growth of NATO

Kurt Volker, (Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), 28 Mar 2006, text of speech presented at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A2=ind0603e&L=dossdo&P=634> (brackets added, word missing in the original text)

And I have already noted that we believe that at Riga, NATO should develop its relationship with global security partners, such as Australia or Japan, and set the stage for decisions on enlargement at its next Summit in 2008. That is a big agenda. It reflects the increased tempo of operational activity at NATO, and the increasing frequency with which our leaders [look] to NATO to tackle a wide range of problems.

OBSERVATION 3. PLAN.

Plank 1: Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters.

Plank 2: Mandate: NATO shall be abolished, its establishing treaty shall be dissolved, and all member governments shall discontinue all operations, commitments, and activities related to the NATO alliance.

Plank 3: Funding shall come from the normal military budgets of NATO countries from funding currently allocated to participation in NATO.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 6 months after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 4. GOALS. These are goals that NATO sets for itself according to its own documentation.

GOAL 1: Security for its members

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO? -- Freedom" [http://www.nato.int/home.htm#](http://www.nato.int/home.htm)

In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means.

GOAL 2: Peace and democratic values

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO? -- Security" [http://www.nato.int/home.htm#](http://www.nato.int/home.htm)

NATO safeguards the Allies' common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

GOAL 3: Transatlantic link

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO? -- Transatlantic link" [http://www.nato.int/home.htm#](http://www.nato.int/home.htm)

The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America and Europe are permanently tied together. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES. Abolishing NATO achieves the goals better than NATO itself.

ADVANTAGE 1: Security

A. Significance: NATO fails to achieve security by increasing the risk of war with Russia

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst) and Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 25 Jan 2006, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

At the end of the Cold War, NATO's purpose vanished. There was no longer a danger of Russian aggression against the West. Instead of disbanding, however, NATO took up an array of missions entirely unrelated to its original purpose -- without bothering to define its new role. Relations between the alliance and Moscow are increasingly testy. NATO antagonized Russia in the late 1990s by circumventing the UN Security Council in attacking Russian ally Serbia. Now the alliance continues to poke at Russia by swallowing up former members of the Soviet bloc as fast as it can.

They go on to say in the same context:

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst) and Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 25 Jan 2006, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

The alliance seems poised to intrude further, and the Russian bear is beginning to growl. Nikolai Bordyuzha, spokesman for the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, has made Russia’s views plain enough, warning that NATO bases surrounding Russia would constitute "a potential threat to Russia’s security."

B. Solvency: Eliminating NATO obligations reduces security risks

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst) and Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 25 Jan 2006, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

NATO is much more than a political club. It is a military alliance with serious obligations for the United States. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one member is an attack on all. That means the United States is obligated to defend every member no matter how small, how militarily and economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed that member may be. And those obligations go on forever. Therein lies the danger.

ADVANTAGE 2. Peace and democratic values

A. Significance: There is nothing more NATO can do to further this goal

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, 6 June 2005, "Georgia On Our Mind - Shaking up the expansion teams," NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZDJhMmVjN2UwNTA2MWJjYzIwY2VkNWVjNDhlNmViMTA=>

The era of democracy promotion via European Union and NATO expansion is over. Throughout the 1990s, the West held up the lure of full membership in the key institutions of the Euro-Atlantic world to encourage governments in central and eastern Europe to persevere with their difficult and painful economic and political reforms. Democracy and free-market systems appear to have set down stable roots in the former Soviet bloc—but in so doing, a great strain has been placed on both the Atlantic alliance and the EU.

B. Solvency: Abolishing NATO would promote peace and reclaim the moral high ground

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), 6 Apr 2004, "Don't Expand NATO!" [http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=2256](http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=2256%20) (ellipses in original)

Unfortunately, as with most bureaucracies, the end of NATO’s mission did not mean the end of NATO. Instead, heads of NATO member states gathered in 1999 desperately attempting to devise new missions for the outdated and adrift alliance. This is where NATO moved from being a defensive alliance respecting the sovereignty of its members to an offensive and interventionist organization, concerned now with "economic, social and political difficulties...ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states," in the words of the Washington 1999 Summit. And we saw the fruits of this new NATO mission in the former Yugoslavia, where the US, through NATO, attacked a sovereign state that threatened neither the United States nor its own neighbors. In Yugoslavia, NATO abandoned the claim it once had to the moral high ground.

ADVANTAGE 3. The transatlantic link

A. Significance: NATO fails to achieve a good transatlantic link

Ted Galen Carpenter, (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, author or editor of five books on NATO), 28 June 2004, "NATO: A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage," <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2712>

NATO since the end of the Cold War is reminiscent of a married couple that has drifted apart. Some couples will do almost anything to avoid facing the troubling reality that the marriage no longer works. They may purchase a new home or even decide to have a child to hold the relationship together. Instead of confronting the question of whether an elaborate, formal transatlantic alliance makes sense in the fluid post-Cold War era, NATO has acted like a married couple in denial.

B. Solvency: "Coalitions of the willing" are a more effective approach to transatlantic linkage

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2005, "NATO and the European Union," CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, p. 4

The allied debate over pre-emptive attack, out-of-area engagement, and "legitimization" of military operations has been brought to a head by the Bush Administration's frustration with cumbersome alliance decision-making procedures. The Administration believes that NATO military actions should mostly be conducted by "coalitions of the willing." In this view, the allies, of which only a small number have deployable forces capable of high-intensity conflict, should use coalitions of member states that agree upon a threat and have the means to counter it.

2A EVIDENCE: ABOLISH NATO

INHERENCY

Status Quo is committed to NATO

Tom Barry (Policy Director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center), 1 Apr 2004, "Long Live NATO," INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CENTER, <http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2004/0404nato.php>

Given that most European nations lack strong militaries of their own and that EU still lacks a unified security infrastructure, the ever-expanding NATO operating under U.S. direction will likely remain an effective instrument of U.S. hegemony, not only in North Atlantic but also from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea, and from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf.

HARMS

NATO increases the risk of war with Russia

William A. Niskanen, 13 Dec 2005, "Alternative Political and Economic Futures for Europe," M.R. STEFANIK CONSERVATIVE INSTITUTE LECTURES, <http://www.institute.sk/article.php?826>

Article V obligates every member government to respond to an attack on any NATO country. This probably increases the risk of a NATO war with Russia, now that the three Baltic countries on the Russian border are now NATO members. Each of these countries includes a substantial number of ethnic Russians, and a dispute with Russia over their treatment or a minor border issue increases the risk of a major war with Russia over issues that are not of general concern to the other member governments; the three Baltic countries clearly add more liabilities than assets to NATO.

NATO doesn't promote security: It defeats Europe's own security initiatives

Jonathan Steele, 8 Nov 2004, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper)

Nato, in short, has become a threat to Europe. Its existence also acts as a continual drag on Europe's efforts to build its own security institutions. Certain member countries, particularly Britain, constantly look over their shoulders for fear of upsetting big brother. This has an inhibiting effect on every initiative.

NATO doesn't promote security: Can't protect against the real threats

Jonathan Steele, 8 Nov 2004, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper)

So it makes no sense that the largest and most powerful European states, those who are most able to defend themselves, should cling to outdated anxiety and the notion that their ultimate security depends on the US. Do we really need American nuclear weapons to protect us against terrorists or so-called rogue states? The last time Europe was in dire straits, as Nazi tanks swept across the continent in 1939 and 1940, the US stayed on the sidelines until Pearl Harbor.

NATO doesn't promote democracy

John Laughland (trustee of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group), 1 Apr 2004, quoted in "Long Live NATO," INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CENTER, [http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2004/0404nato.php](http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2004/0404nato.php%20) (brackets in original)

"Far from promoting democracy in eastern Europe, Washington is promoting a system of political and military control not unlike that once practiced by the Soviet Union. Unlike that empire, which collapsed because the center was weaker than the periphery, the new NATO is both a mechanism for extracting Danegeld [tribute levied to support Danish invaders in medieval England] from new member states for the benefit of the U.S. arms industry and an instrument for getting others to protect U.S. interests around the world, including the supply of primary resources such as oil."

NATO doesn't promote peace: it gets more nations into wars

Jonathan Steele, 8 Nov 2004, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper)

But it is wrong to be complacent about Nato's alleged impotence or irrelevance. Nato gives the US a significant instrument for moral and political pressure. Europe is automatically expected to tag along in going to war, or in the post-conflict phase, as in Afghanistan or Iraq.

NATO is counterproductive and should be abolished

Jonathan Steele, 8 Nov 2004, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper) ["droit de regard" is a French expression meaning "right to monitor," i.e., the right to watch over someone else]

We must go all the way, up to the termination of Nato. An alliance which should have wound up when the Soviet Union collapsed now serves almost entirely as a device for giving the US an unfair and unreciprocated droit de regard over European foreign policy.

Peace and democratic values: Cannot be imposed from the outside

Francis Fukuyama (teaches at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), 19 Feb 2006, "After Neoconservatism," NEW YORK TIMES

By definition, outsiders can't "impose" democracy on a country that doesn't want it; demand for democracy and reform must be domestic. Democracy promotion is therefore a long-term and opportunistic process that has to await the gradual ripening of political and economic conditions to be effective.

SOLVENCY

Transatlantic link: US needs European allies, but it doesn't need all of them

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., 4 Oct 2004, "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," Backgrounder #1803, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, <www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1803.cfm>

Whatever the global issue—be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Doha free trade round, Iran’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Arab–Israeli conflict, or Iraq—the United States simply cannot act effec­tively without the support of at least some Euro­pean powers. But neither is the world one in which a concert of powers dominates. Whatever the issue, the U.S. remains first among equals. This global power reality makes America’s courting of allies vital while also confirming U.S. leadership.

Security: Europe doesn't need US protection

Maj. Thomas S. Mowle (Associate Prof. of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy), Sept 2004, "Why We Must Take European Opinion Seriously," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9

We can, if we wish, mock the Europeans for believing that they live in a militarily safe world. However, they in fact do live in a militarily safe world. Russia is many years away from being a realistic threat to the Union, and there are no other countries that have a capability of attacking them with anything other than ballistic missiles. Europeans are threatened by terrorism, but they do not regard terrorism as primarily a military problem. They can cooperate among themselves without NATO, and even without NATO the Union and United States would retain an interest in cooperation. They are more than capable of building forces for any other contingencies.

Security: Coalitions of the willing are a working substitute for NATO

Cato Institute, Dec 2004, CATO HANDBOOK ON POLICY, Chap. 53 - Transatlantic Relations, p. 533

Britain and Canada contributed small contingents to fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and Germany and Turkey have stepped forward to help to stabilize postwar Afghanistan. And the British, of course, have contributed a substantial military contingent to fight alongside U.S. forces in Iraq. All of those contributions, however, have been made on an individual (that is, national) basis, not through the alliance. And a strong case can be made that even if there were no NATO, Washington would have been able to assemble the same limited ‘‘coalition of the willing.’’

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Ending NATO would not hurt anti-terrorism efforts or reduce global security

Jonathan Steele, 8 Nov 2004, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper)

Ending Nato would not mean that Europe rejects good relations with the US. Nor does it rule out police and intelligence collaboration on issues of concern, such as the way to protect our countries against terrorism. Europe could still join the US in war, if there was an international consensus and the electorates of individual countries supported it.

Europe can get along fine without NATO

Cato Institute, Dec 2004, CATO HANDBOOK ON POLICY, Chap. 53 - Transatlantic Relations, p. 536

American attitudes toward the emergence of a truly independent Europe traditionally have reflected a profound ambivalence. Policymakers should overcome that ambivalence and endorse the EU’s efforts to forge an independent foreign and security policy. The price of European independence is bound to be less than the price of Europe’s continuing subordination to the United States, which is bound to fan resentment (albeit of a different kind) on both sides of the Atlantic.

Ending NATO will not end US support for Europe

Rajan Menon (Fellow, New America Foundation), 1 July 2003, World Policy Journal, "The End of Alliances," <www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=2119>

The commonly heard argument that the end of NATO will inevitably erode the American position in Europe is hardly persuasive. To return to Lord Ismay, the Germans are "down" (in the sense that they are integrated into the EU and have used cooperation as the watchword for dealings with their neighbors for over 50 years); the Russians are "out" (the idea that Russia, mired in innumerable domestic problems, poses a threat to the Baltic states or the states of East-Central Europe is farfetched, as evidenced by the very small proportion of their budgets that these states have devoted to defense spending since 1991); and the United States can remain "in" Europe and contribute to its stability in many ways without stationing thousands of troops there.

ENOUGH ALREADY: THE CASE FOR STOPPING NATO EXPANSION

NATO won the Cold War as an alliance dedicated to deterring Soviet aggression. The "Evil Empire" went away, but NATO did not -- in fact, it continues to grow. Because the risks of NATO expansion outweigh the benefits, my partner and I are happy to affirm: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS and ANALYSIS

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm) *)*

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

We aren't going to claim that if you don't vote Affirmative then four nuclear wars will happen. Instead, we will prove that the Status Quo takes four unnecessary risks with NATO expansion. If we prove to you that there is a Comparative Advantage to ending NATO expansion because it will present less risk than the Status Quo, then we will have justified an Affirmative ballot.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO is committed to expansion

A. Georgia and Ukraine

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst) and Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 25 Jan 2006, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

On the heels of "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, those countries -- both of which have prickly relations with Russia -- have cozied up to NATO, much to the delight of NATO enthusiasts and Russophobes. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told Ukrainian leaders in October that NATO’s door "was, is, and remains open" to Ukraine.

Logan and Carpenter go on to say in the same context...

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst) and Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 25 Jan 2006, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO INSTITUTE, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

By November, Scheffer was using his same line to discuss potential Georgian membership: "Needless to say that NATO's door is open."

B. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia

US Department of State, Embassy of the United States in London, 10 April 2006, "Current Issues: NATO," [www.usembassy.org.uk/nato.html](http://www.usembassy.org.uk/nato.html)

The U.S. Department of State issued a fact sheet on the Adriatic Charter, a pact signed by former Secretary of State Colin Powell and the foreign ministers of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia on May 2, 2003. The charter reinforces continued U.S. support for the alliance's "Open Door," underscoring the goal of fully integrating Albania, Croatia and Macedonia into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

C. The NATO treaty allows ongoing expansion indefinitely

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 9 May 2006, NATO TOPICS, "Enlargement," <www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html>

Enlargement is in fact an on-going and dynamic process, based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area".

OBSERVATION 3. HARMS: NATO expansion creates four serious and unnecessary risks

Risk 1: Disrupting stability in Eastern Europe by encouraging violation of international law

Christopher Boian, 8 June 2006, "Russia warns on NATO expansion," AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE [http://www.washtimes.com/world/20060607-093813-3413r.htm](http://www.washtimes.com/world/20060607-093813-3413r.htm%20) (brackets added)

The lower house of [the Russian] parliament, the Duma, overwhelmingly approved a "message" to the parliament of Ukraine expressing the "serious concern" of the Russian legislature at Kiev's goal of joining NATO. Ukraine's drive to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a violation of a 1997 Russia-Ukraine treaty and, if fulfilled, "would have negative consequences for the entire range of relations between our two fraternal peoples," the Duma message said.

Risk 2: Dangerous consequences from US interventionism

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), 6 Apr 2004, "Don't Expand NATO!" [http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=2256](http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=2256%20) (ellipses in original)

The further expansion of NATO is in reality a cover for increased US interventionism in Europe and beyond. It will be a conduit for more unconstitutional US foreign aid and US interference in the internal politics of member nations, especially the new members from the former East.

The impact to this risk is global destabilization caused by setting a moral example of hegemony and intervention that we do not want other nations to follow.

Francis Fukuyama (teaches at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), 19 Feb 2006, "After Neoconservatism," NEW YORK TIMES

There were other reasons as well why the world did not accept American benevolent hegemony. In the first place, it was premised on American exceptionalism, the idea that America could use its power in instances where others could not because it was more virtuous than other countries. The doctrine of pre-emption against terrorist threats contained in the 2002 National Security Strategy was one that could not safely be generalized through the international system; America would be the first country to object if Russia, China, India or France declared a similar right of unilateral action.

Risk 3. NATO risks becoming too big to be effective or successful

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, 6 June 2005, "Georgia On Our Mind - Shaking up the expansion teams," NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE,<http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZDJhMmVjN2UwNTA2MWJjYzIwY2VkNWVjNDhlNmViMTA=>

The EU, having expanded to encompass more than 450 million people, is reaching its saturation point. And digesting the Balkans—bringing states like Serbia and Croatia into NATO, and Romania and Bulgaria into the EU—may prove to be the straw that breaks the camel's back. NATO and the EU cannot continue to expand indefinitely and remain cohesive, successful organizations.

Risk 4. Colossal breakdown of US relations with Russia

Christopher Boian, 8 June 2006, "Russia warns on NATO expansion" AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20060607-093813-3413r.htm>

Russia issued a sharp warning yesterday to the United States and the former Soviet republics looking to join NATO, saying expansion of the bloc into lands the Kremlin considers its back yard would have a "colossal" and negative effect. In a statement to the Russian parliament, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that "membership in NATO for countries like Ukraine or Georgia would mean a colossal geopolitical shift" and would compel Moscow to respond to safeguard its security and other national interests.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following plan, to be implemented by NATO member governments and the North Atlantic Council:

Plank 1: Mandates:

NATO will discontinue all negotiations and offers of membership to any new countries not already in the alliance.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic treaty shall be amended to ban any future expansion of the alliance.

Plank 2: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any public official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 3: This plan will operate within existing budgets. No increase in funding is needed.

Plank 4: Timeline. This plan takes effect immediately upon an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 5: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1. Upholding respect for international law reduces global risks

Richard Falk (visiting professor of global studies at Univ. of Calif. Santa Barbara), 21 Sept 2005, "The Abandonment of International Law After 9/11," Presentation to the Congressional Black Caucus Annual Legislative Conference, Washington D.C., <www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/09/21_falk_abandonment-international-law.htm>

In a globalizing world of great complexity it is in the interest of all states, large and small, that their relations be reliably regulated by international law. This observation underpins the daily operations of the world economy and many other aspects of international behavior, including maritime safety, environmental protection, tourism, immigration, disease control. The stability of international life depends on a closely woven fabric of law as the basis for almost all activity beyond the borders of a sovereign state.

ADVANTAGE 2. Reversing interventionist foreign policy reduces risk for the United States

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst for Cato Institute and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy), 9 Feb 2006, "The 'Isolationism' Canard," SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, <www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5547>

Bush’s belief that our security is contingent on congenial political arrangements in all foreign countries, no matter how obscure or strategically irrelevant they may be, is both wrong and dangerous. George F. Kennan, perhaps the senior American statesman of the 20th century, remarked in 1999 that "this whole tendency to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes me as unthought-through, vainglorious and undesirable." By contrast, Kennan argued that American foreign policy is at its best when it is "very modest and restrained."

ADVANTAGE 3. Better relations with Russia wins essential help on big international problems

Stephen Sestanovich (Project Director) and the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, 2006, "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do," REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE, p. 3

U.S.-Russian cooperation can help the United States to handle some of the most difficult challenges it faces: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tight energy markets, climate change, the drug trade, infectious diseases, and human trafficking. These problems are more manageable when the United States has Russia on its side rather than aligned against it.

2A EVIDENCE: STOP NATO EXPANSION

INHERENCY

NATO has an open-door policy on expansion

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 9 May 2006, "Enlargement," <www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html>

NATO has an open door policy on enlargement. Any European country in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance, when invited to do so by the existing member countries.

**More countries are lining up to join NATO**

Prof. Dr. Helga Haftendorn (Professor Emerita, Free University of Berlin), 11 July 2005, "Transatlantic Partnerships: Geographical Expansion and Global Relationships," speech transcript, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050711f.htm](www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050711f.htm%20) (ellipses in original)

The question is: how much further should NATO enlarge? There are three countries waiting at the doorstep: Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. They all three have signed a membership act... the Membership Action Plan, but as the Secretary said, there is no timeframe set. It will depend on when and whether they fulfill the criteria. But there are some other countries waiting out there, and have argued for NATO membership: Georgia and Moldavia, and my Polish friends have argued for membership of the Ukraine.

HARMS

NATO expansion hurts relations with Russia

MosNews (Russian news agency), 3 June 2006, "Putin Challenges U.S. on Human Rights, NATO Expansion," <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/06/03/putintalks.shtml>

Putin also emphasized that Moscow feels threatened by the expansion of NATO membership to former Soviet bloc states and NATO involvement in the Middle East. NATO now leads a multinational force in Afghanistan." When the military structure of NATO comes close to our borders, we react. Why should this happen in this world? It’s no longer a world of two systems," he said.

NATO expansion is the biggest threat to Russia since World War 2

Sergei Blagov, 5 May 2004, "''Russia Views N.A.T.O. Expansion as a Strategic Threat'' POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=166&language_id=1>

Russia fears that N.A.T.O. will go on expanding and the next round of expansion could involve Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries, completing what is seen in Moscow as the geopolitical encirclement of Russia. Some Russian commentators say that the eastward expansion of N.A.T.O. constitutes the biggest threat to their country since the Second World War.

Russian fears of NATO expansion are reasonable

The Economist (British news magazine), 15 June 2006, "Surrounding Russia," <http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=7064507>

Still, Russia's worries are partly genuine, and not altogether unreasonable. America would be concerned, argues Mr Nikonov, if Mexico and Canada were to join a military organization led by Russia.

NATO expansion is deceptive, provocative and dangerous

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Clinton's other unwise decision was to break the Bush Administration's promise to Soviet Russia in 1990-91 not to expand NATO "one inch to the east" and instead begin its expansion to Russia's borders. From that profound act of bad faith, followed by others, came the dangerously provocative military encirclement of Russia and growing Russian suspicions of US intentions. Thus, while American journalists and even scholars insist that "the cold war has indeed vanished" and that concerns about a new one are "silly," Russians across the political spectrum now believe that in Washington "the cold war did not end" and, still more, that "the US is imposing a new cold war on Russia."

NATO expansion = corporate welfare and wasted defense spending

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), 6 Apr 2004, "Don't Expand NATO!" [http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=2256](http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=2256%20) (ellipses in original)

It will also mean more corporate welfare at home. As we know, NATO membership demands a minimum level of military spending of its member states. For NATO’s new members, the burden of significantly increased military spending when there are no longer external threats is hard to meet. Unfortunately, this is where the US government steps in, offering aid and subsidized loans to these members so they can purchase more unneeded and unnecessary military equipment. In short, it is nothing more than corporate welfare for the US military industrial complex.

Admitting Ukraine to NATO will start another Cold War with Russia

Alexei Makarkin (deputy director general of the Center for Political Technologies writing for RIA Novosti, Russian news agency), 5 May 2006, "Ukraine headed for NATO" <www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-104-36.cfm>

The admission of the Baltic countries to NATO alarmed mostly the Russian establishment, because the general public in the Soviet Union had regarded them as "Western" republics. But Ukraine's accession will most certainly provoke sharp anti-Western sentiments in the Russian elite and the public. The psychological injury will fan the siege mentality, which is only a step away from another, though slightly different, cold war.

Expansion puts harmful burdens on new countries

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 90

As a result, "since their accession on March 12, 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all experienced integration difficulties," because the real demands of economic and social issues lead to "economic constraints" and "a failure of political will." And still, NATO and EU authorities continue to press these strapped economies to live up to difficult and at times mutually exclusive commitments that undermine pressing economic and social programs.

Joining NATO actually worsens security for Central and Eastern European countries

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 91

In addition, NATO membership—including vulnerability to Western arms merchants—damages the ability of these countries to deal with genuine emerging security issues. Issues of social and economic justice, crime and corruption, environmental degradation, and ethnic reconciliation bear more directly on the security futures of these countries than does their struggle to satisfy NATO’s arcane demands for membership. Consequently, instead of pressing these countries to spend scarce resources on NATO, Washington should encourage them to focus exclusively on European and regional organizations that are better geared to help address the real, pressing interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Expansion blocks Russian cooperation on international issues

Sergei Blagov, 5 May 2004, "''Russia Views N.A.T.O. Expansion as a Strategic Threat'' POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=166&language_id=1>

On March 29, N.A.T.O. expanded to 26 states, incorporating seven new members. Now Moscow argues that N.A.T.O.'s move eastward contradicted its pledge to enhance cooperation with Russia in counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, peacekeeping and other areas, contained in the 2002 agreement. N.A.T.O., in turn, has blamed Russia for failing to fulfill its pledge to withdraw its troops from the former Soviet states of Georgia and Moldova. Moscow argues that Georgia and Moldova are unrelated to the C.F.E.

NATO is provoking a war with Russia

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Above all, the growing presence of Western bases and US-backed governments in the former Soviet republics has moved the "front lines" of the conflict, in the alarmed words of a Moscow newspaper, from Germany to Russia's "near abroad." As a "hostile ring tightens around the Motherland," in the view of former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, many different Russians see a mortal threat. Putin's chief political deputy, Vladislav Surkov, for example, sees the "enemy...at the gates," and the novelist and Soviet-era dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn sees the "complete encirclement of Russia and then the loss of its sovereignty." The risks of direct military conflict could therefore be greater than ever. Protesting overflights by NATO aircraft, a Russian general has already warned, "If they violate our borders, they should be shot down."

SOLVENCY

Respecting international law is essential to uphold democracy

Richard Falk (visiting professor of global studies at Univ. of Calif. Santa Barbara), 21 Sept 2005, "The Abandonment of International Law After 9/11," Presentation to the Congressional Black Caucus Annual Legislative Conference, Washington D.C., <www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/09/21_falk_abandonment-international-law.htm>

It is and should be a requirement of a constitutional democracy in the 21st century that a government’s foreign policy, as well as its domestic behavior, be made subject to the discipline of law. In a globalized world the extension of law to international activity is in the national interest. It keeps our leaders from embarking on geopolitical ventures that are not supported by the citizenry if fully informed.

Ending NATO expansion is the right policy: Stop antagonizing Russia and improve cooperation

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) and Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst), Jan 2006, Cato Institute, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

The West can continue to press forward with NATO expansion indefinitely, antagonizing Russia and entering into security guarantees with countries on its border. But that course is unreasonable if we expect Russia's cooperation on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or other issues vitally important to America. If the United States values those goals, let alone long-term peace with Russia, it needs to engage Moscow, not unnecessarily antagonize it.

Ending NATO expansion is the right policy: Protects US interests

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) and Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst), Jan 2006, Cato Institute, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

NATO boosters ought to close the door of expansion, take a deep breath, and explain what, exactly, NATO's mission is now. Equally important, they need to justify how it is in America's self-interest for the alliance to acquire an ever-expanding roster of fragile and unpredictable client states on Russia's border.

NATO expansion must stop now: We're pushing Russia over the edge and violating democracy in Ukraine

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

In particular, the planned third expansion of NATO, intended to include Ukraine, must not take place. Extending NATO to Russia's doorsteps has already brought relations near the breaking point (without actually benefiting any nation's security); absorbing Ukraine, which Moscow regards as essential to its Slavic identity and its military defense, may be the point of no return, as even pro-US Russians anxiously warn. Nor would it be democratic, since nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians are opposed.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Russian threat doesn't justify NATO expansion: NATO expansion is causing the Russian threat

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

A growing military encirclement of Russia, on and near its borders, by US and NATO bases, which are already ensconced or being planned in at least half the fourteen other former Soviet republics, from the Baltics and Ukraine to Georgia, Azerbaijan and the new states of Central Asia. The result is a US-built reverse iron curtain and the remilitarization of American-Russian relations.

PAPER TIGER: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE

The NATO Response Force (NRF) originated in 2003 as an effort to build European military strength and to project NATO power around the globe in crisis situations. Unfortunately, the NRF is flawed and can never achieve its goals without significant reform. That's why my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and ANALYSIS

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

Significant: "important or noticeable" (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org>)

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

NRF or NATO Response Force: "The NRF, he [General James L. Jones, NATO’s supreme allied commander] explained, is an integrated, combined force of 25,000 land, sea, air and special operations troops, all under one command, certified to handle seven distinct missions from forcible entry to humanitarian assistance." *(U.S. Department of State, Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS,* [*http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html*](http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html)*, brackets added)*

B. Analysis

We will present a goals/criteria case today in which we will show that NRF has specific goals that it cannot meet under the present system, but which could be met with an Affirmative ballot. By "introducing a better method" of organizing the NRF, we will achieve advantages over the Status Quo and justify an Affirmative ballot.

OBSERVATION 2. GOALS: A rapid response military force should achieve 3 important goals

GOAL 1: It should be rapid.

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], <www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec_def/051115_33>

The fully operational NRF is an about 20,000 strong permanently available, multinational and joint force at extremely high readiness. It is supposed to be deployable in 5 days and sustainable for 30 days.

GOAL 2: It should be responsive to modern security threats

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 67

The NATO Response Force (NRF) was intended to make NATO responsive to the security needs of the twenty-first century.

GOAL 3: It should be an effective fighting force

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], <www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec_def/051115_33>

Second, and more important, the NRF is supposed to give NATO high combat readiness forces that can be used against contemporary threats. It is a clear move away from territorial warfare against clearly identifiable enemies towards expeditionary and asymmetric warfare on a global scale.

OBSERVATION 3. PLAN.

Plank 1: Agency: All NATO member governments and their representatives at the North Atlantic Council.

Plank 2: Mandates: The NRF shall be reformed with the following changes:

Decisions to deploy the NRF for up to 120 days shall be made by a majority of the heads of government of NATO members. The NATO unanimous consent rule shall not apply to the NRF.

No parliamentary or UN approval shall be required for the first 4 months of any NRF operation

Troop levels needed to fully staff NRF shall be provided on a proportional basis by all European NATO countries from national militaries and from cuts in contribution to European Union forces

Plank 3: Funding: The funding structure for NRF shall be changed to a common funding pool paid by all NATO members, whether they contribute forces to NRF or not, in proportion to their Gross Domestic Product. Funding shall come from member nations' governments in an optimal mix of the following: Cuts in public education spending, cuts in funding to the European Union military forces, cuts in agricultural subsidies, and general national revenues. No net increase in spending shall occur as a result of this plan, only a redistribution of donor sources.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 4. ADVANTAGES.

ADVANTAGE 1: Rapid response is the best response

A. Inherency: Current decision-making structures and attitudes prevent rapid response

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 69 (brackets added)

For her part, the French Defense Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie said that, although she supported the concept, the [NRF] force should not operate outside Europe, be used in a pre-emptive manner, or operate without a UN mandate. The political requirements of first securing a UN mandate and then parliamentary approval from the states involved would seem to take the "rapid" out of any rapid reaction force.

B. Solvency: Overcoming political delays achieves the advantage of rapid response

Norway Ministry of Defense, 2004, "NATO Response Force – A modern and flexible force" <http://odin.dep.no/fd/english/news/news/010051-990036/dok-bn.html>

The NRF’s ability to respond rapidly is thus dependent on the political will of the member nations to make this possible. This rapid reaction capability will, at the same time, demonstrate the decisiveness of the Alliance, so helping to pave the way for the timely resolution of what might otherwise be an escalating crisis. Speedy decisions regarding deployment of the NRF may therefore obviate the need to commit larger forces at a later time.

ADVANTAGE 2. A more responsive force

A. Inherency: NRF is subject to massive political restrictions

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 68 (brackets added)

Although he [Joschka Fischer, the German minister of foreign affairs] said the force was needed to deal with the "nightmare of a major terrorist attack," Fischer said that Germany could only provide troops for such a force under three conditions:

The NATO Council would have to maintain the right to decide on deploying the rapid reaction force;

Germany’s Parliament would first have to approve any deployment before troops went into combat;

Any NATO force would have to be compatible with the planned 60,000-member European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force due to be set up the following year.

B. Solvency: Removing political restrictions is essential to making NRF responsive

Lt. Col. Carsten Helmut Jahnel (German Army), June 2005 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey Calif., "Relations -- Are Alliances a Function of an External Threat?" p. 74

In addition, it is necessary to make sure that the effectiveness of the elaborately compiled NRF intervention force is not restricted by national provisos and political- decision processes, which must be accommodated. This is valid for parliamentary procedures in the member states and for the mechanisms in the corresponding NATO caucus. Up to the present, all members have intended that the principle of unanimity of NATO would also be valid for NRF missions. The question as to the legitimacy of NRF missions also has to be clarified. NATO commander General James Jones was right when he stated that "in the future nations would have to consider whether the opposition of one or two nations could continually stymie the will of the majority."

ADVANTAGE 3. An effective NRF combat force increases global peace and security

A. Inherency: Appropriate forces will not be available due to NATO funding rules

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs), 12 May 2005, NATO and the European Union," CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, p. 6 (brackets added)

[Supreme Allied Commander] General Jones has pressed an idea that more NATO assets be funded jointly to ensure availability of needed equipment and forces. Today, NATO for the most part follows the concept of "costs lie where they fall," meaning that governments pay the costs for forces they send into an operation, such as in Kosovo in 1999. Such a practice translates into the larger countries with more military capabilities and political will bearing disproportionate costs in providing security for all. General Jones is urging that more assets, as is already the case with AWACS, be funded jointly. Otherwise, he believes that NATO risks failing to develop appropriate forces, such as the NRF, as governments decline to contribute troops because they might be used for expensive operations.

B. Solvency: When NRF works, it will counter threats to peace and security

Elizabeth G. Book, 29 Nov 2003, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union," p. 3 (ellipses in original)

Indeed, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. James Jones said that the force's stand-up was one of the most important changes in NATO's structure since the signing of the Washington Treaty. His optimism about the good the force would be able to perform was clear. "Today...we have taken a major step forward in creating the expeditionary capability, essential to countering the globalization of new threats to peace and security," Jones said.

2A EVIDENCE: NRF REFORM

DEFINITIONS

Description of NRF + how NRF works

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 69

The NRF is a joint and combined force of about 20,000 troops composed of national contributions. The ground element will be brigade-sized with special force units, a joint naval force, and when fully functional will be capable of 200 combat sorties a day. It should be ready to deploy within five days, and have sufficient organic logistics to operate for thirty days. The force will have a period of unit training, then six months of interoperability training, followed by six months on standby or deployment.

TOPICALITY

Significance: NRF is the most significant development in NATO history

Elizabeth G. Book, 29 Nov 2003, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union," p. 3 (brackets added; the entire context of the article is about the NRF]

Indeed, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. James Jones said that the [NRF] force's stand-up was one of the most important changes in NATO's structure since the signing of the Washington Treaty.

SOLVENCY

Expeditionary power is essential to defend shared values of 1/2 billion people

Daniel P. Fata (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy), 3 May 2006, testimony before House International Relations Committee Sub-Committee on Europe & Emerging Threats, "The Road to NATO’s Riga Summit – Consolidating and Advancing Transformation" p. 8

If the Alliance is able to achieve all of these initiatives, it will have taken significant strides toward making itself into a truly expeditionary organization. Allies will have shown that they recognize that the changed security environment of the post-9/11 era requires new thinking, resources, and capabilities in order to continue to defend the Euro-Atlantic territory and the shared values of over half a billion people. Allies will have expanded their vision and capacity to protect security and stability well beyond their borders.

NRF increases peacekeeping and fights terrorism

NATO Allied Command Operations, 25 Sep 2003, "The NATO Response Force – NRF," <www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/030820.htm>

The NRF is the way ahead and puts the spirit of Prague into practical application.NATO leaders recognized that modern, flexible, rapidly deployable joint, meaning sea, land and air forces are required to meet and defeat today’s asymmetrical threats, the most notable one being terrorism. The force will also encompass the longstanding peace enforcement and peace building experience the member nations have acquired up over many years.

NRF works for multiple essential missions

NATO Allied Command Operations, 25 Sep 2003, "The NATO Response Force – NRF," <www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/030820.htm>

The missions for the NRF are yet to be determined, however the global reach is an important element, especially today as NATO forces are committed in Kabul, the Balkans including Kosovo and the Mediterranean. However the NRF will deploy when and where necessary, in support of the collective will of the Alliance. Non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian crisis, crisis response including peacekeeping, counter terrorism, and embargo operations are all potential missions.

NRF significantly improves NATO's capabilities

NATO Allied Command Operations, 25 Sep 2003, "The NATO Response Force – NRF," <www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/030820.htm>

The NRF provides the Alliance with a comprehensive set of sea, land and air resources, highly trained and capable of immediate response wherever and whenever they are required. In General Jones’ words, "Through successful integration, you get a more capable force that can accomplish more things. The symmetry gained from the cohesion of the sea, land and air resources allows forces to operate at greater distances, more efficiently and more successfully than operating in isolation or parallel situations."

INHERENCY

NRF is under-funded in Status Quo and future commitments are in jeopardy

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 78

Moreover, even the richer countries will find their defense budgets under increasing pressure in the face of mounting social costs. The recent German defense reform called for a division of forces into those capable of intervention, stabilization, and homeland defense. The Germans intend to fund 17,000 forces capable for intervention—only enough to meet the requirements of both the EU rapid response force and the NATO Response Force. However, successive German governments have revised their defense budgets downward, and the expensive intervention forces may prove a lucrative target in the future.

Political factors prevent effective use of NRF: Slow decision-making

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 79

However prepared the forces themselves may be, political factors may prevent them from being used rapidly, if at all. The October 2003 NATO exercise (called a "study seminar" because of political sensitivities, rather than a "war game" or "exercise") made clear that political procedures for authorizing the use of force could severely hamper the deployment and use of forces. An attempt to streamline that process in Germany ran into political obstacles. Thus, the speed with which NATO could respond to a crisis depends on political factors.

Political factors prevent effective use of NRF: Waiting for UN approval

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 79

Even for those countries that do not need parliamentary approval for short-term deployments, such as France, there remain questions as to whether UN authorization is required. If recent history is any guide, unanimity within the UN Security Council may be slow in coming, if it comes at all. It is certain most countries are uncomfortable with the notion of pre-emptive strikes.

Unanimity requirement blocks NATO action

Nicola de Santis, (NATO Coordinator for Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), 3 June 2005, "NATO’s Role in Gulf Security and US interests—How will NATO proceed with the partnerships? What does the US get out of NATO-GCC cooperation?" p. 10 (ellipses in original)

Indeed, in order to have a NATO decision, you need to have consensus and in order to achieve that all of the countries compromise. Each country…it is not important how big you are. Iceland does not have military forces at all and it is part of NATO. If Iceland wants to block a decision with the NATO Council, they can do that. So one country can block the achievement of consensus.

NRF is not an effective combat force today

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 78

However effective a vehicle the NRF may be for transformation, it is unlikely to be used for sustained force-entry brigade-sized expeditionary operations. Fortunately, the requirement for such operations remains low. The NRF may be used for show operations, such as the European Rapid Reaction Force conducted in Rwanda in June 2003, but it is unlikely to be deployed in any situation where there is a clear risk of combat.

European budget pressures and over-reliance on the US weaken NRF today

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 79

The NRF will continue to rely on U.S. capabilities to top up the force at least until 2010, and perhaps much longer than that. This reliance on the U.S., along with budgetary pressures, may delay European procurement decisions even longer, and adversely affect the process of European defense transformation.

European defense budgets are not enough to support expeditionary capability

NATO Press Release, 9 June 2005, "Final Communique," Ministerial Meeting Of The Defence Planning Committee And The Nuclear Planning Group Held In Brussels On Thursday, 9 June 2005, <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-075e.htm>

For the first time in recent years, over half of our nations are also projecting increases in defence funding, and most of the remainder expect at least to maintain current levels of expenditure, in real terms. However, in the face of increasing operational costs, defence budgets are still in many cases inadequate to meet the needs of the essential restructuring and modernisation. Most Allies have made progress in realigning force structures for modern requirements, but significant potential remains for restructuring and for reinvestment of defence funds in robust, usable expeditionary capabilities.

Europeans aren't allocating enough troops and funding to NRF

Deutsche Presse-Agentur, (German news agency), 8 June 2006, "NATO vows rise in Afghan troops, tough response to rebels" [http://news.monstersandcritics.com/southasia/article\_1171086.php/NATO\_vows\_rise\_in\_Afghan\_troops\_tough\_response\_to\_rebels](http://news.monstersandcritics.com/southasia/article_1171086.php/NATO_vows_rise_in_Afghan_troops_tough_response_to_rebels%20)

The 25,000-strong force, part of NATO's transformation from a Cold War defence alliance into a modern security organization, is designed to be rapidly deployable to global hotspots and used for anti-terror operations. But diplomats have warned that plans to set up the force are being hampered by several governments' reluctance to earmark soldiers and funds for the enterprise.

NO PLACE LIKE HOME: THE CASE FOR BANNING "OUT-OF-AREA" MISSIONS

NATO was once a vital part of US and Western European foreign policy, guaranteeing the security and freedom of Western Europe. But times have changed. Today NATO finds itself in adventures that are far beyond the scope of its charter and beyond the limits of its competency. That's why my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and RESOLUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

Reform: "to put or change into an improved form or condition" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

OOA or Out of Area Missions: "In 2003 NATO embarked on its first truly out-of-area mission in Afghanistan. In 2004 NATO took on an additional out of area mission training Iraqi troops in Iraq and other countries in the region. These missions raise important questions that impact on the future direction of the Alliance and its role in providing stability beyond the borders of its members." *(Julio Miranda-Calha, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2005, "168 DSC 05 E - NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS,"* [*www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=670*](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=670)*)*

B. Analysis

We will present a harms/advantages case today in which we will show that NATO is failing to meet certain goals, and that it could better meet them under our plan. Our plan will meet the resolution by introducing reforms that allow NATO to achieve significant advantages.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO is committed to out-of-area missions

A. NATO has a policy of expanding OOA missions

Cato Handbook on Policy, Dec 2004, "Transatlantic Relations," Cato Institute, p. 532

At the same time—especially during the Clinton administration—NATO undertook a process of ‘‘double

enlargement.’’ One prong of that double enlargement was expansion of the alliance’s membership; the former Soviet satellite states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted. The other prong was an expansion of NATO’s missions to include maintaining regional stability in Europe (and its peripheries), addressing ‘‘out-of-area’’ threats to the alliance’s members, and combating terrorism.

B. Global pressure will increase OOAs in the future

Rebecca Ford Mitchell, (US State Department, Staff Writer), 26 June 2004, "Ambitious Agenda Set for NATO's Istanbul Summit," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=June&x=20040626062759frllehctim0.659588&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html>

Because it has been able, for more than half a century, to back political decisions with military action successfully, NATO is regarded as the premiere force for projecting stability into the rest of the world. This success, however, is likely to increase the demand for its forces -- as happened in March, when U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited NATO to consider taking on peace enforcement operations in some African countries preceding the initiation of U.N. activities.

C. OOAs create open-ended military commitments and unlimited venues for military intervention

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas (Senior Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy), Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006, "N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," p. 1

N.A.T.O.'s 1999 Strategic Concept. With this concept, the alliance ensures stability in the Euro-Atlantic Region. The document, however, does not state what the boundaries are of this region. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Kosovo conflict, N.A.T.O. can act even without consent of the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.). These entries in the Strategic Concept -- from Russia's point of view -- provide the alliance with a carte blanche to use military force wherever considered necessary.

OBSERVATION 3. HARMS. OOA Missions weaken NATO and hurt the United States

A. OOAs are divisive because Europe has neither the power nor the will to support them

Cato Handbook on Policy, Dec 2004, "Transatlantic Relations," Cato Institute, p. 532

Why has the ‘‘new’’ NATO been such a bust? There are three reasons. First, the military capabilities of the European NATO members are limited. Second, the European members of NATO do not share Washington’s view of out-of-area threats. Third, Washington has deliberately chosen to bypass the alliance, because it wants to maximize its own strategic freedom of action and it regards the European NATO military capabilities as a drag on American power, rather than as a contributor to it.

B. OOAs prevent achievement of Prague Capabilities Commitment

Robert G. Bell, Sept-Oct 2005, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, "NATO's transformation scorecard," <http://www.cast.ru/eng/journal/2005/5_2005_3/> (brackets added)

In addition, as NATO Allies (including the United States) increasingly allocate defense spending to the operations and maintenance prerequisites of expanded global operations, this priority is beginning to crowd out funding that might otherwise be earmarked for the longer-term PCC [Prague Capabilities Commitment] modernization programs.

C. Unlimited military intervention increases terrorism

Ivan Eland (Senior Fellow at The Independent Institute, Director of the Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty), 10 Oct 2005, "Cheney’s Counterproductive Policy Toward Terrorists" <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1584>(brackets added)

Experts on terrorism always say that where terrorism exists, there is an underlying grievance. Anti-U.S. terrorists’ grievance is normally U.S. foreign policy—especially U.S. meddling in the affairs of other nations, usually with the threat or actual use of military force. Every one of the seven attacks on [Vice President Dick] Cheney’s list was motivated by retaliation for U.S. interventionism.

OBSERVATION 4. PLAN.

Plank 1: Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at the North Atlantic Council.

Plank 2: Mandates:

NATO shall amend its charter to permanently block any future deployment of its military forces for any reason outside the borders of its member countries or, in time of hostilities, countries that directly border a NATO member.

This plan shall apply to all future deployments but shall not interrupt any deployments in progress at the time of an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 3: This plan reduces future missions and expenses of NATO and does not require any increase in funding.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect immediately upon an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES.

ADVANTAGE 1: A united NATO is a better vehicle for globally promoting values of democracy and freedom

Kurt Volker (Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" speech at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

Second, we know that our policies must be anchored squarely on our core values, the values of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, economic freedom. Advancing freedom, promoting democracy – this is at the heart of our foreign policy. Third, we know the value of the world’s core democratic community speaking with a united and clear voice. We need to work together with Europe as a single democratic, transatlantic community – not just for our combined resources, but for our combined political weight, which embodies a critical mass of moral authority that exceeds what each of us can provide individually.

ADVANTAGE 2. Achieving the Prague Capabilities Commitment increases Western security

Dr. Peter Struck (Minister of Defense, Germany), 2 Aug 2003, "NATO's Future Role," Munich Conference on Security Policy, <www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?id=106&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&>

A focused capabilities initiative, the "Prague Capabilities Commitment" (PCC), in which individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments, improves NATO's capability to react and take action. It puts NATO in a better position to deal with complex hazards and threats, whatever their origin. This includes both better protection against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic means of delivery and an Alliance contribution to combating international terrorism.

ADVANTAGE 3. Reduction in anti-US terrorism worldwide

Ivan Eland (Senior Fellow at The Independent Institute, Director of the Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty), 10 Oct 2005, "Cheney’s Counterproductive Policy Toward Terrorists" <www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1584>

If Vice President Cheney wants to stop terrorism, an endless escalation of tit-for-tat retaliation will not do. With the Cold War ended, the United States no longer needs such an interventionist foreign policy. Adopting a policy of military restraint overseas would bring many advantages, one of which is less anti-U.S. terrorism at home and abroad.

2A EVIDENCE: BAN OUT-OF-AREA MISSIONS

INHERENCY

NATO mission in Afghanistan is increasing

David I. McKeeby and David Denny (Staff writers), Mar 2006, US State Department, "Bush Thanks NATO for Support in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, [http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2006/Mar/20-329745.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2006/Mar/20-329745.html%20) (brackets added)

De HoopScheffer said that NATO's leadership of the International Stability Assistance Force in Afghanistan soon will grow to include the entire country and the alliance will be "defending values at the Hindu Kush [the mountain range that roughly forms the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan], [and] at the same time showing solidarity and participating in the fight against terrorism."

NATO is planning new missions "wherever"

Robert G. Bell, Sept-Oct 2005, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, "NATO's transformation scorecard," <http://www.cast.ru/eng/journal/2005/5_2005_3/>

Second, NATO’s resolve to undertake "new missions" to "wherever" the threat required continues to be embraced and indeed extended by the Alliance, as exemplified by the Istanbul Summit decision to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and agreement at the recent Brussels gathering by all 26 Allies to contribute in one form or another to the Iraqi Training Mission.

HARMS

Wider scope of operations blocks needed upgrades of NATO's capabilities

Robert G. Bell, Sept-Oct 2005, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, "NATO's transformation scorecard," <http://www.cast.ru/eng/journal/2005/5_2005_3/>

Moreover, with the immediate difficulties of sustaining NATO’s many crisis-response operations demanding much of the Headquarters’ time and attention, the principal long-term PCC modernisation programmes are no longer scrutinised by the North Atlantic Council in the manner they were when Lord Robertson constantly exerted what he called his "own brand of political electro-convulsive therapy" to pressure nations to respond to his "capabilities, capabilities, capabilities" exhortations

Out of Area missions violate NATO and UN principles

Nicola Butler ( research associate and web manager for the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy), May/June 2004, "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Issue No. 77, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Because 'Out of Area' operations struggle to fall within the definition of self-defence, they continue to present a potential legal problem by falling foul both of the UN Charter and of NATO's own North Atlantic Treaty. Even advocates of the Iraq war had great difficulty arguing that Saddam Hussein posed an immediate threat to any NATO country, and (after the event at least) have tended instead to highlight the regime's human rights record as justification for taking military action.

SOLVENCY

NATO must begin limiting its scope of action

Ariel Cohen (Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Ener­gy Security), Ph.D., 9 Jan 2006, Heritage Lecture #919, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East" [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm).

At the same time, many politicians and analysts say that NATO cannot be everywhere and do every­thing. When you look on the map and see NATO in Darfur and Pakistan, you realize that even NATO, with its vast capabilities, is limited—and must limit itself—in its geographic scope and ambition.

Returning to defensive posture is key to NATO success and survival

Ariel Cohen (Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Ener­gy Security), Ph.D., 9 Jan 2006, Heritage Lecture #919, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East" <www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

Some experts caution that NATO should not attempt to grab every mission, thus dispersing and dissipating its strength. It needs to hold Article V sacrosanct, build strength from within, and remain a "political clubhouse" while following the path artic­ulated in Berlin and Prague. Indeed, post-expansion integration and interoperability, combined with improving the doctrine, building airlift and high-tech capabilities, and evolving NATO’s personnel skill set to fit 21st century threats, are vital for the Alliance’s survival and war-fighting ability.

Security at NATO's borders is the most important mission NATO has

Ariel Cohen (Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Ener­gy Security), Ph.D., 9 Jan 2006, Heritage Lecture #919, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East" <www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

To conclude, NATO members need to provide leadership, develop policies, and find means— both financial and personnel—to deal adequately with the increasingly unstable environment along the Alliance’s frontiers. The stakes are too high: sur­vival of our civilization. Failure is not an option.

Achieving Prague Capabilities Commitment increases security

László Kovács (foreign minister of Hungary), 19 Feb 2003, Hungary's Role in the Transatlantic Relationship, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST - Commentary and Analysis on Foreign Policy, Vol 2 Issue 7, <www.inthenationalinterest.com>

The Prague decision on new capabilities is of utmost importance. The NATO Reaction Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitment will enable the Alliance to maintain its relevance as a strong and capable military organization and give a proper answer to all the new threats and challenges wherever they come from.

NATO should stop out-of-area missions: they aren’t working

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author or editor of five books on NATO), 28 June 2004, "NATO: A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage," <www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2712>

But the farther NATO ventures from its traditional territorial defense mission in Europe, the less competent and united the alliance becomes. There are only 6,500 troops deployed in Afghanistan, mainly in the capital, Kabul, and the surrounding area. Yet even that modest undertaking has strained the alliance. Efforts to deploy more forces elsewhere in the country have been postponed repeatedly.

"UN"ACCEPTABLE: THE CASE FOR DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

NATO's pattern of cooperation with the United Nations isn't just a political policy or a gesture of good will. It's embedded in NATO's founding charter that the alliance should work with the UN. Today we will show you that this fundamental intent of NATO is flawed so badly that it compels us to affirm: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished. Today we will ask you to judge this round on one simple criterion: Is NATO cooperation with the UN a good thing or a bad thing?

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm#) *)*

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO is committed to working with the UN

A. The North Atlantic Treaty contains multiple references to supporting the UN. Recall from our definition of NATO that the organization is "committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty."

The Preamble to that treaty says in part: "The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations"

Article 1 says: "The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

Article 5 says, in part: "Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

B. France insists on UN approval for NATO action

Dominique de Villepin, (at the time, he was French Minister of Foreign Affairs), 19 Feb 2004, interview, Le Figaro (French newspaper), English translation published by Embassy of France in the US, "Afghanistan/Iraq/NATO/Middle East" <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2004/villepin_figaro021904.asp>

The question of involving NATO per se has to be seen in other terms. A number of conditions have to be met. First, NATO can only become involved at the request of the Iraqi government for one, with the prior consent of the United Nations for another.

C. NATO waits for UN request before intervening in Darfur

David I. McKeeby and David Denny (Staff writers), Mar 2006, US State Department, "Bush Thanks NATO for Support in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, [http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2006/Mar/20-329745.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2006/Mar/20-329745.html%20) (brackets added)

[NATO Secretary General] De Hoop Scheffer said if the AU [African Union] asks for U.N. assistance, "the NATO allies will be ready to do more in enabling a United Nations force in Darfur." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who met with the secretary-general later in the morning, said the discussions continued on how NATO could strengthen the current AU mission, as well as be ready to help should U.N. peacekeepers be requested for Sudan.

OBSERVATION 3. HARMS: NATO cooperation with the UN is bad

A. The UN Security Council is an undemocratic, self-appointed oligarchy

James Paul and Céline Nahory, 13 July 2005, Global Policy Forum, "Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm>

All agree, for example, that the Council’s membership and institutional structures reflect outdated geopolitical realities and political thinking, shaped by the world of 1945. The five permanent members, with their vetoes and many special privileges, now arouse widespread criticism as a self-appointed oligarchy.

B. The UN undermines efforts to prevent humanitarian disasters and terrorism

Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, 19 Apr 2005, "Where's the Old Bolton When We Need Him?" LOS ANGELES TIMES

The U.N. also undermines the advance of international law. Its charter outlaws war except in self-defense or with the authorization of the Security Council -- a quixotic, unenforceable rule. There have been dozens of wars since 1945 and the U.N's birth. Pretending that nations will not engage in war, and that the U.N. can be the world's policeman, guaranteeing the safety of all, only breeds cynicism. It works against using international law realistically to prevent humanitarian disasters, eliminate threats to regional peace, and stop state supporters of terrorism.

C. Solutions to international problems are delayed when NATO waits for the UN

Eric Reeves, 27 May 2006, "Problem Resolution - WHY THE U.N. CAN'T SAVE DARFUR" THE NEW REPUBLIC online, [http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060522&s=reeves052706](http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060522&s=reeves052706%20) (first brackets in original, second brackets added)

"The [U.N.] role has not been decided yet," he [an advisor to Sudan's president] said, according to Reuters. "Will it be a humanitarian role, one of monitoring the ceasefire, a role of peacekeeping?" Note that none of these options include a mandate to disarm the Janjaweed, the essential precursor to ending the genocide.

He goes on to say later in the same context:

Eric Reeves, 27 May 2006, "Problem Resolution - WHY THE U.N. CAN'T SAVE DARFUR" THE NEW REPUBLIC online, <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060522&s=reeves052706>

Never has it been more obvious that only NATO military action can save Darfur. The people of Darfur have been waiting for help for three years. If working through the United Nations is the best the international community has to offer, they will be waiting for a long time to come.

D. Coordination with the UN on joint missions results in mission failure

Human Rights Watch, July 2004, "Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004" [http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/index.htm](http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/index.htm%20) (KFOR=NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping force; UNMIK=United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo)

"The overlapping security organizations in Kosovo—namely the NATO-led KFOR, the UNMIK international police, the locally-recruited KPS, and the controversial KPC—enjoy an uneasy co-existence and frequently fail to adequately coordinate their activities. A general trend of security responsibility away from KFOR, first towards UNMIK police and ultimately towards KPS, has left responsibility for various security functions unclear. For example, a well-placed diplomatic source argued that the confused security response by KFOR and UNMIK to the initial violence in Mitrovica on March 17 was due partly to the hand-over process from KFOR to the UNMIK police that had been underway for months:"

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following plan, to be implemented by NATO member governments and the North Atlantic Council:

Plank 1: Mandates.

All references to the United Nations shall be stricken from the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO will never require UN approval as a precondition of any action.

NATO will discontinue all cooperation with present and future UN missions.

Plank 2: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any public official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 3: This plan will operate within existing budgets. No increase in funding is needed.

Plank 4: Timeline. Planks 1 and 2 take effect 10 days after an Affirmative ballot. Plank 3: takes effect 3 months later.

Plank 5: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1. World problems are solved better when we bypass the UN

Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, 19 Apr 2005, "Where's the Old Bolton When We Need Him?" LOS ANGELES TIMES

In the past, the U.S. accomplished its foreign policy goals by working around the U.N., not through it. Washington's successful anti-Soviet containment policy, implemented with allies as diverse as France, Germany, Turkey and Japan, proceeded independently of the U.N. U.S.-led efforts to stop British and French seizure of the Suez Canal and to end the Israeli-Arab wars occurred with little help from the U.N.

ADVANTAGE 2. Even UN supporters admit: NATO succeeds where the UN fails

Laura Rozen, 1 July 2004, "Building a Better UN," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=7859>

Over the last decade, Democrats have been alternately torn by two conflicting tendencies: to defend the UN, because it is essentially "their" organization in domestic political terms, and to run away from it when it starts looking like an albatross. The latter happened with the Bosnian debacle, when many a human-rights activist began to look in earnest for alternatives to the UN. They turned to NATO for more effective action.

2A EVIDENCE: DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE UN

HARMS

UN Security Council actions are not in the best interests of the world's people

James Paul and Céline Nahory, 13 July 2005, Global Policy Forum, "Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm>

The Council passes many resolutions but only haphazardly enforces them, fueling resistance to perceived

"double standards" in its actions. Too often it seems the captive of great power politics with little connection to the needs of the world’s peoples. The ten elected members of the Council say they feel like "tourists" or short-term passengers on a long distance train. In spite of some minor improvements in working methods, the Council remains inflexible, oligarchic and out of touch with the world.

UN Security Council violates democracy and makes world problems worse

James Paul and Céline Nahory, 13 July 2005, Global Policy Forum, "Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm>

Powerful governments that claim to champion "freedom," "democracy," and "good governance," have been known to behave despotically in the international arena, bending small states to their will and acting in violation of international law. Such powers sit in the Council and cannot be expected to solve problems that they themselves have created. This can be called the "foxes guarding the chicken coop" problem.

UN hinders international cooperation

Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, 19 Apr 2005, "Where's the Old Bolton When We Need Him?" LOS ANGELES TIMES

The U.N.'s structure reflects post-World War II hopes that have not materialized. As long as ordinary people continue to put faith in it, and governments play politics through it, the U.N. can only hinder international cooperation and the advance of international law.

NATO-UN cooperation failed in Kosovo

Human Rights Watch, July 2004, "Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004" [http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/index.htm](http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/index.htm%20) (KFOR=NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping force; UNMIK=United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; KPS=Kosovo Police Service; KPC=Kosovo Protection Corps)

While international actors have been universally—and accurately—critical of the failures of the Kosovo Albanian leadership during and after the crisis, the dismal performance of the international community has escaped similar critical scrutiny. Instead, the leadership of KFOR and UNMIK seem happy to continue with "business as usual," rather than putting in place the reforms needed to prevent a recurrence of mass violence—and a renewed collapse of the security institutions in the future.

UN failures leave thousands dead

Laura Rozen, 1 July 2004, "Building a Better UN," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=7859>

Iraq represented the third intervention in the last 10 years that the United States and "coalitions of the willing" had pursued without explicit Security Council authorization. The first two followed the UN's two massive failures of the 1990s: its failure to stop the genocide of more than 800,000 people in Rwanda in 1994 and its standing by while more than 7,000 Muslims were killed in the UN "safe haven" of Srebrenica, Bosnia, in July 1995.

Waiting for UN authorization caused the Srebrenica massacre

Swanee Hunt, 11 July 2005, BOSTON GLOBE, "The three lessons of Srebrenica" <www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/07/11/the_three_lessons_of_srebrenica/>

First, the Srebrenica massacre demonstrates that genocidal aggression requires well-reasoned military intervention. Americans assured the Dutch that, if they would commit peacekeepers as a tripwire around the UN-designated ''safe haven," the United States would lead forces to come in with air support to stop a Serb onslaught. Instead, we let ourselves be held back by a ''dual key" arrangement, whereby NATO would not take action without the UN's affirmation.

INHERENCY

NATO is increasing its cooperation with the UN

Dick A. Leurdijk (Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'), 23 Nov 2005, "UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link," p. 3

In a keynote address in Brussels, among others, he [NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer] argued that 'NATO will increasingly act in concert with other institutions', including the UN, pointing at NATO's cooperation on the ground in the Balkans and Afghanistan, while adding: "However, we need to raise our sights beyond ad hoc cooperation on the ground. We need structured relationships at the institutional level as well -- to coordinate strategically, not just cooperate tactically. We need to establish such relationships with the UN."

UN insists NATO get its permission before acting

Dick A. Leurdijk (Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'), 23 Nov 2005, "UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link," p. 10 (brackets added)

Furthermore, other than *In Larger Freedom,* the report of the [UN] High-level Panel, in discussing regional organizations, contained a separate paragraph on NATO: "In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually been considered regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the [UN] Charter but have similar characteristics) have undetaken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these operations are authorized by and accountable to the Security Council."

NATO's charter creates close relationship to UN

US Marine Corps Training and Education Command, 2003, THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA, p. 10-6, [www.tecom.usmc.mil/cce/Programs/PME/csc/8802A/8802A%20Lesson%2010%20and%20readings.pdf](www.tecom.usmc.mil/cce/Programs/PME/csc/8802A/8802A%20Lesson%2010%20and%20readings.pdf%20) (ellipses in original)

The North Atlantic Treaty states that, "...NATO member nations 'reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.' " Article 5 of the treaty addresses the collective self-defense of the alliance and makes reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter. A such, a strong connection is made with the world body of the UN and the long-lasting NATO alliance, and this relationship is evident in the many operations that have occurred over the last half-century

SOLVENCY

NATO succeeds where the UN fails

Swanee Hunt (director of the Women and Public Policy Program at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government), 11 July 2005, BOSTON GLOBE, "The three lessons of Srebrenica" <www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/07/11/the_three_lessons_of_srebrenica/>

Secretary General Kofi Annan has since called the UN refusal to accept military intervention an appalling failure. We stood by, wringing our hands, as thousands were brutally executed in a massacre that might have been prevented by decisive action. Instead, we now have gruesome testimony for war crimes trials -- a dishonorable substitute.After Srebrenica, when the United States finally led NATO going in with air power followed by troops, we did it mostly right. Local and international observers agree that demobilization and reintegration of Bosnian combatants has been a success, and no American soldiers were lost to hostile action. The tragedy is that we waited so long to call the Serbs' bluff and that our force commanders initially refused to pursue the war criminals.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan admits NATO is better at solving problems than the UN

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), Aug 2004, "New Missions, New Means," Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, <www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:P4129F0AA814EB/>

NATO will be called upon by the international community to be a peacemaker, peacekeeper, and the provider of security and stability. Right now – and for the foreseeable future – I cannot envisage any other organisation that could do the job of projecting stability as well as NATO can. When Kofi Annan recently delivered a speech inviting NATO to play a more active role in Africa, he indicated as much.

Strengthening the UN is not the answer: NATO is

Francis Fukuyama (teaches at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), 19 Feb 2006, "After Neoconservatism," NEW YORK TIMES

The conservative critique of the United Nations is all too cogent: while useful for certain peacekeeping and nation-building operations, the United Nations lacks both democratic legitimacy and effectiveness in dealing with serious security issues. The solution is not to strengthen a single global body, but rather to promote what has been emerging in any event, a "multi-multilateral world" of overlapping and occasionally competing international institutions that are organized on regional or functional lines. Kosovo in 1999 was a model: when the Russian veto prevented the Security Council from acting, the United States and its NATO allies simply shifted the venue to NATO, where the Russians could not block action.

DEAL WITH THE DEVIL: THE CASE FOR ABANDONING THE ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE

"Cooperation" sounds like a wonderful thing, but it all depends on whom you're cooperating with and what you're helping them do. One of NATO's recent cooperation initiatives actually subverts the goals NATO stands for, and compels us to affirm: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and CASE OVERVIEW

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

ICI: "NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO. It focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field, starting with the individual members of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates." *(NATO Official Home Page, 9 June 2006, NATO TOPICS: Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),* [*www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html*](http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html)*)*

B. Overview

Today we will give you a comparative advantage case that shows that the Status Quo is failing to uphold NATO's most important goal, and that adopting our plan will not only better meet the goal but will gain other advantages as well.

OBSERVATION 2. GOAL: NATO should promote democracy

Fred Tanner (Deputy Directory, Geneva Centre for Security Policy), 2004, "NATO's Role in Defence Cooperation and Democratisation in the Middle East," p. 103

In view of these developments, it appears that the shared liberal democratic values and norms are at the heart of NATO's legitimacy today. It is on the basis of this common identity "that NATO in the post-Cold War period has turned to focus on democracy promotion as a core principle for its activities."

OBSERVATION 3. INHERENCY: Status Quo policies fail to uphold the goal of promoting democracy

A. ICI offers military assistance and cooperation in the Middle East

Nicola de Santis, NATO Coordinator for Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 10 Dec 2004, Video interview (transcript), NATO Speech: Video interview with Nicola de Santis, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041210b.htm](www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041210b.htm%20) (brackets added)

What is NATO offering on a practical level, through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, to the countries of the broader region of the Middle East? Basically something quite similar to what we are offering to the countries in the MD [Mediterranean Dialogue]: providing tailored advice on defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations; promoting military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations consistent with the UN Charter.

B. ICI cooperation has no pre-condition of democracy and good governance

Fred Tanner (Deputy Directory, Geneva Centre for Security Policy), 2004, "NATO's Role in Defence Cooperation and Democratisation in the Middle East," p. 109 (brackets added, parentheses in original)

The second [initiative] is the 'Istanbul Cooperation Initiative' (ICI). With this initiative NATO reaches out for the first time to Gulf states (the 'broader Middle East region'). The somewhat surprising aspect of ICI is that it contains explicit language on security governance, but this may be because the initiative is a PfP [Partnerships for Peace] template. Yet there is no formal institutional link to PfP, nor is there a PfP-type 'Framework Agreement' that stipulates the political acceptance of good governance and democratic control of armed forces.

OBSERVATION 4. PLAN.

Plank 1: Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters.

Plank 2: Mandates:

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative shall be cancelled.

NATO shall not make any further offers of military cooperation nor assistance with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council

The NATO charter shall be amended to require the existence of a democratic form of government as a pre-condition to any military cooperation or assistance to any nation outside the alliance.

Plank 3: This plan reduces the scope of NATO activities and therefore does not require any additional funding.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect one week after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1: We better promote democracy

A. Significance: GCC focus on "security" provides an excuse to postpone freedom and democracy

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, Winter 2004, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0412_kechichian.asp>

Although a few revolutionary experiments may be underway -- hinting at positive change -- internal clashes between GCC regimes and their opponents have turned nasty and do not augur well for the future. In fact, throughout the Arab world, there seemed to exist a direct contradiction between autocratic regimes that are loathe to give up power in any orderly fashion, and intrinsic forces for change that clamor for freedom, better education and emancipation of women. The prospects for such significant changes could not be ensured in the aftermath of a war for Iraq, however, because most regimes will successfully argue that security must come before political reforms.

B. Solvency: Reducing military intervention and setting an example are the best way to spread democracy

Gen. Wesley Clark, May 2004, "Broken Engagement," WASHINGTON MONTHLY, <www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0405.clark.html>

Instead of brandishing military force and slogans about democracy, we must recognize what our real strengths and limitations are. In this part of the world, American power and rhetoric tend to produce countervailing reactions. Demands and direct action are appropriate in self-defense, but in a region struggling to regain its pride after centuries of perceived humiliation by the West, we should speak softly whenever possible. If we really want to encourage forms of government to emerge which we believe will better suit our own interests, then we have to set a powerful example and act indirectly and patiently--even while we take the specific actions truly necessary for our self-defense.

ADVANTAGE 2: Reduce tensions with Iran

A. Significance: NATO cooperation with GCC increases provocation of Iran

Wayne White, (from The Middle East Institute, former State Department specialist on Middle East & Persian Gulf), 3 June 2005, "NATO’s Role in Gulf Security and US interests—How will NATO proceed with the partnerships? What does the US get out of NATO-GCC cooperation?" p. 5 (brackets added)

Finally one cautionary note and it is about Iran. Quite frankly, I think, Tehran will likely view enhanced cooperation between the GCC and NATO, in virtually any context, [to] be a potential challenge and intrusion, period.

B. Solvency: Reducing tensions with Iran reduces nuclear proliferation risks

Ivan Eland (Senior Fellow at The Independent Institute), 26 Sept 2005, "U.S. Must Resign Itself to "Rogue" State Nukes," <www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1576>

The real threat is that some of these new atomic states will sell nuclear technology or know-how to anti-U.S. terrorists, who are even more radical, have no home address, and thus cannot be as easily deterred. Better U.S. relations with these states would provide fewer political incentives for them to sell the technology to such terrorists and facilitate U.S. purchase of the technology before these sales occurred.

ADVANTAGE 3: Reduced risk of terrorism

A. Significance: Cooperation with GCC expands NATO's military involvement in the Persian Gulf

Prof. Ebtisam Al-Kitbi (UAE University, United Arab Emirates), 3 June 2005, "Perspectives from the Gulf -- What has been the response of GCC states to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative? What are some of the concerns regarding cooperation with NATO" Henry L. Stimson Center, NATO's Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, p. 3-4 (the grammar was as printed below, perhaps due to being a transcript of a non-native speaker of English)

NATO could also be important to introduce a more effective European security while effective in protecting the small Gulf States from outward aggression does not contribute towards a more stable security arrangement because the European states have been reluctant to play a more direct military role, and the cover of NATO could make such an expansion more acceptable.

B. Solvency: Reducing military intervention reduces the root cause of terrorism risk

CATO Institute, 2003, "Chap. 7: Reducing the Lightning Rod Problem," CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS, p. 69-70

According to a study completed in 1997 by the Defense Science board, a panel of experts that advises the secretary of defense: 'As part of its global power position, the United States is called upon frequently to respond to international causes and deploy forces around the world. America's position in the world invites attacks simply because of its presence. Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.'

2A EVIDENCE: ABANDON ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE

INHERENCY

ICI is open to any Middle East country that claims to oppose terrorism and WMDs

NATO Official Home Page, 10 May 2006, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue & Istanbul Cooperation Initiative - Questions & Answers, <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/qa.htm>

\* The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is a new initiative which is meant to promote essentially practical cooperation on a bilateral basis, with interested countries in the broader region of the Middle East.

\* ICI is opened to interested countries in the region which subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Kuwait: promised democratic reforms but didn't do them

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, Winter 2004, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0412_kechichian.asp>

Although Kuwait revived parliamentary life after its 1991 liberation, and while the sheikhdom's exiled rulers promised that genuine democratization would be created, few of the pledges made by the Al Sabah materialized. Understandably, in the aftermath of the 2003 war in neighboring Iraq, Kuwaiti leaders are reluctant to introduce sorely needed political reforms.

Bahrain could become a democracy but more reforms are needed

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, Winter 2004, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0412_kechichian.asp>

The leader who called on Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman to resign -- on the grounds that he failed to restore conditions to redress the Bahraini economy as well as violating basic human rights -- was BCHR's Abdul-Hadi al-Khawajah. A prominent Shia representative who returned from exile in 2001, Al-Khawajah was arrested in September 2004. He pleaded "not guilty" to charges of sedition, defamation and spreading false information, although his trial was postponed after serious demonstrations disrupted court proceedings. Ironically, Manama felt the necessity to organize pro-government activities, in the form of loyalty pledges to the prime minister, to overcome and reverse popular perceptions of incompetence. These developments support the premise that a genuine democratic society in Bahrain, including respect for human rights and the rule of law, is certainly possible -- if and when the country's political institutions are strengthened and allowed to make their own contributions.

Saudi Arabia: ruling family has not implemented democratic reforms

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, Winter 2004, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0412_kechichian.asp>

In March 1992, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia promulgated its famous Basic Law of Government, ostensibly to create a representative consultative council, first promised in 1927.22 Although the Saudi Majlis al-Shura has experimented with several interesting debates during the past decade, consultation and consensus -- the two bases for public participation -- did not spread through the ultra-conservative ruling family.

Oman: pace of reform is slow

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, Winter 2004, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0412_kechichian.asp>

This unprecedented initiative in the Gulf region augured well for Oman. Over time, the sultan, or perhaps his successor, will probably emerge as the first constitutional monarch on the Arabian Peninsula. Nevertheless, the pace of reform remained slow and, in specific instances, tied to internal crises. Critics of the Omani approach claim that the 1996 initiatives were only taken after the 1994 attempted coup d'état that shook the regime.

United Arab Emirates: No democracy at all

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 8 Mar 2006, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005, United Arab Emirates, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61701.htm>

Traditional rule in the emirates generally is patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty to the tribal leaders, to the leaders of the individual emirates, and to the leaders of the federation. There are no democratically elected institutions or political parties.

SIGNIFICANCE

NATO military involvement in the Middle East will jeopardize the existence of the alliance

Peter Rudolf (analyst with the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik specialising in transatlantic relations), Spring 2004, NATO REVIEW, "Should the Middle East be NATO's new central front?" <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/debate.html>

The focus on the Greater Middle East should not be seen as Alliance therapy. In the absence of a analysis of engagement in the Greater Middle East – one that is based upon strategic priorities and takes into account finite resources and capabilities – your long list of things the Alliance might get involved in could easily lead to over-stretch. NATO remains too important an institution for its existence to be jeopardized by an overly ambitious and costly engagement in the Middle East.

US intervention in the Gulf States stirs up anti-American hatred

Dr Michael D. Yaffe, (academic dean, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington), Fall 2004, "The Gulf and a New Middle East Security System" MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, Volume XI, Number 3 <www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0409_yaffe.asp>

In general, the United States needs to be concerned about domestic factors within Gulf states becoming a stronger determinant in the shaping of future collective security arrangements. Public dissatisfaction with the United States is increasing, spurred on by the Iraq War and its aftermath, support for Israel, the perceived ill-treatment of Arabs in the United States, and the alleged propping up of authoritarian Gulf regimes. Anti-Americanism is at a pitch that has never before been seen.

NATO is perceived in the Middle East as a tool of Western intervention

Fred Tanner (Deputy Directory, Geneva Centre for Security Policy), 2004, "NATO's Role in Defence Cooperation and Democratization in the Middle East," p. 111

Nevertheless, recalling the above mentioned obstacles, the success of future defence cooperation in the context of the Istanbul framework depends on the political will and added security values and other benefits that both NATO members and MD/ICI partners will get from such cooperation. For NATO, the main challenges are its persistent Cold War image as an instrument of Western intervention, its lack of resources and the conflicting national agendas of member states.

Provoking Iran is a bad idea - threatens security of GCC nations

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 30 Nov 2005, "NATO LEGISLATORS HOLD FIRST SEMINAR IN THE GULF" <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=847>

The most immediate threats to the GCC countries were said to emanate from the continuous instability in Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The latter is increasingly perceived by some as revolutionary and threatening to the security of the region.

Iran is dangerous to the Gulf States

Ephraim Kam (deputy head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University), 27 Apr 2006, "Compromise still possible," MIDDLE EAST ROUNDTABLE, Vol 4 Edition 15, <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=129>

First, Washington views the scenario of a nuclear Iran with great concern because it would threaten America's most important interests in the Middle East. As the administration sees it, nuclear weaponry in Iran's hands would endanger its allies in the region, beginning with Israel and the Gulf states; enhance radical trends in the region and the Muslim world; create a threat to the flow of oil from the Gulf; contribute to a strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq; and threaten regional stability.

GCC cooperation should have included human rights requirement in order to solve root cause of terrorism

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 18 March 2005, Rome - LELLOUCHE CALLS FOR STRATEGIC VISION IN NATO RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES, <www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=658>

Despite religious differences, it was important to know that all members were traveling in the same direction and shared the same political goal of stability through prosperity and democratic reform. Turkey, he noted, had already provided a model. A NATO - GCC Charter would provide security-related assistance and assurance, but also include a CSCE type "Basket III" that referred to human rights and better governance. This would go to the heart of terrorism which was based on ignorance and poverty, and derived from the inevitable equation that no education equals no future.

SOLVENCY

Iran can be deterred without NATO involvement in the Middle East

Prof. Christopher Layne ( International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M Univ), 10 Apr 2006, "Iran: The Logic of Deterrence," THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, <www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_04_10/cover.html>

In this sense, dealing with the Iranian "nuclear threat" is actually one of the easier strategic challenges the United States faces. It is a threat that can be handled by an offshore balancing strategy that relies on missile, air, and naval power well away from the volatile Persian Gulf, thus reducing the American poltico-military footprint in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran is hardly desirable, neither is it "intolerable," because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States.

Middle East will get democracy without outside intervention

Gen. Wesley Clark, May 2004, "Broken Engagement," WASHINGTON MONTHLY, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0405.clark.html>

We can't know precisely how the desire for freedom among the peoples of the Middle East will grow and evolve into movements that result in stable democratic governments. Different countries may take different paths. Progress may come from a beneficent king, from enlightened mullahs, from a secular military, from a women's movement, from workers returning from years spent as immigrants in Western Europe, from privileged sons of oil barons raised on MTV, or from an increasingly educated urban intelligentsia, such as the nascent one in Iran. But if the events of the last year tell us anything, it is that democracy in the Middle East is unlikely to come at the point of our gun

Non-intervention is the best way to get democracy in the Gulf

Interpress News Service, 28 Mar 2006, "After Iraq, Arabs Wary of 'Western' Democracy" <www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32669>

Stated the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abdul Rahman bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, at a conference organized by the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, earlier this month: ''The more we try to find home grown solutions for (regional) crises, while avoiding the image of reforming under foreign pressure, the more successful we will be in achieving reforms and realistic policies.''

HARD CURRENCY: THE CASE FOR FAIR FUNDING OF NATO OPERATIONS

Because NATO is an alliance that must balance the competing interests of over two dozen nations, strains are bound to occur. The most important strains in any partnership are those about money, and NATO has financial issues that need to be addressed. That's why my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: DEFINITIONS

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY:

A. NATO follows the "costs fall where they lie" principle of funding tasks

Gen. James Jones (highest ranking military officer at NATO), 9 Jan 2006, "Global War on Terror and Future of NATO," HUMAN EVENTS, [www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374](www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374%20)

The last century resulted in the acceptance within NATO of the principle of "costs falling where they lie," a phrase that is not very compelling grammatically but which meant that a nation paid for all the costs of the forces it contributed to a NATO task.

B. Costs for most NATO operations are not shared in common

Elisabeth Skons, 22 Mar 2005, "International financing of peace operations," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Project on Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Paper presented at the International Task Force on Global Public Goods

UN operations are financed primarily through the common budget of the organization, while only a small portion of NATO operations are funded by NATO common budgets.

OBSERVATION 3. HARMS

A. The NATO Response Force is threatened

Gen. Klaus Naumann (former Chairman of NATO Military Committee), Nov 2005, SECURITY RISKS AND TRANSFORMATION - EUROATLANTIC AND REGIONAL PERSPCTIVES, p. 41

NATO must therefore modernize its procedures of financing operations beyond the Cold War formula of "costs lie where they fall." To apply this outdated formula on the NRF could well mean that the NRF will remain a dormant force which will never be used for what it was created: a rapid response at the early stages of a conflict which may allow for extinguishing a spark before it became a fire.

B. Fundamental unfairness within the alliance

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), Aug 2004, "New Missions, New Means," Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, <www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:P4129F0AA814EB/>

Our established procedures have a nation pay for all equipment and personnel it deploys abroad. This is encapsulated in the formula "costs lie where they fall". As a principle, it is a good one. But it can mean that those nations with certain key capabilities will always be asked to deliver – and always expected to pay. This is not just unfair to certain nations. It also undermines the very logic of NATO as a coalition in which burdens are shared equitably and fairly.

C. Out of Area Missions are at risk

Gen. James L. Jones (Supreme Allied Commander), 7 Feb 2006, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 11

NATO's funding arrangements were appropriate when forces did not deploy outside the European theater of operations, such as during the Cold War. However, with operations being conducted today at strategic distances, our current approach to resourcing our operations actually acts as a disincentive to nations contributing forces for deployments.

OBSERVATION 4. PLAN.

Plank 1: Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters.

Plank 2: Mandates:

NATO shall abandon the "costs lie where they fall" rule for funding its operations.

Funding for all NATO operations shall be paid by the same GDP-based formula currently used for AWACS support. All NATO countries shall be required to participate in proportion to their national economic size.

Plank 3: Funding increases required from countries currently not paying enough shall come from an optimal mix of the following sources in those countries: Cuts in public education, cuts in welfare, general national revenues, and increased cigarette taxes.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 6 months after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. SOLVENCY

A. AWACS experience shows success of funding reform

Gen. James Jones (highest ranking military officer at NATO), 9 Jan 2006, "Global War on Terror and Future of NATO," HUMAN EVENTS, <http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374> (brackets added)

This [costs lie where they fall] may no longer be the way to manage out-of-area missions and so we are looking at expanding the model of NATO AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control System). This Alliance capability, which is funded by 14 NATO nations, has worked tremendously well despite being truly international not only in funding but also in manning structures. It works because it is funded in advance, just as navies budget ‘steaming time’ up front so as to make an allowance for the future costs of their operations. This is a new concept when applied to land forces.

B. GDP-based common funding is the right answer

Elisabeth Skons, 22 Mar 2005, "International financing of peace operations," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Project on Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Paper presented at the International Task Force on Global Public Goods

A system based on obligatory rather than voluntary national contributions is essential to ensure sustainability and predictability. For the same reasons it would be desirable to have a system of common assets financed by a common budget. The GNP-scales used for the financing of peace operations appear to provide a workable model.

OBSERVATION 6. ADVANTAGES.

ADVANTAGE 1: A robust NRF increases world security and stability

NATO Official Home Page, 5 Apr 2006, ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, <www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm>

From its initial steps, the NRF has been acting as the engine for transforming NATO into a much stronger and more effective military organization. The NRF, as a key element of NATO’s military culture, will enable the Alliance to meet the threats to security and stability in the new world order.

ADVANTAGE 2. Effective out-of-area missions enforce international law and safeguard peace

Markus Meckel (NATO General Rapporteur), 2002, "General Report. 'Security policy challenges after the Attacks of September 11, 2001 and the future role of NATO' " NATO Parliamentary Assembly[, www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=251](,%20www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=251)

Thirdly, over the past few years NATO has become one of the most important players in the area of international crisis management and the implementation of peace missions. NATO is the only security policy player, in addition to the United States, that is capable of taking action worldwide to enforce international law and to safeguard peace. Whether and where this happens is decided in each case by the members. Even though the focus has continued to be on Europe, operations of this kind can also be undertaken "out of area", such as in Afghanistan, in the future.

2A EVIDENCE: FAIR FUNDING

HARMS

Current cost sharing mechanism fails to meet today's needs

US Department of State, Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, [http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html%20) (brackets added)

Strategic efficiencies can be accomplished, he [General James Jones] said, by transforming U.S. and European militaries into smaller forces with expanded, specialized capabilities, sharing resources and revamping NATO’s funding mechanisms, which currently require each country to fund all aspects of its own troop deployment for the common defense. That rule was made at a time when it never was expected that any member’s forces would travel far outside Europe, Jones said. This arrangement no longer makes sense in an era in which NATO has approximately 30,000 troops deployed on three continents, he said, and is a disincentive for smaller nations to participate in operations.

Examples of funding problem causing nations not to commit troops when needed: Afghanistan and Iraq

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 12 Apr 2005, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO's EVOLVING REL IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, p. 6

Although NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance, they did not commit all the troops, planes and helicopters needed to extend NATO's 8,000-strong Afghan peace keeping force from its bases in Kabul and the north into the west of the country. Similarly, in Iraq, delays in finding the required extra instructors for Iraq had cast doubt on plans to have the expanded mission up and running before the Iraqi elections at the end of January 2005.

INHERENCY

Status Quo uses "costs fall where they lie" policy

Elisabeth Skons, 22 Mar 2005, "International financing of peace operations," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Project on Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Paper presented at the International Task Force on Global Public Goods

The majority of NATO military capabilities are financed according to the principle that costs lie where they fall, i.e. member states pay from their own budgets for their own forces and for their support in the field. The majority of what is perceived as NATO forces and equipment is simply the national military forces of the NATO member states.

NATO has only a small amount of common funding

Elisabeth Skons, 22 Mar 2005, "International financing of peace operations," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Project on Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Paper presented at the International Task Force on Global Public Goods

NATO as an organisation owns and funds only a small amount of assets and capabilities. There are three common NATO budgets: the military budget, the civil budget and the NATO Security Investment Programmes (NSIP). The military budget is financed mainly by the defence ministries of member states. It covers the operating and capital costs of NATO's own military assets, which consist primarily of its military headquarters and planning staff and its AWACS aircraft.

Peacekeeping operations funded by "costs lie where they fall"

Elisabeth Skons, 22 Mar 2005, "International financing of peace operations," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Project on Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Paper presented at the International Task Force on Global Public Goods

NATO's peace support operations are also financed primarily by the countries providing the forces ('costs lie where they fall'). Each member state pays for the personnel and equipment that it engages in a given operation.

SOLVENCY

Scheffer says fair sharing of costs needed for collective capabilities and NRF

US Embassy in London, 6 Feb 2006, "NATO Head Calls for Expansion of Strategic Partnerships," [www.usembassy.org.uk/nato200.html](http://www.usembassy.org.uk/nato200.html)

De Hoop Scheffer said that solidarity also must be exhibited in the fair sharing of operational costs -- such as the deployment of NATO’s Response Force, which was sent to provide immediate aid to the victims of Pakistan’s earthquake -- and in common funding for collective capabilities.

AWACS common-funding model should be expanded to other missions: solves unfairness

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 12 Apr 2005, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO's EVOLVING REL IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, p. 11

Your Rapporteur also recommends considering adjusting NATO's common funding approach to current realities. The Allies' present funding key stems from the late 1940s and is hopelessly inadequate for today's security environment. The current system of financing NATO-led missions according to the principle "costs lie where they fall" is unfair and counterproductive. For example, NATO could consider building common NATO assets earmarked for post-conflict operations, similar to existing ones like the Airborne Early Warning System (AWACS).

Funding reform means NATO can do a better job at projecting stability

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 4 Feb 2006, Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, <www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060204a.htm>

But modernising the way we pay for things in NATO is critical, because it will make it easier to do what we need to do: project stability. Right now, participation in the NRF is something like a reverse lottery: if your numbers come up, you actually lose money. If the NRF deploys while you happen to be in the rotation, you pay the full costs of the deployment of your forces. This can be a disincentive to countries to commit to participation in the NRF. And that is something that the Alliance can’t afford.

GDP formula works: NATO uses it for a few commonly funded programs today

Elisabeth Skons, 22 Mar 2005, "International financing of peace operations," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Project on Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Paper presented at the International Task Force on Global Public Goods (brackets added)

[NATO] Member states contribute to these funds [military, civilian and NSIP] according to a cost-sharing formula that is decided upon unanimously, and which is loosely linked to the gross domestic product (GDP) of member states. However, the cost-sharing formulas are partly also the result of a political bargaining process.

OUTVOTED: THE CASE FOR REFORMING NATO's DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

NATO is in need of serious reform in order to be able to quickly respond to today's challenges to peace and security. That's why my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and OVERVIEW

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

Consensus: "All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country." *(NATO Official Web Page, NATO TOPICS, 1 Mar 2005, "Consensus decision-making at NATO - A fundamental principle,"* [*http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html*](http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html) *)*

B. Overview

We will present a comparative advantage case today in which we will show that introducing a better method of decision-making will produce advantages over the Status Quo. If you find that our plan is an improvement over the Status Quo, then an Affirmative ballot will be justified.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO is committed to consensus, not majority vote

US Department of State, 31 Mar 2004, "NATO's Defense Role, Operation by Consensus Remain Same," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=March&x=20040331184118FRllehctiM0.1473963&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html>

NATO will continue to operate by consensus, not majority vote, despite its enlarged membership, a senior Bush administration official stated during a background briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center March 31.

OBSERVATION 3. PLAN.

Plank 1: Agency: The North Atlantic Council and all NATO member governments and their representatives.

Plank 2: Mandate: NATO shall use a majority vote procedure instead of consensus for all decisions.

Plank 3: Funding: This plan does not change the funding of any NATO operations.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES.

ADVANTAGE 1: More effective crisis response

A. Significance: Slow decision making blocks rapid response in times of crisis

Senator John Warner (R-Va.), 26 Apr 2006, Remarks at the Atlantic Council 2006 Award for Distinguished International Service, <www.senate.gov/~warner/pressoffice/statements/20060426.htm>

To become more agile and respond more quickly to contingencies, NATO must lessen some of its restrictions related to consensus decision-making. There are several in this audience tonight who have had first-hand experience with this problem. In my many visits with NATO officials, they often point out problems that result from the overburden of bureaucracy and the longstanding consensus requirements.

B. Solvency: Decision reform allows rapid crisis response

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 12 Apr 2005, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO's EVOLVING REL IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, p. 11

NATO's capability for swift military action in a crisis has been considerably improved, its decision-making processes are however not well suited to fast developing crises. Deployment of forces and possible pre-emptive measures require consensus among all member states of the Alliance. A review of the political decision making process is necessary to allow rapid reaction forces, such as the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) to perform the roles they were designed for.

ADVANTAGE 2. Positive peer pressure promotes performance

A. Significance: Consensus rule helps weak allies hide their deficiencies

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The consensus rule clearly was not the cause of any Ally's military deficiencies. Yet it did complicate efforts to exert peer pressure within NATO on weak performers, who not surprisingly resisted efforts by the United States, the Secretary General, and some other Allies to publish more data on the defense capabilities performance of individual members.

B. Impact: Strengthening European capabilities is essential for Western democracy

Julian Lindley-French (senior scholar at the Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich), 18 Jan 2006, "Big world, big future, big NATO," <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2006/nato.php>

The political credibility of the transatlantic relationship as the foundation of the international system, and the particular role of Europeans therein, must necessarily be based upon military capability that preserves the military superiority of the democracies. Such an observation might not be politically correct, but it is certainly strategically correct.

ADVANTAGE 3: We remove opportunities for abuse by a single nation

A. Significance: One nation can sabotage the alliance by bad behavior in the consensus process

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The political jitters were symbolized by the so-called Meciar problem in the Slovak Republic. In 1998, Vladmir Meciar, the authoritarian and corrupt Slovak prime minister since 1992, was ousted by a broad coalition of opposition parties, but he remained an influential political force. Would NATO risk embarrassment, some in Washington wondered, if Slovak voters returned Meciar or his party to power once their country was invited to join? Worse, following Slovak accession to NATO, would a new Meciar-dominated government hesitate to abuse the consensus rule and paralyze the Alliance if it served his narrow political interests? Moreover, Meciar was not a unique case; similar concerns were voiced, for example, regarding former Romanian and Bulgarian political figures.

B. Solvency: The majority should be allowed to get things done without being stymied by one member

Manuela Stoop, (Netherlands Atlantic Association), 11 Mar 2004, "The NATO Response Force," <www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=67>

The current decision-making process at the NAC does not compare to the requirements of the NRF, which has to be deployed as quickly as possible. NATO commander General James Jones was right when he stated that "in the future nations would have to consider whether the opposition of one or two nations could continually stymie the will of the majority."

2A EVIDENCE: DECISION-MAKING REFORM

HARMS

Consensus rule creates bad decisions

General Klaus Naumann (former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee), June 2005, "The EU and NATO—Organizations in Need of a Fresh Look" Center for Strategic Decision Research, <www.csdr.org/2005book/naumann.htm>

The first and, in my view, indispensable step is to transform the political side of NATO’s house as profoundly as NATO asked the military to transform. Such a transformation must raise the question of decisions by consensus as well: At this moment all committees are bound to achieve consensus, which makes the lowest common denominator the best that can be achieved after considerable time and effort.

Disagreements frequently block effective decision-making

Philip Gordon, 2005, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, p. 30

Because of the sensitivity of military actions, NATO will always make its most important decisions by consensus, which means that any disagreements among the 26 members can block or severely delay action--as they have done repeatedly over the past several years.

NRF effectiveness is blocked by consensus – and unilateral action is blocked by NRF

Seyom Brown, Mar 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE: A REASSESSMENT, p. 31 (italics in original)

First, as NATO comes to *depend* on the multinational, but integrated, NRF to initiate virtually all of its military missions, the Alliance risks having paltry little to commit at moments of truth, since any decision to deploy the NRF still must be made at the level of the North Atlantic Council where the consensus rule applies. When the Council is paralyzed by its divisions or is sluggish in resolving them, more "modular" responses (such as proposed later in this monograph) may be cumbersome to put together ad hoc; and members may not even be able to act unilaterally, not having other appropriate national contingents of their own in-being and ready to deploy.

NRF advantages are lost by consensus decision-making

General Klaus Naumann (former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee) at the first of the SHAPE Lecture Series, 10 May 2005, NATO Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, <www.nato.int/shape/opinions/2005/s050510c.htm>

But in my view to stick to a rather rigid application of the consensus principle in all subordinate bodies would really mean to squander our advantages. And think for a moment (and I mentioned this) think of the NATO Reaction Force. The politicians imposed on us considerable decrease of readiness. We won't be able to exploit the advantage given in their hands if he had deliberations of weeks over the decision to deploy the force

One small country like Iceland can block all the other NATO countries

Nicola De Santis, The Middle East Institute, 3 June 2005, NATO’s Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, "NATO’s Role in Gulf Security and US interests" (ellipses in original)

North Atlantic Council, in an effort to find a common position. Indeed, in order to have a NATO decision, you need to have consensus and in order to achieve that all of the countries compromise. Each country…it is not important how big you are. Iceland does not have military forces at all and it is part of NATO. If Iceland wants to block a decision with the NATO Council, they can do that. So one country can block the achievement of consensus.

Consensus rule damaged the alliance on aid to Turkey decision

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The now very public argument lasted several more days before Belgium and Germany agreed, for a variety of reasons, to a face-saving compromise: Turkey's request was moved from the NAC to the DPC, where France is not represented. The DPC quickly reached consensus, on February 16, on guidance to the NMAs to prepare plans to help protect Turkey through, for example, the deployment of NATO AWACS and support to Allied deployments of theater missile and chemical and biological defense capabilities. The NMAs completed the planning in the next few days, and on February 19, the DPC authorized the NMAs to implement the agreed assistance to Turkey. Although NATO officials understandably tried to put the best face possible on the incident--Secretary General Robertson described it as "damage above, not below, the waterline"--its impact, particularly in Washington, should not be underestimated.

Consensus almost blocked military assistance to a NATO member in time of crisis

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

For some, at least, the consensus rule appeared to have outlived its usefulness. As Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) told his colleagues on May 8: First, I agree that we must eliminate the "consensus rule," the antiquated requirement in the NATO charter that nearly prevented NATO from protecting one of its own members, Turkey, before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

INHERENCY

General agreement among all members is required for NATO action

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

Since its creation in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has developed a tradition of making decisions by consensus. This requirement for general agreement among all members on positions or actions taken in the name of NATO has survived serious internal rifts and four rounds of enlargement.

CJTF response: CJTF is a tool of US intervention/hegemony (see NEG HEGEMONY and NEG INTERVENTION BAD briefs for why this is bad)

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., 18 Feb 2005, "President Bush Should Advance a New U.S. Vision for Europe," HERITAGE FOUNDATION (brackets added)

By championing initiatives such as the CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force], the U.S. can fashion NATO as a toolbox that can further American interests around the globe by constructing ad hoc coalitions of the willing, both within and without NATO, that can bolster U.S. diplomatic, political, and military efforts in specific cases.

CJTF response: CJTF is only designed for a few missions -- still need overall NATO decision reform

Niels van Willigen, Jan 2003, "Germany and the transatlantic link," NATO/EAPC Fellowship 2001-2003 Final Report, p. 3 [CJTF=Combined Joint Task Force]

Although CJTF's could be used during the defense of alliance territory, it is meant to be generated and tailored primarily for military operations not involving defense tasks, but crisis management tasks such as humanitarian relief and peace keeping.

CJTF response: Timing -- CJTF has been around since '94 -- why hasn't it solved yet?

Senator William V. Roth, Jr. , 1998, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "1998: NATO in the 21st Century" [http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=340](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=340%20) (parentheses in original)

Toward this end, at a NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994, the Allies agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters in the NATO structure to facilitate rapid and appropriate military responses to new challenges.

SOLVENCY

Decision-making reform is key to solving problems and future NATO success

Major General Rick Lynch, (US Army, is deputy chief of staff, Political/Military/Economic, Multi-National Force-Iraq), and Lt. Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, (US Army, Political Advisor's Office at Joint Forces Command Naples), May 2006, "Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq," US ARMY PROFESSIONAL WRITING COLLECTION, <http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/may_2006/5_06_2.html>

Once accord is reached for a NATO-led operation, ensuing operational decisions should not be held hostage to the political process. This may require rethinking the 50-year policy of consensus decisionmaking. When even the most picayune operational decision requires a 26-member consensus, any nation can block progress on overarching objectives with the wave of a finger. For example, some Allied nations that stood behind the Istanbul pledge to support Iraq and have contributed to out-of-country support have also in practice politically blocked progress on the main effort of in-country training. The lesson is clear: once the commitment is made and plans are approved, nations must be obligated to support the efforts politically if not materially. There are many ways to improve the political dimensions of NATO decision making, but in the end, success always depends on political commitment throughout the operation.

An alternative proposal for voting [change the mandates if you want to use this "plan advocate"]:

William A. Niskanen, 13 Dec 2005, "Alternative Political and Economic Futures for Europe," M.R. STEFANIK CONSERVATIVE INSTITUTE LECTURES, <http://www.institute.sk/article.php?826>

Approval of either type of NATO military response would require the approval of four of the six governments of the largest member countries and two-thirds of all other member governments; approval by this rule would then bind all member governments. This would protect NATO against an obligation to defend any member country without the approval of most of the large and smaller member governments. This would also protect NATO from the ability of one or a few member governments to veto a NATO out-of-area military operation.

INSIDE THE LINES: THE CASE FOR A DEFENSE-ONLY ALLIANCE

Maybe Leo Tolstoy said it best: "What an immense mass of evil must result from allowing men to anticipate what might happen." NATO's original purpose was to defend Western Europe from outside attack, and it performed that job perfectly. But after the Cold War, NATO abandoned that successful strategy in favor of trying to guess what might happen and using armed intervention against those who had neither attacked nor threatened to attack any of its members. Recognizing the failure of NATO's current direction, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: DEFINITIONS

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO is committed to non-defensive use of force

A. NATO attack on Yugoslavia set a precedent for non-defensive force

Richard Falk, 20 Feb 2003, " Why International Law Matters" THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030310/falk>

When the United States led the NATO coalition in 1999 to avert ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, a controversial precedent was set for the use of nondefensive force without a mandate from the UN Security Council.

B. NATO has permanently transformed away from a defensive posture

Vince Crawley, 24 Feb 2006, US State Department, "NATO Faces Challenges in Mideast, Darfur, Black Sea and Elsewhere," <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/nato204.html> (brackets added)

He [Kurt Volker at the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs] also described NATO’s ongoing transformation, noting that the NATO of the Cold War "was focused on protecting the territory of its members," but now it is operating "in Afghanistan, in Pakistan – we just closed that operation - in Iraq, in Darfur." "Operating a much greater geographic distance. I think this is a trend that’s only going to continue," he said.

OBSERVATION 3. NATO's aggressive posture causes significant harms

HARM 1: People Perish: Abandoning NATO's defensive posture directly led to deaths in Yugoslavia

Philip Corwin (highest ranking United Nations civilian official in Bosnia-Herzegovina at time of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre), July 2005, "Srebrenica And the Politics of War Crimes," <www.srebrenica-report.com/foreword.htm>

With the end of the Cold War, NATO’s role as a defensive alliance ended. There were those who said that NATO should have been dissolved, now that there was no more Soviet Union. But there were also those – many of whom were bureaucrats benefiting from the existence of such a massive organization -- who said NATO should now be used as a weapon to forge "democracy" around the world – in other words, it should be used to promote the global economy, and make the world free for Coca-Cola. Four of the six constituent republics within former Yugoslavia agreed to this immediate transition to "democracy". Serbia did not, and it paid the price. In fact, everyone in former Yugoslavia paid the price, and Srebrenica was part of that price.

HARM 2: Ethics Evaporate: Aggressive military action violates universal standards of behavior

Stephen J. Sniegoski, 2006, "The Downing Street Memos and Nuremberg: The Illegality of the War on Iraq," CURRENT CONCERNS, <www.currentconcerns.ch/archive/2006/01/20060107.php>

As the Declaration in the Judgment of the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946 enunciated: "To initiate a war of aggression is the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." In the opening speech of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Justice Robert Jackson, the chief American prosecutor, asserted: "It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and beautiful city with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still buried under its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or wage an aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes."

HARM 3: Heights of Hypocrisy: NATO engages in the same actions for which Saddam Hussein was condemned

Stephen J. Sniegoski, 2006, "The Downing Street Memos and Nuremberg: The Illegality of the War on Iraq," CURRENT CONCERNS, <www.currentconcerns.ch/archive/2006/01/20060107.php>

The United States was quick to make use of the prohibition against initiating war in order to induce the United Nations to condemn the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and authorize the use of force to oust Iraqi forces from that emirate. However, in 1999 the United States, under the auspices of NATO, attacked Yugoslavia, which was not engaging in any external aggression but rather was trying to suppress an internal insurrection within its national boundaries in Kosovo — an insurrection that had been fomented partly by the CIA.

HARM 4: Allies Aggravated: Lack of a bright line policy on use of force divides and weakens the alliance

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 2004, "165 PC 04 E rev. 1 - NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=500>

Progress notwithstanding, major questions have not been addressed by the Allies, such as the question of who authorises military force under which conditions. This remains a fundamental issue that requires the Allies' urgent attention unless they want to risk a growing gap in US and European thinking on legitimacy and the use of force. As former German State Secretary for Defence, Walter Stützle, told the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations in early October, NATO appears to have at least temporarily lost what he called its 'C3 capability', i.e. its ability to agree on a common concept, achieve political consensus and act as a coalition.

HARM 5: Wider Wars: Unprovoked intervention creates hatred and armed resistance

Richard Falk, 19 Apr 2004, The American Society of International Law's 98th Annual Meeting, "Mapping New Boundaries: Shifting Norms in International Law" <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/04/19_falk_iraq-war-law.htm>

At present, the U.S. Government seems to be claiming the role of being the legislative agency for the creation of geopolitical norms, reinforced by ad hoc coalitions of the willing, in at least two areas impinging on the legal norms governing the use of force: (1) intervention in sovereign states to achieve regime change; (2) selective coercive pressure to promote counter-proliferation goals beyond the mandate of the non-proliferation treaty regime. To the extent that these geopolitical norms are acted upon it represents a fundamental shift from world order based on the principles of territorial sovereignty to a world order based on hegemonic edict. Such a world is best denominated as an imperial world order, and would likely be challenged by statist and non-statist forms of armed resistance.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following plan:

Plank 1: Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters.

Plank 2: Mandates:

The NATO charter shall be amended to require all intervention by NATO military forces to be only in response to a violent attack against a member nation and only against those who attacked it.

No existing missions in violation of Mandate 1 shall be cancelled, but all future decisions about intervention shall conform to this standard.

Plank 3: Funding -- No change in funding is implemented by this plan.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect immediately upon an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES: A defense-only posture solves the harms and achieves significant advantages over the Status Quo

ADVANTAGE 1: Increased likelihood of success on critical international issues

Nicola Butler ( research associate and web manager for the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy), May/June 2004, "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Issue No. 77, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Rather than striving to project US military power further and further beyond its borders, NATO should reaffirm its role as a purely defensive alliance and give a much higher priority to pursuing multilateral action aimed at addressing the root causes of the threats that it faces. Issues such as climate change, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and the Middle East conflict could all be addressed far more effectively through multilateral diplomatic efforts than by military responses.

ADVANTAGE 2: A firm bright-line strengthens the alliance by setting a clear goal

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 2004, "165 PC 04 E rev. 1 - NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=500>

Finding a NATO consensus is a prerequisite for dealing effectively with today's main security threats. To do this, we need a dialogue, but the current state of the transatlantic partnership is characterised by an absence of debate on the primary goals of the Alliance. No agreement exists on the best way to tackle terrorism and countries with WMD. Some nations believe that the way in which the current fight against terrorism is framed might actually lead to more terrorism. No agreement exists on the relevance of the concepts of containment and deterrence in case of new proliferators.

2A EVIDENCE: DEFENSE-ONLY

HARMS

NATO non-defensive intervention in Yugoslavia was unjustified

Stephen J. Sniegoski, 2006, "The Downing Street Memos and Nuremberg: The Illegality of the War on Iraq," CURRENT CONCERNS, <www.currentconcerns.ch/archive/2006/01/20060107.php>

Sanction from the United Nations was not obtained. Proponents of the U.S. attack tried to argue that Yugoslav brutality, which they called "genocide," justified a "humanitarian" war. Whether or not such an attack on a sovereign state was justified for such humanitarian reasons, it clearly violated both the UN Charter and Nuremberg principles. And given the fact that the atrocity claims were much exaggerated, falling far short of genocide, the humanitarian claim itself was highly questionable.

Non-defensive interventions divide and weaken the alliance

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author or editor of five books on NATO), 28 June 2004, "NATO: A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage," <www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2712>

But the farther NATO ventures from its traditional territorial defense mission in Europe, the less competent and united the alliance becomes. There are only 6,500 troops deployed in Afghanistan, mainly in the capital, Kabul, and the surrounding area. Yet even that modest undertaking has strained the alliance. Efforts to deploy more forces elsewhere in the country have been postponed repeatedly. And that is with a mission that has the united backing of NATO members.

Non-defensive intervention eliminates better, peaceful solutions

Philip Corwin (highest ranking United Nations civilian official in Bosnia-Herzegovina at time of the Srebrenica massacre), July 2005, "Srebrenica And the Politics of War Crimes," <http://www.srebrenica-report.com/foreword.htm>

Today, one can only imagine what might have happened in the Balkans if diplomacy had been given a better chance, if NATO had not had the ambition it had to push eastward, up to the borders of the former Soviet Union, to annex what is now being called "the new Europe". It is possible – not certain, but possible -- that in due time there might have been a peaceful break-up of former Yugoslavia, probably along different boundary lines. But the decisions to fracture former Yugoslavia were taken precipitously, by minority communities within Yugoslavia, and were driven by powerful forces outside Yugoslavia – namely, those of NATO, especially the newly-reunited Germany.

Non-defensive interventions threaten world peace

Richard Falk, 20 Feb 2003, " Why International Law Matters" THE NATION, <www.thenation.com/doc/20030310/falk>

It needs to be recalled and confirmed anew that the primary mission of the UN is war prevention. There remains the possibility that America's diplomatic muscle will intimidate the Security Council into ignoring its constitutional responsibilities under the Charter, and either mandate an unwarranted war or refuse to place obstacles in the way of Washington's stated intentions. Such a posture would weaken the credibility of the UN as representing the best interests of the peoples of the world on matters of peace and security, and would further undermine the role of international law. Not only the peace of the world but the vitality of our democracy is in acute danger if the US government continues down this path of lawlessness.

"Preventive War" doctrine will lead to global war and chaos

Richard Falk, 20 Feb 2003, " Why International Law Matters" THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030310/falk>

To apply that claim to Iraq, given the absence of any credible evidence of an imminent threat, is to carry American unilateralism to the frightening extreme of claiming an extraordinarily dangerous and perverse right of "preventive war" (that is, lacking the elements of necessity and imminence). Even here the question "prevent what?" cries for an answer, given the absence of a plausible Iraqi threat in the foreseeable future and the razor-sharp containment policy poised to annihilate Iraq in the event of a Baghdad provocation. Imagine establishing a precedent that might be invoked by China to attack Taiwan pre-emptively, or India in relation to Kashmir, or dozens of other farfetched pre-emptive claims, resulting in an upsurge of dangerous warfare.

INHERENCY

NATO is looking for new missions in which it can intervene

Vince Crawley, 24 Feb 2006, US State Department, "NATO Faces Challenges in Mideast, Darfur, Black Sea and Elsewhere," [www.usembassy.org.uk/nato204.html](http://www.usembassy.org.uk/nato204.html)

The 26-nation alliance was involved in eight simultaneous operations in 2005 and is looking at a range of possible new missions and partnerships, said Kurt Volker, the second in command at the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, during a speech February 23 in Washington.

SOLVENCY

Clear agreement on when to intervene strengthens confidence and trust among NATO members

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 2004, "165 PC 04 E rev. 1 - NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=500>

Except for Afghanistan, 'failing states' such as Sudan and Central Africa do not receive attention from NATO. However, in a world in which the demand for effective security policies is overstretching supply, NATO is faced with multiple challenges at a time of military diminishing resources and a lack of agreement on practical priorities. Agreement on basic principles is important to rebuild trust and confidence on NATO's agenda, its priorities and the specific mix of policy instruments to be employed.

International standards of conduct require defensive posture

Richard Falk, 20 Feb 2003, " Why International Law Matters" THE NATION, <www.thenation.com/doc/20030310/falk>

World War II ended with the historic understanding that recourse to war between states could no longer be treated as a matter of national discretion, but must be regulated to the extent possible through rules administered by international institutions. The basic legal framework was embodied in the UN Charter, a multilateral treaty largely crafted by American diplomats and legal advisers. Its essential feature was to entrust the Security Council with administering a prohibition of recourse to international force (Article 2, Section 4) by states except in circumstances of self-defense, which itself was restricted to responses to a prior "armed attack" (Article 51), and only then until the Security Council had the chance to review the claim.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSE

Less intervention would not reduce safety -- Turn: It would decrease foreign resentment

Theodore C. Sorensen (special counsel and adviser to Pres. John F. Kennedy, practiced international law for over 36 years), 9 Feb 2006, "Presidential Trashing of American Law and Diplomacy," p. 7

I do not think that a more multilateral, law-abiding America would be defenseless or more vulnerable than it is now, especially considering that our current actions antagonize the rest of the world and seem to be building more resentment and creating more enemies.

NO STRINGS ATTACHED: THE CASE FOR ENDING NATIONAL CAVEATS

NATO has powerful military forces that can accomplish a lot of good in the world. But their effectiveness is often blocked by a structural defect that NATO's supreme commander wants desperately to eliminate. Today my partner and I join with NATO commander General Jones in affirming: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: DEFINITIONS

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

Significant: "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

Reform: "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

Caveat: A Latin word meaning "let him beware," "caveat" has a specific meaning in the context of NATO military rules, as explained by Ahto Lobjakas in February 2006: "NATO officials use the term caveat to describe restrictions that different countries place on military action by their forces" *(Ahto Lobjakas, 13 Feb 2006, "Afghanistan: ISAF Expands And Prepares For Long-Term Stay," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* [*http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html*](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html) *)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO's current structure allows national caveats

Col. Michael L. McGinnis (director of the Systems Engineering Dept. at US Military Academy), 2004, "A Deployable Joint Headquarters for the NATO Response Force," JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY, Issue 38, p. 62

National caveats. NATO operations require significant consensus building. All 26 member nations must be in general agreement on the scope of operations before the North Atlantic Council will issue an activation order to take military action. Even after such an order is issued, nations may decline to conduct specific operations, invoking national caveats. Claiming these or other restrictions, individuals assigned to a multinational headquarters may forego exercises or deployments.

OBSERVATION 3: HARMS: Caveats create multiple present and future problems

A. Caveats increase burdens and undermine efficiency and morale

General James Jones (highest ranking military officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), NATO’s HQ), 9 Jan 2006, "Global War on Terror and Future of NATO," interview in HUMAN EVENTS online, <http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374>

The greater the number of caveats, the greater the overall number of troops needed since someone else’s units will have to pick up the slack. Kosovo proved this. We have twice the number of troops in Kosovo (16,000) than we do in Afghanistan, a much larger nation. It is my job to direct a spotlight on these caveats, these misguided ‘safety cocoons’ and to demonstrate how paralysing an influence they are in places such as the Balkans. Left unchecked caveats will spread like a cancer undermining the efficacy and morale of our operations.

B. Caveats block the success of NATO's security mission in Iraq

Daniel R. Coats (US Ambassador to Germany), 13 Oct 2004, The Transatlantic Partnership University of Cologne Convocation,<http://www.uni-koeln.de/uni/aktuell_rede_ws0405_02.htm>

In addition, some NATO nations have placed so many restrictions on their troops' activities that operating as an integrated force is nearly impossible. For example, Germany's prohibitions against any Bundeswehr troops in Iraq for any reason whatsoever, severely hinders the NATO effort to train Iraqi troops in Iraq to provide security for the Iraqi people against insurgents and terrorists. Thus, "no German boots on the ground" prohibits key German military officers currently assigned to NATO headquarters from engaging in the effort that will hasten Iraqi self-governance and self-determination.

C. Hidden caveats create surprises that sabotage NATO missions

Defense and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 15 Nov 2005, "RESOLUTION 336 on REDUCING NATIONAL CAVEATS," <www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=828>

2. Recalling that national caveats may be both declared and known to commanders, or undeclared and therefore unknown to commanders until they actually assign a mission to a particular unit and discover that a caveat prevents that unit from performing that mission; 3. Recalling that such restrictions limited the ability of NATO forces in Kosovo to respond to civil unrest there in March 2004;

D. Caveats threaten the success of the new NATO Response Force

Kathleen Rhem, 15 Sept 2005, American Forces Press Service, Headquarters - United States European Command, "NATO transforming to meet 21st century threats," <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=704>(brackets added)

A senior U.S. defense official, speaking on background, explained Sept. 13 that the NATO Response Force is "usable to do all the things that NATO for decades didn't have to do." "The war was going to come to NATO; NATO did not have to go looking for the war," the official told reporters traveling with [US Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld. "The NRF is designed to focus NATO on being able to provide that kind of capability, to put NATO in a position where it can be an exporter of security around the globe." During the meetings, U.S. officials planned to bring up their concerns on "caveats" — conditions individual nations insist be applied in using their forces for NATO missions.

She goes on to say in the same context:

The official said such caveats can cause myriad problems for commanders in the field. "A commander on the ground has got to know that when he has a security problem or a stability issue to take care of, he needs to be able to use the forces under his command and they can actually go out there and carry out the mission and not worry about whether there's written or more informal caveats," the official said. Such caveats limit commanders' flexibility, Rumsfeld said.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following plan

Plank 1: Agency: NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters shall vote to adopt the affirmative plan. NATO member governments shall make any necessary changes in their national laws to support implementation of the plan.

Plank 2: Mandates:

All national caveats on military participation in current missions shall be abolished.

The NATO treaty shall be amended to permanently ban all future caveats.

Plank 3: Funding shall come from the normal military budgets of NATO countries.

Plank 4: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: This plan takes effect immediately upon an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 6: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. Caveat elimination solves the harms

A. Eliminating caveats is the key to avoiding future problems and costs

General James Jones (highest ranking military officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), NATO’s HQ), 9 Jan 2006, "Global War on Terror and Future of NATO," interview in HUMAN EVENTS online, <www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374>

With regards to Afghanistan and ISAF, the lessons learnt are clear: a) minimise all national caveats on force commitment. If capitals persist in caveating what their units may or may not do within a NATO mission, then we will incur unforeseen and hard to justify costs in future missions of a similar nature.

B. NATO members should trust local commanders with operational decisions

Major General Rick Lynch and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, US Army, May 2006, "Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq," US ARMY PROFESSIONAL WRITING COLLECTION, [www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/may\_2006/5\_06\_2.html](www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/may_2006/5_06_2.html%20) (brackets added)

In all cases, the NTM-I [NATO Training Mission-Iraq] commander is forced to find other solutions to operational requirements. When nations transfer operational control of their personnel to the NATO command structure, they should also transfer the trust in the command for proper employment of forces. This trust is built on careful national consideration of the operational plans, which are politically supported or rejected well in advance of deployment.

2A EVIDENCE: CAVEATS

INHERENCY

Caveats are a frequent occurrence

Major General Rick Lynch and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, US Army, May 2006, "Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq," US ARMY PROFESSIONAL WRITING COLLECTION, <www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/may_2006/5_06_2.html>

NATO personnel issues are equally unwieldy. Some contributing nations attach operational restrictions on personnel that are not commensurate with the political commitment at Istanbul. In addition to operational caveats on personnel, members can have differing limitations or requirements on the length of deployment, predeployment training, mid-tour leaves, and other personnel issues unforeseen to operational planners.

Many restrictive caveats are being applied

Kathleen Rhem, 15 Sept 2005, American Forces Press Service, Headquarters - United States European Command, "NATO transforming to meet 21st century threats," <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=704>

Caveats vary in their limitations and genesis. Examples include more restrictive rules of engagement on the use of force than NATO rules specify, geographic limitations on where troops can operate or where they can fly helicopters, or operational limitations on, for instance, using riot control agents to put down civil disturbances, the U.S. official explained. Some are constitutional issues for the countries involved, others are less formal and can be in writing or only come to light when troops from a certain country are ordered to perform a specific mission.

Removal of "some" caveats is not enough: We need ALL removed

NATO press conference with NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Mr. Soren Jessen-Petersen, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo, 17 Sept 2004, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040917a.htm](www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040917a.htm%20) (Q & A format in original, brackets added, ellipses in original)

[Q.] What kind of changes should be made in both tactics and objectives of KFOR troops in Kosovo just to prevent further violence in the province? Thank you. [A.] De Hoop Scheffer: Well, I think what has been done since March... Of course, KFOR performed very well in March, but there were too many national caveats, so-called caveats. So a lot of these caveats have been removed and I'm going on to plead for the removal of more caveats.

Afghan caveats restrict who can ride on a helicopter

Ahto Lobjakas, 13 Feb 2006, "Afghanistan: ISAF Expands And Prepares For Long-Term Stay," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, [http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html%20) (brackets added)

The ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] command often has to contact the political leadership of different countries to gain access to their troops or assets in Afghanistan. Restrictions usually involve anything from specific "rules of engagement" to details about whether helicopters can carry Afghan personnel.

Caveats are applied in Iraq

Major General Rick Lynch and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, US Army, May 2006, "Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq," US ARMY PROFESSIONAL WRITING COLLECTION, <www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/may_2006/5_06_2.html>

National caveats on personnel participating in NATO-led operations are not a new challenge. Lessons learned from operations in the Balkans often emphasize the impact of caveats on that mission. Nations contributing personnel to the NTM-I also apply operational caveats to their force offerings, to include restrictions on the place of duty and length of deployment. Operational impacts from caveats are countless but include restricting force protection troops from securing vehicle convoys. Another case involves limiting personnel to duty in Baghdad's International Zone.

HARMS

Caveats are a "major headache" for Afghanistan NATO commanders

Max Boot (senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, visited Afghanistan with Gen. James Jones), 21 June 2006, "NATO's Afghanistan challenge" LOS ANGELES TIMES, <www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions>

This points to one of NATO's biggest challenges — getting members to volunteer troops, and to do so without placing too many caveats on their deployment. In addition to limits of geography (many troops won't operate in the south or east), there are also tactical limits. For instance, some soldiers are not allowed by their governments to use chemicals like tear gas to disperse unruly crowds. This can become a major headache for ISAF commanders when figuring out how to deal with riots of the kind that rocked Kabul in May.

Caveats are a serious problem in Afghanistan

Defense and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 12-13 Nov 2005, "SUMMARY of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee," [http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=855](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=855%20)

Jeff Sessions (US) emphasized that economic growth is the key to success in Afghanistan, but military contributions remain crucial to securing some regions and cementing the progress made so far. National caveats are a serious problem in this regard, especially if they prevent national contingents from playing an active military role as NATO forces move to the south of Afghanistan.

Caveats impose ridiculous and infuriating restrictions on NATO commanders

Gerard Baker, 29 Dec 2005, "Nato facing a critical test of its resolve from resurgent Taleban," THE TIMES (London newspaper), <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25689-1961736,00.html>

These caveats are infuriating for the Nato commanders but are imposed by political leaders terrified that the slender public support for the operation in Afghanistan might be shattered completely by serious military reverses. In our case we had fallen foul of a caveat that stated that German military planes were not to fly at night. That’s right. Germany, the second richest member of Nato, a country whose government expresses full commitment to the War on Terror, says that it can take part only in daylight hours.

Hard to get important missions done with caveats being applied

Philip H. Gordon, 8 Jan 2006, International Herald Tribune, "Back up NATO's Afghanistan force,"<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/06/opinion/edgordon.php>

Nor is it clear that the NATO forces are being provided with the resources and flexibility they need to fulfill their mission. While the overall rules of engagement are fairly robust, each contributing nation is operating under so-called national caveats that strictly limit what their troops can do. A British general involved in the ISAF mission said these "wretched caveats," combined with the lack of available aircraft, make it hard for him to do his job.

Caveats wrecked crowd-control mission in Kosovo

James Appathurai (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, Background Briefing, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm>

But in Kosovo, for example, there were troops that could not move, that had national restrictions on movement from one zone to another zone, or restrictions on the protection of patrimonial sites or restrictions on doing crowd control. Now, if you're in Kosovo, if you can't do crowd control you can't move and you can't protect patrimonial sites. It's hard for the force commander to use those forces in an effective way. And the March riots of last year certainly shone a very bright spotlight for all Allies on the actual operational implications of what these caveats mean for the commander on the ground.

Caveats hampered response to violence in Kosovo in March 2004

James Pardew (deputy assistant secretary general and director of operations in NATO's Operations Division), 20 June 2006, "NATO's evolving operations," WORLD SECURITY NETWORK, <www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=13085&topicID=31>

The upsurge in violence in Kosovo in March 2004 highlighted both the problem caused by restrictions on the use of forces and the importance of quality intelligence. The rioting effectively took the Alliance by surprise and national caveats hampered the immediate response.

SOLVENCY

NATO needs political support to use troops properly

Major General Rick Lynch and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, US Army, May 2006, "Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq," US ARMY PROFESSIONAL WRITING COLLECTION, <www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/may_2006/5_06_2.html>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has embarked on a determined transition to a more responsive and deployable posture amidst emerging global threats and instability. Adapting to that environment will be the greatest challenge for an enduring Alliance. Matching the developing NATO Response Force capability and the additional resources of an expanding organization with politically supported mechanisms to support the use of those resources demands the full attention of Allied leadership. As NATO considers its potential response to disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, and future stability operations, the now-familiar lessons identified from the training mission in Iraq must become lessons learned and applied. Only then will NATO maintain its place in history and further its reputation as the modern world's most successful military alliance.

LET'S MAKE A DEAL: THE CASE FOR RATIFYING THE C.F.E. TREATY

Author's note: This is a difficult, more advanced case. Be sure you do some background reading and research to fully understand the issues involved.

Russia and many European countries have signed a treaty that promises to reduce tensions in Europe and bring benefits to many nations. The Russian government has ratified it, but it waits in vain for NATO to respond. Extending a hand of friendship to our former adversaries in Russia, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and OVERVIEW

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

Reform: "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006, <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform> )

Significant: "having or likely to have influence or effect" (Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006, [www.m-w.com/dictionary/significant](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/significant) )

CFE - The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

B. Overview

We will present a comparative advantage case today that will show that the Status Quo has a very important goal, but is not meeting it due to defects in the current behavior of NATO. Our plan will deserve an Affirmative ballot when we show that it better achieves the goal and produces advantages over the Status Quo.

OBSERVATION 2. GOAL: NATO has the goal of building a cooperative and non-threatening relationship with Russia

NATO Official Home Page, 9 May 2006, NATO Topics, "Rus. NATO-Russia relations - Building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area," [www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html](www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html%20) (brackets added)

It [the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council] signaled the determination to give the NATO-Russia partnership new impetus and substance, and demonstrated the shared resolve of NATO member states and Russia to work more closely together towards the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic Area. This goal was first expressed in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which provides the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations.

OBSERVATION 3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: To better understand our case today, let's look at the history of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty

First, the original CFE treaty:

Strategic Forecasting (research firm that gathers intelligence in the areas of geopolitics, security and public policy), 11 Feb 2004, "Battle for the FSU: Russia's Gambit, NATO's Checkmate," <www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1>

NATO and the Soviet Union signed the initial CFE treaty in 1990. The provisions of the treaty called for caps on the amount of combat equipment allowed in certain prescribed "zones" in Europe. In the intervening years, the language in the CFE has become outdated. It does not explicitly cover certain states -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia -- because they did not exist at the time.

Our next piece of evidence explains that to remedy these problems, the "Adapted CFE Treaty" was created in 1999 as we see in:

US Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, 1 Oct 2005, "Verification and Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)" <www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57326.htm>

An Adapted CFE Treaty was signed at the Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in November 1999. At the same time, Russia and Georgia agreed on a Joint Statement which addressed concerns about Russian forces on Georgian territory; Russia made specific commitments regarding withdrawal of its military forces from Moldova; and Russia reiterated then-Prime Minister Putin’s commitment that Russia would reduce its CFE Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the flank region to Adapted Treaty levels. NATO Allies have said that they will not move to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty until all remaining commitments on Georgia and Moldova have been completed.

OBSERVATION 4. INHERENCY: The goal of cooperation with Russia is failing because NATO fails to ratify the new CFE

A. CFE ratification is the biggest issue dividing Russia and NATO today

Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India, 22 June 2005, "CFE treaty remains major obstacle in Russia-NATO relations," [www.india.mid.ru/nfr2005/nf14.html](www.india.mid.ru/nfr2005/nf14.html%20) (parentheses in original)

The ratification of the adapted version of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty) remains the biggest unresolved issue in Russia-NATO relations, Alexander Yakovenko, the Russian Foreign Ministry's official spokesperson, told RIA Novosti today.

B. NATO refuses to ratify the treaty

Maria Danilova, Associated Press, 24 June 2005, "NATO, Russia clash over key arms control treaty," <http://www.latvians.com/en/Mailer/issue-2005-07-02/2005_07_02.shtml#news10> (brackets added)

After Russia agreed in May to pull its troops out of Georgia, "there are no more pretexts left" to delay the ratification of the treaty, [Russian Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov said. But regarding Moldova, Lavrov insisted that Russian troops are crucial to keeping the peace in the region and protecting large ammunition arsenals there. [NATO Secretary General Jaap] De Hoop Scheffer, however, insisted NATO would continue to link the troop withdrawal with ratification of the treaty. "That position will not change," he said.

OBSERVATION 5. We offer the following plan, to be implemented by all the NATO governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters:

Plank 1: Mandates:

NATO will discontinue its insistence on further Russian actions linked to CFE ratification.

NATO member governments that have signed the Amended CFE will ratify it.

Immediately after ratification, NATO countries will adhere to all provisions of the treaty as long as there is no material breach lasting longer than 10 days by Russia. The Secretary General of NATO shall be empowered to make the determination of whether a material breach has occurred.

Immediately after the treaty becomes effective, the NATO Baltic States shall sign, ratify and adhere to the Amended CFE treaty on the same basis as other NATO states.

Plank 2: Funding shall come from the normal operating budgets of NATO and the general revenues of its member governments.

Plank 3: Enforcement shall be through NATO member governments and the NATO Secretary General. Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 4: This plan takes effect 7 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 5: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 6. This plan achieves the goal of cooperation with Russia and has multiple Advantages over the Status Quo:

ADVANTAGE 1. CFE reduces tension with Russia and improves efforts against terrorism and WMD

A. Link: Mutual suspicion blocks efforts on terrorism and WMD

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 28 <www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Nevertheless, mutual suspicion between Russia and NATO countries has not yet been fully overcome, and military planning is still rooted in the possibility of a major confrontation between the two. This complicates their relations, and diverts intellectual and material resources from confronting truly pressing threats, primarily the fight against international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

B. Solvency: CFE ratification will greatly improve cooperation and trust between Russia and NATO

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 32 <www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

The entry into force of an adapted CFE Treaty would meet Russia’s interests. There is no other legal instrument which would restrict NATO’s capabilities to develop armaments and armed forces on the territory of Alliance states near Russia’s borders. The system for the mutual exchange of information, notifications and on-site checks ensures a high level of transparency; this is a major factor for stability and trust, as it eliminates the possibility of covert preparations for military activity. Transparency also allows military construction to be planned and implemented, without concentration on the worst possible case scenario.

ADVANTAGE 2: Implementing CFE opens the door to wider expansion of European security

Assembly of WEU (Western European Union), Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 5 Jun 2002, "Monitoring international discussions on arms control and disarmament," [www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions\_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1784.html#P230\_69753](www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1784.html%23P230_69753%20) (parentheses in original)

The Conference also stressed the importance for the States Parties of living up to their obligations under the Treaty and the commitments entered into at Istanbul, so that the adapted CFE Treaty could be ratified and enter into force as soon as possible. This "new" Treaty, which "will provide a new structure of limitations to reflect changes that have taken place in the political and military situation in Europe (and) will provide for enhanced transparency and provisions pertaining to host State consent to the presence of foreign forces" will also be open to signature by other OSCE member states. This is a very important point, because it could mean extending the zone of stability established by the Treaty to cover the whole continent, which would have positive repercussions, particularly in south-eastern Europe and Cyprus, if the states concerned do indeed accede to the adapted Treaty.

2A EVIDENCE: RATIFY CFE

HISTORY & BACKGROUND

List of nations that have signed Amended CFE

Wade Boese (Research Director), Jan 2003, "The Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty at a Glance," Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/adaptcfe.asp>

CFE states-parties: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States.

CFE puts limits on military equipment in each country

Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, 2005, "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe CFE" <http://www.idds.org/issConvCFE.html>

In the original CFE Treaty, within the ATTU region, each group (NATO and WTO) was limited to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters, in all 78,800 each or a combined total of 157,600 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (TLE). In the Adapted Agreement, group totals are replace with individual country totals.

INHERENCY

NATO and Russia are stuck in a legal quagmire on CFE ratification

Strategic Forecasting (research firm that gathers intelligence in the areas of geopolitics, security and public policy), 11 Feb 2004, "Battle for the FSU: Russia's Gambit, NATO's Checkmate," <www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1>

Moscow's stance on the CFE is at once simple and convoluted: It maintains that all limitations imposed by the original treaty should remain in effect until a new treaty is ratified. NATO argues that since the countries in question did not exist at the time the CFE was signed, its implementation does not apply to military capabilities in those states. This legal quagmire will force both players to couch their actions within the framework of a now-obsolete Cold War-era treaty.

Russia and three other countries are waiting for the rest of the countries to ratify CFE

Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, 2005, "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe CFE" <http://www.idds.org/issConvCFE.html>

On 19 July 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed legislation ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty, which sets out limits on the number of troops and armaments deployed across Europe, and the foreign ministry called on other CFE signatories to the pact to ratify it immediately. Out of the 30 signatory states, including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, only a handful have ratified the amended CFE Treaty as of 2005.

NATO is the only thing holding up CFE ratification

Taras Lariokhin, RIA Novosti (Russian news agency), 2 June 2006, "Russia lays responsibility for CFE treaty on NATO states," <http://en.rian.ru/world/20060602/48985032.html>

Responsibility for the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty lies with NATO countries, the head of a Russian delegation to a Vienna conference said Friday." Given the unconstructive position of NATO member countries, and their unwillingness to launch the ratification process of the adaptation agreement, all responsibility for the CFE's future will rest with our Western partners," said Anatoly Antonov, who heads the Foreign Ministry's department on security and disarmament.

No legitimate reason for NATO not to ratify CFE

WEEKLY TREATY REVIEW, 21 Dec 2005, "Russian Foreign Minister Urges NATO States to Ratify CFE Treaty," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/tic/WTR/wtr_21dec05.pdf>

The Russian foreign minister pointed out that there are currently no grounds for hampering the ratification of the treaty. He also recalled that the adapted version of the treaty had been ratified by just four signatories so far -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Solving Baltic concerns depends on ratifying CFE, which is currently blocked

Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, 2005, "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe CFE" <http://www.idds.org/issConvCFE.html>(parentheses and brackets in original)

Though Russian military withdrawal is not legally required under the terms of any existing treaty, it has been repeatedly demanded by Georgia and Moldova and most CFE countries have made it a pre-condition for their ratification the Adaptation Agreement. The delay in ratification, in turn, poses a problem for Russia in connection with the NATO expansion. On 2 April 2004, NATO formally added seven new European members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia {ACR 402bEUR04 17.3, 2.4}. The new members are expected to accede to the CFE Treaty, which would prohibit a large build-up of foreign NATO armed forces on their territory. But since the original CFE Treaty is not open for accession, their joining the CFE awaits ratification of the Adapted Agreement, which does have provisions for accession. Russia has repeatedly expressed great concern about the window that has been created for a substantial NATO military build-up on its borders in the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia).

NATO uses CFE as bargaining chip for Georgia and Moldova

Maria Danilova, Associated Press, 24 June 2005, "NATO, Russia clash over key arms control treaty," [http://www.latvians.com/en/Mailer/issue-2005-07-02/2005\_07\_02.shtml#news10](http://www.latvians.com/en/Mailer/issue-2005-07-02/2005_07_02.shtml%23news10)

Russia, worried about the prospect of NATO bases on its doorstep, wants the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to commit to the CFE treaty. NATO seeks to use the treaty as an instrument to persuade Moscow to lessen its involvement in Georgia and Moldova, which have both complained of Russian meddling.

SIGNIFICANCE

Russia fears large deployment of troops in Baltic States

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 28 [www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf](http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf)

Several Russian analysts and political figures, meanwhile, consider the strictly hypothetical deployment of large contingents of foreign troops on the territory of the Baltic States as virtually inevitable or, at least, as highly likely. As a result, important aspects of their working papers and recommendations can be found to be greatly unbalanced. This hinders the achievement of the pragmatic, strategic aims of President Putin.

Russia will react if Baltic States are not brought into CFE

Dan Rozelle, 16 Oct 2002, "CFE Treaty set as condition for NATO expansion," The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, [http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol7/ed0716.html](http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol7/ed0716.html%20) (ellipses in original)

Also joining in with less-diplomatic language was Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. "...Russia has taken on commitments to restrict its military presence in northwestern Europe," Ivanov said. "If, however, the Baltic states do not sign this treaty, and if they refuse to take on similar obligations after joining NATO, it would be stupid and laughable for Russia not to react to this."

NATO blockage of CFE aggravates relations with Russia

Sergei Ivanov (Russian Defense Minister) analyses the evolution of NATO-Russia relations since the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, Winter 2005, NATO REVIEW, <www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/special.html>

We have fundamental differences with NATO over the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty). Russia has ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty, which is intended to constitute a cornerstone of the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture. By contrast, the NATO Allies keep insisting on what we consider to be a far-fetched linkage of the Treaty ratification to fulfillment of commitments made at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's 1999 Istanbul Summit in relation to Georgia and Moldova. Since NATO insists on this linkage, the new Baltic Allies, none of which have signed the CFE Treaty, effectively form a grey zone that is not covered by international arms-control agreements. To resolve this issue, Russia has taken concrete steps, starting with the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgia. We have also entered into arduous negotiations with the Transdniestrian Republic in Moldova. However, the Alliance states are yet to begin fulfilling their commitments in relation to the Adapted CFE Treaty.

SOLVENCY

Russia currently abides by CFE rules even though it hasn't been ratified

AFX News (German news agency), 7 Dec 2005, "Russia may reconsider abiding by CFE treaty if US expands military presence," <www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2005-12/artikel-1991732.asp>

"Russia currently fulfills all its obligations under the treaty. But if we see that other countries ignore it, we will draw certain conclusions," [Russian Defense Minister Sergei] Ivanov said. The landmark treaty was meant to slash deployments of conventional forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Soviet-era counterpart, the Warsaw Pact.

NATO policy change will solve for relations with Russia -- NATO is the problem

Russian News & Information Agency (RIA NOVOSTI), 31 May 2006, "CFE Treaty unviable, out of touch with reality - Russia diplomat," <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060531/48882627.html>

"Today the blocking basis of the treaty offers considerable privileges to members of the military and political alliance [NATO] at the expense of those countries who are not in the alliance, including Russia," he [Anatoly Antonov, chief Russian delegate to a Vienna CFE conference] said. Antonov said the document, which had originally been intended as a mechanism for preserving and consolidating control over conventional weapons in Europe, was used by some countries as "an instrument for attaining their geopolitical interests in the former Soviet republics." The diplomat blamed this approach for undermining the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the world's largest regional security organization, and for causing serious problems in relations between Russia and NATO.

CSE is verifiable and works great

US Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, 1 Oct 2005, "Verification and Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)" <www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57326.htm>

The CFE Treaty is an excellent example of a multilateral arms control regime that has been successful without the establishment of a separate international implementing organization such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Instead there is a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in which all States Party meet for most of the year. All CFE States Party have an interest in compliance, but both verification of, and compliance with CFE are national responsibilities. CFE states exchange extensive detailed data on their forces and provide many notifications of changes in that data.

CFE experience with inspections shows good compliance

Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, 2005, "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe CFE" <http://www.idds.org/issConvCFE.html>

Each group of states allocates its quota of inspections among its member states. Each party is also obliged to receive inspections (the "passive inspection quota"). Up to 23 percent of the active quota may be used to conduct "challenge inspections" of sites where the presence of TLE is suspected. Inspections have not revealed any serious compliance problems.

NATO can monitor and verify CFE compliance

US Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, 1 Oct 2005, "Verification and Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)" [www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57326.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57326.htm)

In addition, the 22 NATO CFE states fully cooperate in their inspection activities and exchange the results of their inspections in the NATO Verification Coordination Committee (VCC). States Party employ all national means and methods at their disposal, including national intelligence technical means for CFE verification, in addition to data analysis and inspection results. The Treaty on Open Skies gives CFE states another potential means for potential monitoring CFE.

Ratifying CFE would promote stability in Europe

General Yuri Baluyevsky, (First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces), 3 March 2004, "NATO expansion will deal a lethal blow to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," ISVESTIA, quoted in Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, p. 28

"An adapted CFE Treaty is one of the effective instruments for supporting stability and a balance of interests in the space from the Atlantic to the Urals. We cannot fail to be concerned by attempts to throw doubt over the future of the regime for controlling conventional weapons in Europe."

CFE would relieve Russian fear of Baltic States

Dan Rozelle, 16 Oct 2002, "CFE Treaty set as condition for NATO expansion," The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol7/ed0716.html>

Russia has recently aired a number of grievances with the Baltic states, nearly all of which are designed to interfere with acceptance into NATO. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 25 Sep 02) Chief among Russia's many demands is that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania sign the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

CFE would create trust and cooperation and solve Baltic States issues with Russia

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 28 <www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

In these conditions the accession of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to an adapted CFE Treaty would be useful, as this would eliminate the "gray zone" that has formed near Russian borders, and in which no norms or procedures for the control of armaments, or measures of trust or transparency, currently apply. This would reinforce trust, and would help strengthen cooperative relations between former potential enemies. In part, national and territorial ceilings for armaments of the Baltic States limited by the Treaty would be confirmed by a consensus of the Joint Consultative Group during the process of accession by these states to the CFE Treaty. Other complex issues could also be resolved, for example the issue of whether or not Baltic States would become a part of the flank zone.

CFE would improve cooperation with Russia and improve political-strategic relations

Dr. Marcel de Haas, 29 May 2006, ''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, <www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

Taking into account the longstanding positive experience in arms control between N.A.T.O. and Russia -- resulting from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty -- it is without doubt that military-operational cooperation can be implemented easier than can changing political attitudes. If primacy is given to increased military cooperation, in due course such confidence-building measures may also result in improving political-strategic relations.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Russia is already withdrawing troops from Georgia - ahead of schedule!

Russia withdrawing from Georgia according to plan - commander, RIA Novosti. 08 June 2006 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/06/mil-060608-rianovosti01.htm>

Under an agreement Russia and Georgia signed March 31, Russian troops and hardware are to leave Georgia's two Soviet-era bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi by 2008. The pullout from Akhalkalaki, about 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the border with Turkey, a NATO member, is to be completed by December 2006.Trains carrying equipment from the Akhalkalaki base depart once a week from a railway station in Tsalka, 100 kilometers (62 miles) east of the base, Popov said. The withdrawal is being monitored by a joint Georgian-Russian commission set up under the March agreement.

Russia is withdrawing military from Georgia

Russian News & Information Agency Novisti, "No Georgia CFE ratification without Russian withdrawal - MP," 8 June 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20060608/49212578.html>

Russia has already started withdrawing military hardware from the Black Sea base of Batumi and Akhalkalaki, about 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the border with Turkey, a NATO member. The withdrawal is being monitored by a joint Georgian-Russian commission set up under the March agreement.

**Russian withdrawal from Georgia is on** **schedule and has no problems**

Russian News & Information Agency Novisti, 8 June 2006, " Russia withdrawing from Georgia according to plan - commander," <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060608/49203407.html>

Another train with Russian military hardware from a Soviet-era military base in Georgia departed from the former Soviet republic according to plan, a senior Russian military officer said Thursday. Major-General Andrei Popov, in command of the Russian troops in the South Caucasus, said the train had departed from the Black Sea base of Batumi. He added that the remaining equipment at the base could be removed by three trains, whereas 15 trains would be needed to withdraw the remaining hardware from a base in Akhalkalaki in southern Georgia. "The equipment is being removed according to schedule and without any problems," Popov said.

Russia has met all conditions for CFE ratification

RIA Novosti (Russian news agency), 27 Apr 2006, "NATO in Ukraine, Georgia to reorient Russia military potentials" [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060427/46977984.html](http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060427/46977984.html%20)

"Russia has done everything for the adapted CFE Treaty to come into force: it has complied with the flank limits, fulfilled all the relevant elements of Istanbul agreements and ratified the CFE Agreement on Adaptation," Kamynin said. In another effort to comply with the Istanbul agreements, Kamynin said Russia was already working to pull out its military bases from Georgian territory by 2008.

Georgia pullout is doing fine; Moldova pullout is doing the best it can

Russian News & Information Agency RIA NOVOSTI, 6 July 2006, "Russian FM urges West to ratify adapted CFE treaty," [http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060706/50992437.html](http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060706/50992437.html%20) (brackets in original)

"Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have ratified it [the adapted treaty], but the West refuses to do so under the pretext of ongoing Russian military presence in Transdnestr and Georgia," Lavrov said. He said "the Georgia pretext" was no longer valid as the sides had already agreed on the withdrawal of military bases from Georgian territory. Lavrov said there were only 500 Russian servicemen currently deployed in Moldova's breakaway Transdnestr region and that they were guarding Europe's largest arms depot. "It would be a crime to leave it unattended," he said.

PENALTY BOX: THE CASE FOR INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AND SANCTIONS ON TURKEY

NATO is supposed to be an alliance of democracies that uphold freedom and human rights as an example to the world. But NATO today has neither the mechanism nor the will to uphold those standards upon its own members, and one of its members is falling far short of what the world has a right to expect. That's why my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1: TOPICALITY and CASE OVERVIEW

A. Definitions

NATO: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" <http://www.nato.int/home.htm#> )

Reform: "to put or change into an improved form or condition" (*Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reform))

Significant: "having or likely to have influence or effect" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com/dictionary/significant*](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/significant) *)*

B. Overview

We will present a goals/criteria case today in which we will ask you to judge this round through the criteria of Democracy and Human Rights. At the end of the round, we will ask you for an Affirmative ballot on the basis that our plan better upholds, promotes, and sustains these vital principles better than the Status Quo.

OBSERVATION 2. GOALS: NATO should promote Democracy and Human Rights

Tom Malinowski (Washington advocacy director of Human Rights Watch), 28 May 2002, "Beware, Moscow could contaminate NATO," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, <http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2002/nato0528.htm>

NATO has based its post-Cold War expansion in part on a commitment to promote democracy and the rule of law. It is "determined," in the words of its 1999 Washington Declaration, to "stand firm against those who violate human rights."

OBSERVATION 3. INHERENCY: NATO lacks the mechanism and the will to uphold these values among its own members

A. NATO lacks a mechanism to discipline unworthy members

Celeste A. Wallander (Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Nov/Dec 2002, "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101facomment9987/celeste-a-wallander/nato-s-price-shape-up-or-ship-out.html>

Right now, NATO operates like a soccer team that holds tryouts to select players but then can never cut delinquent ones from the roster if they break training and lose their skills and conditioning. If NATO is to remain a successful team, it needs a credible mechanism to bench, and ultimately drop, flabby members.

B. NATO lacks the will to discipline unworthy members.

Szechy Balazs, 2002, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and State Administration, THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY, p. 49

NATO has never sanctioned, much less ejected, a state for domestic political changes, but not because it lacked opportunity. Both Greece and Turkey experienced reversions to autocracy. Portugal's membership as a dictatorship demonstrates that strong national security interests can trump liberal interests in advancing democracy.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following plan, to be implemented by all NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters.

Plank 1: Mandates:

NATO's charter shall be amended to allow for two levels of internal discipline, which will be: one-year probation and expulsion.

Discipline shall be applied to any government that 1) is not freely elected and completely controlled by elected leadership; or 2) does not uphold human rights; or 3) initiates combat against another NATO country.

One-year probation may be imposed by a vote of 2/3 of NATO members. NATO members will suspend arms transfers and foreign aid to the sanctioned country during the probationary period. Probation may be lifted by a 2/3 vote of NATO members in good standing if reforms are completed.

If probation has not been lifted after one year, the offending country shall be automatically expelled from NATO. It may re-apply for membership on the same basis as any other nation that has never been a member of NATO.

Turkey shall be placed on probation.

Plank 2: Funding shall come from existing NATO budgets. No increase in funding over current budgets is needed.

Plank 3: Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office. Any arms transfers made illegally to a sanctioned country shall be punished with 10 years imprisonment without parole.

Plank 4: Mandates 1-4 take place 1 day after an Affirmative ballot. Mandate 5 takes place 2 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 5: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. ADVANTAGES.

ADVANTAGE 1: Internal discipline achieves the goals of our case, and makes NATO more valuable and more effective

A. Significance: The military aspects of the alliance fail if NATO does not meet the higher social goals

Celeste A. Wallander (Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Nov/Dec 2002, "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101facomment9987/celeste-a-wallander/nato-s-price-shape-up-or-ship-out.html>

Nato is a uniquely effective multilateral military alliance precisely because it is a political security community of countries with common values and democratic institutions. Nato works only because it is both military and political in nature. Dilute NATO's political coherence, and the result will be a one-dimensional traditional military alliance that cannot operate effectively.

B. Solvency: Internal discipline upholds democracy and human rights and ensures success of the alliance

Celeste A. Wallander (Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Nov/Dec 2002, "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101facomment9987/celeste-a-wallander/nato-s-price-shape-up-or-ship-out.html>

Regrettably, the current obsession with how military missions will be defined and whether members spend two percent of their GDPS on defense has obscured a more urgent crisis: NATO needs to take steps to ensure that old, new, and prospective members live up to its political standards, thereby securing the organization's coherence and relevance. If NATO is truly dedicated to protecting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, its own members cannot be exempt from upholding those principles.

ADVANTAGE 2. Promote peace, end hypocrisy, and uphold international law

A. Significance: The Turkish invasion and ongoing occupation of Cyprus call out for NATO sanction

American Hellenic Institute, 12 Apr 2006, "Greek American Membership Organizations’ 2006 Policy Statement on the Cyprus Problem," <www.ahiworld.com/press_releases/041206.html>

NATO’s toleration of Turkey’s aggression against Cyprus in violation of the NATO Treaty and the UN Charter is evidence of a double standard and a stain on NATO’s record and honor. NATO should call for the immediate removal of Turkey’s illegal occupation forces and settlers from Cyprus and the demilitarization of Cyprus. If Turkey refuses to cooperate, NATO should consider appropriate action to bring Turkey into compliance.

B. Solvency: Upholding international law is essential to successful foreign policy and resolution of the Cyprus problem

Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-Maryland), 18 Mar 2006, at the American Hellenic Institute’s annual awards dinner, quoted in "Greek American Membership Organizations’ 2006 Policy Statement on the Cyprus Problem," <www.ahiworld.com/press_releases/041206.html>

NATO for the first time in its history invoked the article of the Charter that said an attack on one country is an attack on all. Yet if you look around the world today that great support that we had has evaporated, and I think we need as a country to get back to many of our earlier roots in the area of foreign policy. We need to understand that the rule of law is not an ‘a la carte’ selection. You can’t pick and chose when you are going to abide by international law.

Rep. Van Hollen goes on to say in the same context:

And it is especially important that we maintain note of those convictions because when we talk about situations like that in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus we are going to need to depend on the rule of law for our argument.

ADVANTAGE 3: Promote human rights and democracy in Turkey

A. Significance: Turkey has significant problems with military interference in democracy and lack of freedom

Prof. Bruce Fleming (US Naval Academy, visited Turkey in Spring 2006), 9 May 2006, "Talking Turkey," ACTURCA, <http://acturca.wordpress.com/2006/05/11/talking-turkey/>/ (parentheses in original)

More recently, Turkey's political history for the last decades has been an alternation of civilian governments with military coups when the military felt things were getting too chaotic. Even today, with a civilian government, the military is omnipresent. The Istanbul English-language newspaper Turkish Daily News when I was there was full of cases Turkey had lost before the European Court in the Hague because military judges had been involved in civilian trials, rebukes by European delegates to the Strasbourg assembly regarding military presence in chambers during political debates, and continuing worries about how far freedom of the press in Turkey goes. (In Turkey it's a crime to "malign Turkishness.")

B. Solvency: US & European allies must help Turkey transition to democracy

Michael A. McFaul (Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ.) and others (Urban Ahlin, Ronald Asmus, Steven Everts, Jana Hybaskova, Mark Leonard, Michael McFaul, Michael Mertes), 14 Mar 2004, "A Trans-Atlantic Plan For Democracy," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1483>

Second, the United States and its European allies need to help create the external security environment and regional context in which democratic change can occur more easily. As well as working to further peace between Israel and Palestine, we must help Turkey succeed in turning itself into a full-fledged democracy that qualifies for EU membership, renew pressure on the Iranian regime for democracy and arms control, and avoid a premature disengagement from the democratic transition under way in Iraq.

2A EVIDENCE: ESTABLISH DISCIPLINE AND SANCTION TURKEY

GOAL

NATO should promote democratic values

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO? -- Security" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#

NATO safeguards the Allies' common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

INHERENCY

NATO needs an expulsion method

Philip Gordon (Director, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution), 17 Apr 2002, "THE FUTURE OF NATO AND ENLARGEMENT," testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, p. 37

I would add the thought, though, that we might need to consider a mechanism to suspend the membership of those who no longer meet their obligations, either military or political. That has been considered in the past. It never proved actually necessary, or it was never implemented in the past, but as the number of members rises, and I think to help us confront this problem, at some point, too, the process is great at getting candidates to reform before they get in, but once they get in they get a free pass. I think we might need to think about some sort of suspension mechanism to make sure that all allies continue to meet their obligations even once they are in.

NATO has consistently failed to discipline its own members

Prof. Joaquín Roy (Director, European Union Center, Univ. of Miami), Mar 2005, "The U S. perception and attitude towards the "Constitutionalization" of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy" <http://aei.pitt.edu/3038/01/austin.txt>

But NATO also consolidated the dictatorship of Oliveira Salazar in Portugal (a founding member of the Alliance in 1949). It never raised an eyebrow when Turkey (a member along with Greece in 1952) was under the influence of its military. And it never moved a finger when Athens fell under "the dictatorship of the Colonels."

US is supporting Turkey in Status Quo

Prof. Joaquín Roy (Director, European Union Center, Univ. of Miami), Mar 2005, "The U S. perception and attitude towards the "Constitutionalization" of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy" <http://aei.pitt.edu/3038/01/austin.txt>

The U.S. government has been increasing its insistence on Turkish membership in the European Union and has already started its "campaign" for a closer cooperation between the EU and the Ukraine, aiming at full membership some day.

NATO fails to enforce any peace or democracy standards upon its own members

Richard Corbett (member of British Parliament), 12 May 2006, " Blog - Richard Corbett MEP," [http://corbett.pir2.info/blog/archives/2006\_05\_01\_archive.html](http://corbett.pir2.info/blog/archives/2006_05_01_archive.html%20) (brackets added)

This [the EU] contrasts with NATO, which, despite achieving its main goal of dissuading external aggression, failed to keep peace between its own members (the conflict between Turkey and Greece) and allowed Portugal to be a member when it was a dictatorship.

Turkey's abuses and lack of democracy are being ignored

Frida Berrigan and William D. Hartung, with Leslie Heffel, June 2005, U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR 2005: PROMOTING FREEDOM OR FUELING CONFLICT?, A World Policy Institute Special Report, ARMS TRADE RESOURCE CENTER, [http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html#15](http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html%2315)

Turkey is so valuable that Washington turns a blind eye to human rights abuses and lack of democracy, and supports the country’s bid to become a member of the European Union despite the objections of leaders within that body.

HARMS

Turkey is an unreliable ally

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe) and Omer Taspinar (research fellow and director of the Turkey program) both of the Brooking Institution, Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p. 66

U.S. anger over the Turkish parliament’s March 1, 2003, refusal to allow U.S. forces access to Turkish territory for the invasion and Turkish frustration over U.S. support for Iraqi Kurds have led to unprecedented mutual resentment between Ankara and Washington. Numerous opinion polls confirm that growing numbers of Turks perceive their NATO ally as a security problem rather than a strategic partner.

Turkey is hurting the West's war on terrorism

Jonathan Eric Lewis, Spring 2006, MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, "Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?" <http://www.meforum.org/article/928>

Erdogan's government has also undercut the West's war on terrorism. By criticizing Israel's counterterrorism operations as "state terror," Erdogan enabled Turkey's European critics to characterize the Turkish military's operations against the PKK in the same way. The sympathy of AKP deputies toward Iraqi insurgents also implied some forms of terrorism to be more legitimate than others, a logic which can be turned against Turkey by its longtime Islamist opponents.

Turks hate America and don't support US goals

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe) and Omer Taspinar (research fellow and director of the Turkey program) both of the Brooking Institution, Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p. 66

A 2005 BBC poll, for example, found that 82 percent of Turks considered U.S. policies in the Middle East as a threat to peace and security. In analyzing Turkey’s frustration with the United States, one needs to go beyond the Bush administration’s negative global image. The German Marshall Fund’s May 2005 transatlantic survey, for example, showed that although anti-Americanism is in relative decline in Europe, the trend in Turkey is in the opposite direction.

Failure to sanction Turkey = hypocrisy

American Hellenic Institute, 12 Apr 2006, "Greek American Membership Organizations’ 2006 Policy Statement on the Cyprus Problem,"<http://www.ahiworld.com/press_releases/041206.htm>

The failure to call for the removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus is a striking example of the double standard in Turkey’s favor. It is particularly distressing as the Turkish troops which invaded Cyprus caused substantial loss of lives, 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees and huge destruction of property. The reasons to call for the removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus are as compelling, and more so, than getting Syrian troops out of Lebanon.

NATO's double standards are an embarrassment compared to the European Union's higher standards

Prof. Joaquín Roy (Director, European Union Center, Univ. of Miami), Mar 2005, "The U S. perception and attitude towards the "Constitutionalization" of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy" <http://aei.pitt.edu/3038/01/austin.txt> (parentheses in original)

In stark contrast to the "flexible" membership requirements in NATO (a sort of "coalition of the willing"), Greece, Portugal and Spain had to wait to enjoy impeccable democratic credentials to enter the European Union. This shows the clear difference in membership conditions, reflecting a deeper philosophical aim. Double standards do not work in Brussels.

Turkey's government is militarized and fascist

Prof. Bruce Fleming (US Naval Academy, visited Turkey in Spring 2006), 9 May 2006, "Talking Turkey," ACTURCA, <http://acturca.wordpress.com/2006/05/11/talking-turkey/>

Put in Turkish terms this question becomes: Why has the military again and again engineered coups of civilian governments? The military, in whatever country it intervenes in politics, invariably finds civilians and their goings-on unpredictable and messy (see my earlier consideration of "Military Hardness" for one way this works out on our domestic front). The military can always make things happen on a schedule, or the trains run on time. But as a result military control blurs into fascism. That's why right-wing dictators are so thickly tarred with military overlay.

Turkey violates civil rights: speech, press, religion

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, 8 Mar 2006, "Turkey - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005," <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61680.htm> (parentheses in original, brackets added)

The government, particularly the police and judiciary, limited freedom of expression through the use of constitutional restrictions and numerous laws, including articles of the penal code prohibiting insults to the government, the state, "Turkish identity," or the institutions and symbols of the republic. Other laws, such as the Anti-Terror Law and laws governing the press and elections, also restrict speech. Individuals could not criticize the state or government publicly without fear of reprisal, and the government continued to restrict expression by individuals sympathetic to some religious, political, and Kurdish nationalist or cultural viewpoints.

Turkey violates civil rights: torture and abuse

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, 8 Mar 2006, "Turkey - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005," [www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61680.htm](www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61680.htm%20) (parentheses in original, brackets added)

Incidents of torture and abuse declined during the year but remained widespread. Courts rarely convicted security officials accused of torture and tended to issue light sentences when they did convict (see section 1.d.). According to the HRF [Human Rights Foundation], there were 657 credible cases of torture or abuse reported at its 5 national treatment centers through November. Of these, 180 cases involved torture or abuse inflicted during the year; the rest involved incidents that occurred previously. A number of human rights observers claimed that only a small percentage of detainees reported torture and abuse because they feared retaliation or believed that complaining was futile.

Turkey causes trouble: War in Cyprus and violations of human rights against the Kurds

Frida Berrigan and William D. Hartung, with Leslie Heffel, June 2005, U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR 2005: PROMOTING FREEDOM OR FUELING CONFLICT?, A World Policy Institute Special Report, ARMS TRADE RESOURCE CENTER, http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html#15

Ankara disrespects and abuses religious, political and ethnic minorities. It has also aggressively taken part in two conflicts: against Greece over the island of Cyprus and against the Kurdish population in the southeast portion of the country. The country’s long-running conflict with the Kurdish minority is rife with human rights abuses.

Turkey prosecutes anyone who questions the government

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, 8 Mar 2006, "Turkey - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005," [www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61680.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61680.htm) (parentheses in original, brackets added)

Active debates on human rights and government policies continued, particularly on issues relating to the country's European Union (EU) membership process, the role of the military, Islam, political Islam, and the question of Turks of Kurdish origin as "minorities"; however, persons who wrote or spoke out on such topics risked prosecution.

Turkey does not meet European standards of human rights and democracy

Frida Berrigan and William D. Hartung, with Leslie Heffel, June 2005, U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR 2005: PROMOTING FREEDOM OR FUELING CONFLICT?, A World Policy Institute Special Report, ARMS TRADE RESOURCE CENTER, http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html#15

In 2002, Turkey sought membership in the European Union (EU), but was turned down for a number of reasons, primarily its poor human rights record. Before Turkey can join the EU, it must comply with the Copenhagen criteria, including "democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities." Turkey has not been able to fulfill the criteria in the past, and does not seem to have made much headway recently.

SOLVENCY

NATO has leverage: Turkey buys huge quantities of arms from the US

Frida Berrigan and William D. Hartung, with Leslie Heffel, June 2005, U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR 2005: PROMOTING FREEDOM OR FUELING CONFLICT?, A World Policy Institute Special Report, ARMS TRADE RESOURCE CENTER, [http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html#15](http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html%2315)

In the midst of a thirty-year plan to modernize its military, Turkey purchases an enormous quantity of weapons and other military equipment from the United States. Between 1994 and 2003, Turkey took delivery of more than $6.8 billion in U.S. weaponry and services.

NATO has leverage: Turkey will respond to demands for reform

Frida Berrigan and William D. Hartung, with Leslie Heffel, June 2005, U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR 2005: PROMOTING FREEDOM OR FUELING CONFLICT?, A World Policy Institute Special Report, ARMS TRADE RESOURCE CENTER, [http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html#15](http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/wawjune2005.html%2315)

Recently, Ankara has been more amenable to Washington’ s requests, and the two countries are discussing housing 72 F-16 fighter planes on the base. According to a senior Turkish military official, "the bottom line is that we will gain nothing by rejecting the U.S. request. Plus a failure to accommodate the request could be unnecessarily costly. So Turkey’s final response should be a yes."

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSE

Uniqueness: Need to search for new allies to replace Turkey anyway because Turkey is unreliable

Jonathan Eric Lewis, Spring 2006, MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, "Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?" <http://www.meforum.org/article/928>

A 2004 Johns Hopkins University Central Asia-Caucasus Institute study group found that "with the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalitions projecting power into Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the South Caucasus has de facto been drawn into the perimeter of Euro-Atlantic strategic concerns." It is essential that Washington maintain its strategic reach, even if it cannot rely on Ankara to do so. The deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations mandates not abandonment but rather a search for new allies.

AFGHANISTAN MISSION IS WORKING

HARMS

Status Quo is working: End is near for bad guys in Afghanistan

Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, 6 Mar 2006, "Jones Sees Demise of Afghan Terrorists, Narcotraffickers," AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE, <www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/20060306_4403.html>

The end is drawing near for remnant Taliban, al Qaeda and other elements seeking to displace the Afghan government for their own purposes, the American general who oversees U.S. troops in Europe and NATO matters said here yesterday. "I think this is a turning moment for what's left of the insurgency and also for the criminal element, the narcotics traffickers and all the others, who are working on their own in their own way to destabilize the growth of the (Afghan President Hamid) Karzai government," Marine Gen. James L. Jones told "CNN Late Edition" host Wolf Blitzer.

NATO is spreading rule of law and democracy in Afghanistan

NATO official web page, 5 Feb 2006, "ISAF Forces in Afghanistan," 2006 - BG001, <www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounders/bg001_isaf.htm>

ISAF's [International Security Assistance Force] role is to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community in maintaining security within its area of operations. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan in extending its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to stronger democratic governance, the spread of the rule of law, and the reconstruction of the country.

NATO mission in Afghanistan is essential to long-term security of the country

NATO official web page, 5 Feb 2006, "ISAF Forces in Afghanistan," 2006 - BG001, <www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounders/bg001_isaf.htm>

ISAF conducts security presence patrols throughout Kabul and its surrounding areas and within the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) areas of operation. ISAF conducts approximately 600 patrols each week - around 100 of which are conducted jointly with the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA). Operations in support of National Security Forces can also involve the clearance and destruction of unexploded ordnance or material, which could be used for improvised explosive devices. This is essential for the long-term security of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's biggest problem is drugs

General James Jones (NATO Supreme Commander), quoted in "Analysis: NATO Sizes Up The Task In Southern Afghanistan," 23 May 2006, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, <www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/d903acf2-b360-4005-a0a2-fa086848914c.html>

"The situation in Afghanistan, in my view, in terms of threats, is multifaceted. I'm not so much concerned about a return of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda as much as I am about the success of the war on drugs -- which is accounting for about 50 percent of the gross domestic product of that country. To me, that is a much more serious problem. It has its own threats with regard to violence."

INHERENCY

NATO has changed its policies to meet new challenges in Afghanistan

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

Our first priority for Riga is to ensure that NATO succeeds in Afghanistan as it prepares to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the South and thereafter to the East. At that point NATO will be responsible for security throughout Afghanistan, with a remaining U.S.-led coalition pursuing the counter-terrorism mission. As part of this transition, NATO has changed its Operations Plan and rules of engagement to meet greater challenges in those regions.

DISADVANTAGES

1. NATO pullout would hurt war on terror: US needs NATO in Afghanistan to free up troops elsewhere

Francis Rheinheimer, 15 May 2006, "Afghanistan Stage III: NATO’s most ambitious operation?" CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, <www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=3428&from_page=../index.cfm>

The expansion of NATO into the volatile southern regions of Afghanistan comes at a time when the United States is struggling to maintain its overseas campaigns. Increasing costs, both financially and in terms of human lives, have jelled popular discontent with the war in Iraq and cast doubt on Washington’s ability to balance the "war on terror" with other pressing security needs. The U.S. force in Afghanistan will be drawn down from 19,000 to 16,500 this year, although both military and civilian leaders have promised an American presence in the country for years to come.

2. NATO pullout from Afghanistan would cause "terrorism export"

James Graff, 28 Jan 2006, TIME magazine, Europe edition, "Old Alliance, New World," <www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901060206-1154159,00.html>

Jaap De Hoop Scheffer says he has no illusions about the complexity of the task facing Nato in Afghanistan. But the aim of its mission, he adds, is quite simple: finish what was started. "If we think we can leave Afghanistan on its own now after all that we have invested, we are making a fatal mistake," Nato's Secretary-General told Time last week. "Afghanistan was an exporter of terrorism, and if we do not want it to become one again, we had better take what we do there very seriously."

Afghanistan will export terror if NATO pulls out

Judy Dempsey, 30 Jan 2006, International Herald Tribune " Dutch pressed over Afghanistan," <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/29/news/nato.php>

Days before the Dutch Parliament holds a crucial vote over sending troops to the south of Afghanistan, the NATO secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has made an impassioned appeal to his countrymen to support one of the most dangerous missions undertaken by the U.S.-led military alliance. "This is an alliance based on solidarity where nations cannot pick and choose," de Hoop Scheffer said during an interview in his Brussels office. If the NATO alliance does not succeed, he warned, "the consequences will be dire," adding, "It will be a nation exporting terrorism."

3. Pullout from Afghanistan would wreck NATO alliance solidarity

Judy Dempsey, 30 Jan 2006, International Herald Tribune " Dutch pressed over Afghanistan," [http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/29/news/nato.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/29/news/nato.php%20) (brackets added)

He added that countries could no longer argue against joining an operation because it was too dangerous. "Afghanistan is NATO's most important operation," he [Scheffer] said. "Solidarity demands in this alliance that if you are in a position to participate in this operation you should participate. You should not say, sorry, it is too dangerous. We will not go. That is an argument I do not buy. What do you have armed forces for?"

4. Pullout from Afghanistan hurts NATO-Russia cooperation

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, <www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm>

Speaking about cooperation where it matters, Afghanistan and the wider region around it must be a key concern to Russia as well as to NATO. In the NRC we have conducted regular and detailed consultations on the situation in Afghanistan. I hope that we can make progress soon on Russia’s offers of assistance to ISAF. And I am heartened by Russia’s interest in engaging with the Alliance on the challenges and opportunities in this broader geographic region, and what we in the NATO-Russia Council can contribute to meet them.

5. Pullout from Afghanistan would wreck Afghanistan

Sen. John McCain, 4 Feb 2006, Munich Conference on Security Policy, "NATO's Future Role in International Peace Keeping," <www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?id=160&sprache=en&>

The 37 countries active in Afghanistan are faced off against terrorists who believe they can apply lessons from Iraq to undermine President Karzai and Afghanistan's democratic government. We cannot let them do that. Operations there are costly and they are dangerous, but they are necessary to preventing the reemergence of a pre-9/11 failed state.

ARTICLE V - USELESS

Article V does not require a military response

World Affairs Institute, 14 Nov 2001, "Europe in Transition - Responding to New Challenges," p. 3

In reality, of course, declaring that an attack on an ally is an attack on you does not require that you respond with military force. No U.S. Senate would consent to ratifying a treaty that took away its right to declare war. Depending on the circumstances, military force may not be an appropriate or desirable step.

Article V is vague about what constitutes "an armed attack"

Mike Purzycki, Oct 2005, "The North Atlantic's Tenuous Organization," THE GLOBE, International Affairs Society, <www.gwias.com/globe/archive/000075.html>

Second, the wording of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty does not specify clearly enough the circumstances under which the alliance can use military force in response to an attack against one of its members. The article states that if "an armed attack" occurs against one or more member states, all members will "assist the Party or Parties attacked" by taking action "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The article leaves ambiguous the definition of "an armed attack." For example, it offers no explanation of why the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were sufficient to invoke Article V while those in Madrid and London were not.

Article V doesn't have much meaning after 9/11

Fiona Simpson and Chris Lindborg, Dec 2002, "The Results of the Prague Summit and the Challenges Ahead," British American Security Information Council, [www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002ResultPrague.htm](http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002ResultPrague.htm)

In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article V of its Charter for the first time in its history. This article, which interprets an attack on one member as an attack on all, states that each member will assist he Party or Parties attacked, including making use of armed force. The fact that this offer of assistance has remained largely unexploited provoked questions on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the continuing relevance and effectiveness of NATO.

Article V is meaningless without political unity

Ambassador Brenda Schoonover, 28 Feb 2006, "Europe and the United States - An Evolving Alliance," AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0103/scho/schoonover_europe.html>

In addition, for the first time in history, NATO evoked article V of the Common Defense Treaty stipulating that an attack against the United States was an attack on all of NATO. Unfortunately, the Europeans' widespread show of solidarity proved to be short-lived. One of the reasons cited is the Americans' go-it-alone attitude and another, our pre-emptive actions in Iraq.

ASIAN COUNTRIES JOINING NATO - NEGATIVE

HARMS

1. No threat: We need less commitments in Asia, not more

Doug Bandow ( political writer and policy analyst, served as a special assistant to President Reagan), 7 July 2006, "Can't We Drop Even One Alliance?" http://antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248

The Red Hordes seem ill-prepared to pour forth from Russia to conquer Europe, so who needs NATO? China doesn't have the conventional capability to invade Taiwan, let alone Japan. Why base a Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa?

INHERENCY

1. NATO is already cooperating with Australia and Japan

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

And as we look ahead to the Riga Summit this fall, we are finding that as NATO is active in places like Afghanistan or Iraq or Darfur, we are working side-by-side with countries that share NATO’s values and that are capable of contributing to security, such as Australia or Japan and others. Given the tempo of demands placed on the Alliance, we are working to identify ways to strengthen our cooperation with these countries and other security contributors beyond the alliance as well.

2. US is already has anti-terrorist military cooperation with Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

Activities by terrorists and their supporters have been centered in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in the area of the Sulawesi Sea. With the cooperation of those nations, we have been building capacity and strengthening the ability of those countries to resist the activities of the terrorists and to actively seek their capture or demise.

3. Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines (OEF-P) is already doing military cooperation

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) remains focused on training, advising, and assisting WOT efforts of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). As a result, we note both operational and organizational improvement in counterterrorism capacity of the AFP and other Philippine Security Forces.

4. Status Quo is solving terrorism in the Philippines

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

Other efforts, such as strategic communication, humanitarian and civil assistance, civil-military operations, intelligence fusion, and ongoing peace negotiations between the Philippine government and separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), have eroded support to the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamyah. In summary, we have made progress, but more can and will be done.

5. JCET program helps Philippines defeat terrorism

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

In addition to operations in the Philippines, the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program is the principal mechanism used by Special Operations Forces to assist partner nations in building capacity to defeat terrorism and improve our understanding of complexity of the local environment.

6. Status Quo military partnership is improving Indonesia military

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

Aid to the Indonesian military (TNI) will help sustain ongoing reforms as well as increase capacity for action against security threats and bolster their professionalism. Our assistance to the TNI will contribute to the long-term success of the Indonesian democracy — and ultimately — help remove conditions that breed terrorism. In the wake of the recent Department of State decision to waive the FY06 Foreign Operations Appropriations restrictions in the interest of national security, we have moved out smartly to implement Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Indonesia. As we move forward in this new partnership, we remain committed to the improving the professionalism of the TNI and we will continue to closely observe and emphasize their support for human rights.

7. Theater Security Cooperation Plan enhances US relationships with Asian allies

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of allies and regional partners. It is fully coordinated with our embassy country teams and integrates available resources — security assistance, military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and outreach programs — into a coherent, mutually supportive set of activities for each country. Of note, our enlisted leadership development program, targeted at militaries in developing nations, serves to enhance the professionalism and capacity of this key cohort. With stronger non-commissioned officers, we believe that the operational professionalism of units is increased as well as individual soldier leadership, important in building capability and respect for human rights.

8. US-Japan alliance is strong and guarantees regional stability in Asia

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most important pact in the Pacific and is as strong as ever. Approximately 50,000 U.S. armed forces personnel are in Japan, either permanently assigned or forward deployed with Naval Forces. The Government of Japan also provides approximately $4 billion annually in host nation support to our basing arrangements. These forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces send a strong signal of U.S. commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region as well as providing a ready response force in East Asia.

9. US commitments to Korea, Japan and Taiwan are adequate: No need for Europe

JAMES B. STEINBERG (VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION), 2003, "AN ELECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY" CROSSING THE ATLANTIC: A Report from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops, p. 24

U.S. security interests in East Asia, including treaty alliances with Japan and Korea, and a strong historical connection to Taiwan, mean that the United States will have a greater stake than Europe in managing the complex transition in East Asia involving the growing strength of China and the likely unification of the Koreas.

10. US already has strong alliance with Thailand

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON (US NAVY, COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND), 8 Mar 2005, Testimony BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE, <www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050308fallon_sasc.shtml>

Thailand is a Major Non-NATO Ally that maintains a robust military relationship with the U.S. Thailand has led military peace observers in Aceh, Indonesia, and completed engineering deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thailand routinely supports our access and training requirements and plays generous host to the USPACOM's premier multilateral exercise, Cobra Gold.

SOLVENCY

1. European alliance provides no benefit to East Asia

Anthony H. Cordesman, Spring 2005, NATO REVIEW, "Rethinking NATO's force transformation," <www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art4.html>

The "specialisation" of Europe and the United States also reflects the reality that two of the most important security priorities for the United States are outside of Europe: the security of Korea and stability in the Taiwan Straits. Both are military arenas where Europe can at most play a token role. Even in the Gulf and Central Asia, the United Kingdom is now the only European power with any real-world prospect of deploying and sustaining serious out-of-area deployments.

2. Proposed new missions for NATO can be accomplished better by Status Quo methods

Rajan Menon (Fellow, New America Foundation), 1 July 2003, World Policy Journal, "The End of Alliances," <www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=2119>

The new job description being written for NATO will also extend its reach beyond Europe, but such ventures —"out of area operations"—have typically produced friction, not fellowship, in the past. Furthermore, it is hardly self-evident that NATO has a comparative advantage over states with which the United States has convergent interests, but not a formal alliance, when it comes to putative partners for such missions. Nor is clear why these missions require a grand military alliance.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Promotes formation of an anti-US alliance of Russia and China

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <www.cfr.org/publication/10824/>

While some U.S. observers are concerned that China and Russia are trying to build a new sphere of influence in the region, others say the two countries are reacting to U.S. efforts to encourage democracy in Central Asia, which are seen as threatening to both Moscow and Beijing. "It's a mutually reinforcing process," says Carpenter. "The reactions of Russia and China are influenced by the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the U.S. hegemonic presence in the world. That, particularly, is drawing together two natural adversaries."

2. Security turn: New alliances in Asia will be less secure than the Status Quo

Purnendra Jain, 18 Mar 2006, "A 'little NATO' against China," ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html](www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html%20) (brackets added)

No doubt growing worries about terrorism and about nuclear developments in the Korean Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East have placed new demands on regional leaders. However, it is not necessarily politically sensible for a select group of nations to band together and exclude others - a Cold War-type response. A cooperative and inclusive framework rather than exclusion and containment would be a better way forward.

BOSNIA FAILURE

NATO failed to establish a functioning government in Bosnia

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 6 Nov 2005, "Fanning the Flames in the Balkans," <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6336>

Bosnia consists of the Bosnian Serb republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, each with a high degree of autonomy, which are tenuously linked by a weak central government. Most real power resides with the two sub-state units - and even more so with an international high representative backed by a NATO army of occupation. A decade after the Dayton accords, Bosnia is still largely a pretend country. There is almost no sense of nationhood. The economy is heavily dependent on international aid and the spending of the military personnel and international bureaucrats who infest the country. Indeed, nearly half of Bosnia's gross domestic product consists of such international inputs.

NATO gets none of the credit for the lull in fighting in Bosnia

Ivan Elund (Director, Center on Peace & Liberty) The Independent Institute, 22 Nov 2005, "The Failure of Nation-Building in Bosnia and Iraq," [http://www.antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=8112](http://www.antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=8112%20)

The only thing that can be said for the Dayton accords is that they have stopped the fighting in Bosnia for a time. The U.S. foreign policy establishment, however, has attributed this lull in carnage to U.S. military and political pressure, as well as to the presence of NATO peacekeepers during the ensuing 10 years. Actually, it probably has more to do with the decentralization of government in this multi-ethnic state.

NATO had nothing to do with solving violence in Bosnia

Dr. Jan Willem Honig, Senior Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King's College, 21 Jan 2005, "A Future Role for NATO in the Greater Middle East?" <www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=97>

The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) that went into Bosnia after the Dayton Accords in 1995 and NATO’s 1999 Kosovo Force (KFOR) are often presented as examples of how the presence of intervention forces can suppress local violence. However, although NATO forces certainly helped in raising the cost associated with renewed violence, in both cases the key ingredient for ending hostilities was an agreement between the conflict parties rather than the deployment of intervention forces.

NATO failed to arrest Bosnian war criminals

Human Rights Watch, 29 June 2005, "Balkans: Srebrenica’s Most Wanted Remain Free," HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, <hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228.htm>

"You can count on one hand the number of times NATO has made real attempts to arrest [Radovan] Karadzic and [Ratko] Mladic," said Holly Cartner, the Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The authorities must know where these men are. If they don’t know, they are not looking very hard."

**NATO incompetence blocked the search for war criminal Radovan Karadzic**

*Human Rights Watch, 29 June 2005, "Balkans: Srebrenica’s Most Wanted Remain Free," HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS,* [*hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228.htm*](hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228.htm)

NATO has often offered the excuse that Karadzic’s whereabouts are unknown. But sightings of Karadzic have been more numerous than arrest attempts, and successive prosecutors at the ICTY have criticized NATO inaction. During 1996-98 when NATO did direct significant intelligence resources to locating Karadzic, western officials admit that force protection and worries over leaks from within NATO ultimately stymied efforts to arrest him.

NATO stood by and allowed genocide in Bosnia in 1995

Human Rights Watch, 29 June 2005, "Balkans: Srebrenica’s Most Wanted Remain Free," HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, <hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228.htm>

On July 11, 1995, the United Nations and NATO allowed Bosnian Serb forces to seize Srebrenica, despite it having been declared a United Nations "safe area." Serb forces killed between 7,000 and 8,000 Bosnian men and boys in the week after the fall of the town. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has ruled the crimes in Srebrenica to be genocide.

Confused decision-making led to NATO bumbling in Srebrenica

Richard Holbrooke, 19 July 2005, "Was Bosnia Worth It?" WASHINGTON POST, p. A21

As assistant secretary of state for European affairs at the time, I argued, unsuccessfully, that we needed NATO airstrikes to stop the Bosnian Serbs -- bullies who preferred long-range artillery and short-range murder to anything resembling a real military operation. But Britain, France and the Netherlands had troops deployed, as part of the United Nations' peacekeeping force, in three extremely exposed enclaves in eastern Bosnia, including Srebrenica. Facing the brutal threats of Mladic, they refused to consider airstrikes until the Dutch troops were ignominiously escorted out of Srebrenica. By then it was too late.

CAPABILITIES IMPROVEMENT - NOT NEEDED

HARMS

1. No need for capabilities improvements: Status Quo forces are sufficient for any threat

Carl W. Ek (Specialist in International Relations), 18 Jan 2006, "NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment," Congressional Research Service, p. 6

Some observers have questioned the need for DCI and PCC [Prague Capabilities Commitment], arguing that NATO already enjoys vastly superior technological prowess vis-à-vis countries other than the United States, and that the alliance's military capabilities — whatever their shortcomings — are more than sufficient to meet any threat.

2. Not many shortfalls in capabilities, and existing shortfalls are being addressed

Carl W. Ek (Specialist in International Relations), 18 Jan 2006, "NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment," Congressional Research Service, p. 5-6

In airlift, which has long been an alliance weakness, there has been "some progress"; several countries are committed to buying Airbus A400 planes, but those aircraft will not be ready until 2010. In the meantime, European members are chartering Antonov transporters from Ukraine. Air-to-air refueling is described as a "serious lack" among European capabilities, although Germany and Canada have already been procuring multi-task planes with refueling capabilities. The report notes that there have been "promising results" in CBRN protection; a Czech battalion has been operational since 2004, and is already part of the NATO Response Force. Theater missile defense is expected to be operational by 2010. In 2005, a transatlantic consortium was tapped to provide an air-to-ground surveillance system that will be funded and operated by NATO, much as the AWACS program has been. There has also been "substantial progress across the alliance" in equipping aircraft with precision-guided munitions (PGMs, also known as "smart bombs.")

INHERENCY

1. 2002 Prague Summit improvements are underway: Ground Surveillance, WMD and missile defense

NATO official home page, 2 Aug 2005, NATO TOPICS, "Improving NATO’s operational capabilities," <http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html>

The Alliance is reviewing its defence and operations planning process and implementing a package of projects launched at the 2002 Prague Summit. It has created a high-readiness NATO Response Force and streamlined its command structure. Work is also continuing on an Alliance Ground Surveillance system, defences against weapons of mass destruction and theatre missile defence.

2. Deployability and usability of forces is being improved

NATO official home page, 2 Aug 2005, NATO TOPICS, "Improving NATO’s operational capabilities," <http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html>

NATO is putting into place a series of measures to increase the deployability and usability of its forces. These are aimed at ensuring that the Alliance can fulfill its present and future operational commitments and fight new threats such as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Prague Capabilities Commitments are being followed

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 12-13 Nov 2005, "SUMMARY of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee [Folketinget, Copenhagen, Denmark]" <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=855>

Much of the concern over the PCC is driven by the gap in capabilities between the United States and other members of the Alliance, but there is some evidence that European capabilities are improving. Much progress has been made in strategic lift, with fifteen NATO countries involved in upgrading their airlift capabilities. She also highlighted a transatlantic project that enhances ground surveillance capabilities. Progress was also mentioned on improving Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Reform of defence spending is needed.

4. 70-80% of Prague Capabilities Commitment improvements have been made

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO’s Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Education, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

NATO however must act as a catalyst for military transformation ensuring that nations have a common understanding of what is required and adopt common military standards. The Alliance can do this in a number of ways. \* First the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which seeks to address many of the collective shortfalls in the shorter term. NATO has a success rate at present of about 70-80% in meeting those commitments: not perfect but a lot better than zero percent;

SOLVENCY

1. The money's not there: Even wealthy European countries cannot afford to spend more on defense

Elisabeth Skšns (Project leader), May 2004, Military Expenditure and Arms Production, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "World military spending: where are we heading?" <http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/study/051104SG.html>

Similar funding problems have arisen in the UK during 2003 (the cash crisis of November 2003), while France and Germany have problems to accommodate their defence budgets within an overall central government budget that meets the EU upper limit on budget deficits of 3% of GDP. Thus, there is both a ‘cash problem’ and a fiscal problem, demonstrating the competition between military and social needs in these countries.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Wasted money: Capability improvements are just excuses for defense contractor spending

Carl W. Ek (Specialist in International Relations), 18 Jan 2006, "NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment," Congressional Research Service, p. 6

Others are skeptical of the possible motives behind the push for capabilities; they contend that massive defense spending increases are unnecessary and wasteful, and that DCIand PCC merely serve to boost sales for high-technology arms and equipment manufacturers.

CAVEATS - NOT A PROBLEM

INHERENCY

1. Minor Repair: Better notification about caveats

David M. Toczek, 1 Jan 2006, MILITARY REVIEW, "Knowing the rules: planning consideration for NATO operations," <http://www.highbeam.com/library/docFree.asp?DOCID=1G1:143525773>

In planning for the arrival and employment of new NATO forces, a pressing question is, Which caveats will they come with? Unfortunately, there is no way to know until the force is transferred to NATO's control. When a nation places its forces under NATO command, it issues a transfer of authority (TOA) message a few days before the scheduled TOA, stating which force requirements the units will fill, their command relationships to the gaining commander, and the limitations on their employment (caveats). Until the message arrives at the gaining headquarters, any discussion of caveats is speculation. Given this method of notification, we can understand the challenges NATO commanders face.

2. NATO countries are already eliminating or reducing caveat restrictions

James Pardew (deputy assistant secretary general and director of operations in NATO's Operations Division), 20 June 2006, "NATO's evolving operations," WORLD SECURITY NETWORK, <www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=13085&topicID=31>

As NATO broadens its operational experience, nations are moving to eliminate or reduce the restrictions they place on the ways in which their contributions to operations may be used. These include preventing troops and/or equipment from being involved in certain activities, such as crowd control.

3. Southern expansion of ISAF mission in Afghanistan will be without caveats

Ahto Lobjakas, 13 Feb 2006, "Afghanistan: ISAF Expands And Prepares For Long-Term Stay," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/238fc3e5-ba61-4015-b1bc-599c2581108f.html>(brackets in original)

Vendrell also says the EU is increasing its own direct involvement in Afghanistan. "There is a second possibility which is only now been approved -- just now -- and is not happening yet," he says. "This is the possibility of channeling some [European] Commission money to a Provincial Reconstruction Team for use by the PRT in their own civil-military projects." The four European NATO countries involved in the southern expansion of ISAF have all agreed to do so without "caveats."

4. Kosovo caveat problems have been solved

James Appathurai (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, Background Briefing, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm>

Well over, I would say well over 50 percent of the caveats in Kosovo that existed last March have been removed, much of these related to the movement of forces in terms of crowd and riot control. And in fact, not only have the caveats been removed in Kosovo, but the troops that have been sent are now troops that are capable of crowd or riot control and equipped and trained for it.

5. Afghanistan caveat problems have been solved

James Appathurai (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, Background Briefing, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm>

Caveats have been less of a problem in Afghanistan, for a variety of reasons. Of course now, as troops deploy, or as we plan for troops to deploy to the south, the nations are very well aware of this issue and of the challenges that they pose. So I have not heard a significant discomfort -- let me put it that way -- about caveats in terms of NATO's deployment to the south. The nations that are going are well aware that this is a very robust environment, and that force commander needs a flexibility required to do what is necessary. And we're talking about of course forces that are very effective, very mobile, and that I would say are combat experienced.

6. No more caveats will be applied in Afghanistan

Al Pessin, 15 June 2006, "General: NATO On Track to Expand Role in Afghanistan," VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, <www.voanews.com/english/2006-06-15-voa4.cfm>

In all, NATO will have a bit more than 30,000 troops in Afghanistan when the transition is complete, nearly 50 per cent more than the U.S.-led coalition has had. And in addition, there will continue to be some U.S. troops in the country outside the NATO command. Just how many has yet to be decided. And General Jones says to his amazement all the countries involved have agreed to operate under the same 'rules of engagement,' without the individual national restrictions called 'caveats' that have hampered NATO operations in the past." That is really not going to be the problem.

7. Afghanistan NATO troops are assuming risks and abandoning caveats

Senator John W. Warner, 26 Apr 2006, remarks at the Atlantic Council 2006 Award for Distinguished International Service dinner, <www.senate.gov/~warner/pressoffice/statements/20060426.htm>

I’m pleased to say that General Jones informed me on my recent trip that we now have far fewer "caveat" restrictions in Afghanistan; the soldiers serving there, regardless of their nationality, are more equally assuming the risks of the dangerous ISAF mission.

HARMS

1. Some caveats are necessary safety restrictions for proper use of forces

James Appathurai (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, Background Briefing, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm>

Some of these relate to safety. They're not caveats, but simply the equipment that the particular forces have. Different forces have different national characteristics, national capabilities, different training. That is simply a fact of life when it comes to NATO because it is a multinational operation. Some forces can do different things.

2. They're not arbitrary whims: Caveats promote safe use of equipment

James Appathurai (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 26 Jan 2006, Background Briefing, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060126a.htm>

So these caveats are very often not based on whims but on the capabilities that you happen to have. And I think this case of night flying does relate very much to that. It's not that they don't like flying at night; it's that they just don't have the equipment necessary to do it safely in that kind of environment.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Removing caveats will hurt missions: Units will be used for tasks they are not trained for

David M. Toczek, 1 Jan 2006, MILITARY REVIEW, "Knowing the rules: planning consideration for NATO operations," <http://www.highbeam.com/library/docFree.asp?DOCID=1G1:143525773>

In the strictest sense, national caveats allow a nation to ensure that its forces are not employed in a manner for which they have not been trained or equipped. An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit, for example, might be prohibited from conducting improvised explosive device defense (IEDD) operations because its soldiers have not been trained for that type of work. The caveat precludes a NATO commander from improperly employing the EOD team in an IEDD role, either through an act of omission or commission.

2. Link to intervention disads: Lifting caveats = abandonment of peacekeeping and escalation of intervention

Tanvir Ahmad Khan (former foreign secretary of Pakistan), 5 June 2006, DAWN "Nato at our doorstep" <http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/05/op.htm>

But can Nato craft a different image in the present circumstances when Afghanistan is once again being "lost"? Its commander says that many national caveats constrained Nato’s earlier operations in Afghanistan and that in the new combat operation, "commanders at every level cannot be constrained by the kinds of caveats you might just get away with in a peacekeeping operation". Is this the drum roll of a military alliance being shifted from protecting reconstruction teams to the task of reconquering districts that keep slipping out of Kabul’s control? If so, its forces should expect a bitter battle, fluctuating in time and space, with 12,000 or more of the insurgents.

CFE TREATY RATIFICATION - NEGATIVE

HARMS

1. Russian complaints about NATO and CFE are just whining: they can't do anything about it

Strategic Forecasting (research firm that gathers intelligence in the areas of geopolitics, security and public policy), 11 Feb 2004, "Battle for the FSU: Russia's Gambit, NATO's Checkmate," <www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1>

At a recent security conference in Munich, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov warned NATO that Russia would withdraw from the Cold War-era Conventional Forces in Europe treaty if NATO does not curb plans to expand into Russia's front yard. Ivanov's threat is just one move in what will be a geopolitical chess match between NATO and Russia over NATO's eastward march. Ultimately -- due to financial, political and strategic constraints -- Russia will lose.

2. The Baltic States are a military problem for NATO, not for Russia

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 27 <www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Moreover, the acceptance of the Baltic States into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization complicates the status of that organization in a military sense—operations have to be planned in a theater which is separated from the main ground forces of the Alliance, and highly vulnerable, given a hypothetical armed conflict with Russia.

SOLVENCY

1. CFE accomplishes nothing: Russia will violate CFE if they feel like it

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 22 <www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

The situation became especially acute in the second half of 1995, when Moscow put forward an ultimatum, demanding that either the flank zone quota are reviewed, or Russia will unilaterally violate the restrictions. This threatened the entire CFE Treaty.

2. Georgia will block the treaty from taking effect until Russia withdraws all troops

A. Link: Georgia won't ratify CFE until Russia withdraws

Russian News & Information Agency Novisti, "No Georgia CFE ratification without Russian withdrawal - MP," 8 June 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20060608/49212578.html>

Georgia will not ratify the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe until Russia fulfils commitments it undertook at Istanbul in 1999, a senior Georgian parliamentarian said Thursday. The commitments include withdrawal of Soviet-era bases now belonging to Russia from Georgia. Under an agreement signed in March, Russia will withdraw its two remaining military bases by 2008.

B. Link: Georgia and Moldova both won't ratify CFE until Russia withdraws

Robert E. Hunter & Sergey M. Rogov, 2004, RAND Corporation NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION, "Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant - The Next Stage of NATO-Russia Relations," p. 14

The NATO position aside, the entry into force of the adapted treaty would require its ratification by all 30 CFE states, including Georgia and Moldova, whose assent is unlikely absent resolution of the "Istanbul" issues.

C. Impact: All countries must ratify CFE before it takes effect

Christine Kucia, Oct 2002, "Baltics Deny Plans to Deploy NATO Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control Association, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/balticsoct02.asp>

The CFE Treaty was adapted in 1999, in part to allow new states to join the treaty, but all 30 states party to the original treaty must ratify the adapted version before new countries may accede to the agreement.

3. Can't have it both ways: Russia claims CFE is good for security and that it it's bad for security

Vladimir Socor, 12 June 2006, " NATO AND GUAM COUNTRIES HOLD FIRM AT CFE TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE," Eurasia Daily Monitor, [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\_id=2371175](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371175%20) (GUAM=Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, brackets in original)

In a talking point calculated to unsettle the audience and break with arms-control orthodoxy, Russian representatives declared that the CFE Treaty can no longer be deemed a "cornerstone of European security" and has even turned into the opposite of that. In a thinly veiled appeal to certain West European governments, the Russian delegation appealed to "those interested in building [security in] a united Europe to speak out decisively" together with Russia for the adapted treaty's ratification on those terms.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Blackmail and harassment in Georgia if CFE is ratified without Russian compliance

A. Link: CFE should not be ratified without Russian withdrawal from Georgia

Vladimir Socor (senior fellow of the Washington-based Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies), The Wall Street Journal Europe, 19 Dec 2003, <http://newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=419>

The EU must include Georgia and Azerbaijan -- and also Armenia -- in its Wider Europe and New Neighborhood initiatives. EU Commission President Romano Prodi's "Nyet" can not be a final answer. And certain West European countries that are members of both NATO and the EU must stop their slippage toward ratifying the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe without requiring Russia to meet its troop-withdrawal obligations on the southern flank.

B. Impact: Moscow uses its troops in Georgia for blackmail and harassment

Vladimir Socor (senior fellow of the Washington-based Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies), The Wall Street Journal Europe, 19 Dec 2003, <http://newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=419>

A frustrated Moscow responded by inviting the chieftains of three secessionist areas of Georgia for a week-long gathering and official meetings in Russia's capital. The event was designed to blackmail Tbilisi's new leaders by advertising the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia as final, and hinting at Ajaria's potential secession. Russian troops are stationed in all three areas. At the year-end meeting of the OSCE, Russia openly repudiated its international obligation to close its military bases in Georgia. Now Russia demands an 11-year extension by treaty; wants that treaty meanwhile to legalize the bases; and because Georgia won't capitulate to such demands, Russia has suspended the official negotiations.

Russia won't meet the conditions it promised to meet when CFE was signed

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 20 <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Furthermore, the situation which has unfolded in connection with the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty shows that the process of implementing pragmatic foreign policy positions continues to meet with difficulties. Russia is not yet ready to fulfill its obligations assumed when Russia signed the Agreement in Istanbul, in November of 1999, and which relate to the agreement reached between the Russian Federation and Georgia, to withdraw Russian military bases and Russian troops from Moldova.

Russia is cheating on Georgia troop-withdrawal agreements

Plamen Ralchev, 2005, GEORGIA’S RUSSIAN HURDLES: Negotiating Russian Troops Withdrawal from Georgia, INSTITUTE FOR REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, p. 4

In recent months, the Russian side had sought to re-label the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases as "anti-terrorist centers" and retain sizeable garrisons with heavy weaponry at both bases, as well as to create an "anti-terrorist center" in Tbilisi, and conclude agreements with Georgia on this matter prior to the start of troop withdrawal.

Russia is lying about withdrawal of troops from Georgia

Russian News & Information Agency Novisti, "No Georgia CFE ratification without Russian withdrawal - MP," 8 June 2006, [http://en.rian.ru/world/20060608/49212578.html](http://en.rian.ru/world/20060608/49212578.html%20) (brackets in original)

Nika Rurua, deputy head of the Georgian parliament's committee for defense and security, told RIA Novosti: "The Russian military base in Gudauta [in the breakaway province of Abkhazia] still exists. International observers who could confirm Russia's statements that the base has been closed are not admitted there."

2. Not holding Russia to its Istanbul CFE commitments hurts Russia's long term security interests

A. Link: CFE requires Russia to withdraw troops from Moldova and Georgia

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 30 <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Here we see that Russia has, in a legally binding way, confirmed that it, like any other state party to the adapted CFE Treaty, retains the right to maintain troops on the territory of other CFE Treaty states only given the clearly-stated agreement of the latter. But in the case of Georgia and Moldova, disagreement with the presence of Russian troops on their territory has been expressed clearly and unambiguously. It is impossible to agree with the point of view that the Istanbul obligations are in no way connected with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

B. Impact: Russia's defiance leads neighbors to dangerous behavior - destabilizing Russia long-term

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 31 <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Russia’s refusal to fulfill her obligations may lead to analogous acts of defiance by other states, which would directly contradict Russia’s strategic interests. Thus we can see that Russia’s current position with regard to the Istanbul obligations is counterproductive from the point of view of the country’s national security interests.

3. CFE without Russian compliance sanctions Russian interference in the sovereignty of Georgia

A. Link: Ratifying CFE legitimizes Russian troops in Georgia

Vladimir Socor, 17 May 2006, "MOSCOW PRESSING FOR CFE TREATY RATIFICATION DESPITE ITS OWN NON-COMPLIANCE," Eurasia Daily Monitor, [www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\_id=2371093](www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371093%20) (brackets added)

Thus, Russia is now pressing for the [CFE] treaty's speedy ratification by all state-parties, so as to make possible the Baltic states' accession to the ratified treaty, while still keeping Russian troops on Georgia's and Moldova's territories in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Moscow calculates that Western consent to ratification of the 1999 treaty in such circumstances would legitimize, prolong, and even legalize the stationing of Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova as "peacekeepers."

B. Link: Russian meddling destroys Georgian sovereignty

Plamen Ralchev, 2005, GEORGIA’S RUSSIAN HURDLES: Negotiating Russian Troops Withdrawal from Georgia, INSTITUTE FOR REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, p. 10

Furthermore, trade-off between Georgia and Russia will be additionally complicated because it is to be expected that Moscow would propose restrictions on Georgia's freedom to decide on foreign policy and security arrangements. Russia would want language barring Georgia from participating in security arrangements or other activities "unfriendly" to Russia, by the latter's definition. Tbilisi may be able to resist such demands, as some other countries successfully negotiated in their treaties with Russia. But those countries were not exposed to the blackmail of having Russian troops and Russian-backed secessionists within their territories.

C. Impact: Destruction of sovereignty reduces international peace and security

Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, International Development Research Centre, 15 Aug 2001, "1. State Sovereignty," <http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28492-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html>

State sovereignty has, for the past several hundred years, been a defining principle of interstate relations and a foundation of world order. The concept lies at the heart of both customary international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter and remains both an essential component of the maintenance of international peace and security and a defence of weak states against the strong.

4. Secessionist violence: Russia transfers CFE-limited equipment to secessionists and destabilizes Moldova

Vladimir Socor, 12 June 2006, " NATO AND GUAM COUNTRIES HOLD FIRM AT CFE TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE," Eurasia Daily Monitor, [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\_id=2371175](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371175%20) (GUAM=Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, brackets added)

During the [CFE] deliberations, Russia's delegation insisted on retaining the troops in Moldova on the excuse that they serve as "peacekeepers" and guard the vast ammunition stockpiles there. It claimed, moreover, that the troops are stationed there under bilateral arrangements with Moldova. The Russian delegation invoked again the "peacekeeping" excuse for retaining the Gudauta base, which is located in Abkhaz-controlled territory (more accurately, in territory handed by the Russian military to its Abkhaz proxies). The Russian side declined altogether to discuss the issue of unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment in the hands of secessionist forces.

CHINA IS BAD

China has an atrocious human rights record

John J. Tkacik Jr. (Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center), 21 Jan 2005, "Don’t Let Europe Forget Tiananmen or Zhao Ziyang," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WebMemo #642, <www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm642.cfm>

But consider this: Last week, when Britain’s foreign secretary Jack Straw sympathized with Chinese complaints that they were being "lumped in" with such other dictatorships as "Zimbabwe and Burma," Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters without Borders, and a host of lesser-known human and civil rights groups in the Atlantic Community all issued shocked press releases. Mr. Straw’s comments baffled human rights activists across Europe who can document quite exactly how the Chinese communist regime parallels the Burmese and Zimbabwean despotisms.

Even the European Union admits: China violates human rights in Tibet and threatens Taiwan

John J. Tkacik Jr. (Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center),, 21 Jan 2005, "Don’t Let Europe Forget Tiananmen or Zhao Ziyang," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WebMemo #642, <www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm642.cfm>

Yet on January 14, only a day after Ms. Ferraro-Waldner’s meetings in Washington, the European Parliament in Strasbourg passed a resolution condemning China’s violations of human rights in Tibet and its threats to Taiwan and calling on members to "maintain the European Union embargo on trade in arms with the People’s Republic of China and not weaken national restrictions on such arms sales."

Human rights in China are worse now than 1989/Tiananmen

John J. Tkacik Jr. (Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center), 21 Jan 2005, "Don’t Let Europe Forget Tiananmen or Zhao Ziyang," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WebMemo #642, <www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm642.cfm>

Focus on the fact that the E.U. arms embargo was levied on Beijing for massive human rights abuses in 1989 and that since then the human rights situation in China has only gotten worse.

China disrupts the Atlantic alliance

John J. Tkacik Jr.(Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center), 21 Jan 2005, "Don’t Let Europe Forget Tiananmen or Zhao Ziyang," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WebMemo #642, <www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm642.cfm>

Convincing the E.U. to relax its embargo is only the latest example of China’s growing deftness at turning its economic clout into serious political influence. China’s diplomats have found the key to persuading the Eurocrats in Brussels to compromise the traditional democratic values of the European Parliament in Strasbourg: money. More importantly, the Chinese are in the process of disrupting the Atlantic Alliance. They are forcing the Europeans to choose between Beijing and Washington, and the Europeans are tilting to Beijing.

China transfers weapons to NATO's enemies

John J. Tkacik Jr. (Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center), 21 Jan 2005, "Don’t Let Europe Forget Tiananmen or Zhao Ziyang," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WebMemo #642, <www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm642.cfm>

Highlight China’s record of conventional arms transfers to the third world, which have become a threat to Europe’s armed forces. European countries have participated in peacekeeping operations in several of China’s conventional weapons customers, such as Zaire, Sudan, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe (and even Liberia, which had diplomatic ties with Taiwan).

It's more than deterrence: China is threatening Taiwan

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10824/](www.cfr.org/publication/10824/%20) (brackets in original)

Beijing currently has from 700 to 800 short-range missiles pointed across the Taiwan Strait. "China is worried about the functional equivalent of a [Taiwanese] Declaration of Independence," Bush says. The Pentagon report "expresses concern that China’s capability is shading beyond deterrence into coercion, trying to force Taiwan to negotiate on China’s terms," he says. And a good deal of China’s military expansion is also "designed to deter a U.S. response to a Taiwan Straits crisis," Segal says. Over the last decade, China has also invested in a new class of amphibious assault ships that would be critical for any invasions by sea.

China is the next big military threat to the United States

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <www.cfr.org/publication/10824/>

The Defense Department's 2006 assessment of China's military power (PDF) cited long-term trends in China's modernization of its strategic forces—including its nuclear capacity, land- and sea-based access denial capabilities, and precision-strike weapons—that "have the potential to pose credible threats to modern militaries operating in the region." The report, seen as a bellwether of the U.S.-China relationship, showcased the Pentagon's view that China is the next big military threat to the United States.

CHINA IS GOOD

INHERENCY

European arms embargo doesn't matter: Lots of other restrictions on arms sales to China

Greg Austin, 16 June 2005, " Testing the Transatlantic Alliance," THE GLOBALIST, <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4580>

First, the administration knows that other limits on arms sales will still apply after the EU lifts the embargo, which has been in place since 1989. European countries — alongside other states like Canada, Japan and Australia — will continue to apply restrictions on sales of military-related technology to China. They do so under a number of regimes that include China, but do not target it exclusively (such as the Wassenaar agreement or the Missile Technology Control Regime).

HARMS

European arms embargo on China had no impact -- they get arms elsewhere

John J. Tkacik, Jr., 21 Jan 2005, "Don’t Let Europe Forget Tiananmen or Zhao Ziyang," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WebMemo #642, <www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm642.cfm>

The arms embargo was never really about arms. The Chinese get all they need, cheaper, from Russia. In a sense, all the embargo does is give Moscow greater price leverage with Beijing.

Lifting European arms embargo on China will have no impact

Greg Austin, 16 June 2005, " Testing the Transatlantic Alliance," THE GLOBALIST, <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4580>

After the EU lifts the ban, there may well be some differences between the United States and its European allies as to which arms are restricted to China — and which are not. But in terms of the motive forces of world power politics — or the big decisions for war — these differences will not be significant.

Chinese military threat is exaggerated

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <www.cfr.org/publication/10824/>

But some critics say the Pentagon is exaggerating the military threat from China, and accuse defense officials of "threat procurement," building up China as an enemy in order to justify massive military spending on new defense and weapons systems. "I'm not sure why the Pentagon always uses a worst-case scenario when assessing the military threat from China, but it does," says Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

China has no intentions of attacking the United States

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <www.cfr.org/publication/10824/>

Richard C. Bush III, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, says, "Most experts would define 'threat' to mean a combination of capability and intentions. There's no question that China is building up its capabilities, but China has displayed no intentions of using those capabilities against the United States."

Pentagon estimates of Chinese defense spending are exaggerated

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <www.cfr.org/publication/10824/>

Many independent analysts put the real figure at $50 billion to $65 billion, including research and development. The Pentagon's estimates, however, range from $70 billion to a high of $105 billion per year. "It'd be very hard to find an independent analyst who believes that [$105 billion] figure is even remotely accurate," Carpenter says.

China is focused on a "peaceful rise" and won't start a war

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10824/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10824/)

Other experts say that China, focused on a "peaceful rise" and sustaining economic growth, has no intention of picking a fight with anyone, least of all Washington. "China requires a good relationship with the United States for everything it wants to accomplish," Segal says.

Spending money to counter China is unjustified

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <www.cfr.org/publication/10824/>

"It's hard to justify spending half a trillion dollars each year because China might emerge as a security challenge twenty or thirty years in the future." [said Ted Galen Carpenter] A war with the United States would threaten China's two greatest policy priorities, continuing strong economic growth and maintaining internal social stability.

SOLVENCY - Note: these are not arguments against Affirmative fiat, which is a separate issue as to whether AFF can mandate that outside countries join with NATO. Even assuming that other countries are mandated that they join or ally themselves with NATO, when NATO members vote to go to war, they don't have to commit any troops or actually fight, under the rules of the alliance. If NATO votes to start a war but no one contributes any troops, then nothing happens and no solvency is achieved. And if these nations are part of NATO but don't want to aggravate China, then they will never vote to oppose China, and any alliance formed to contain China will be ineffective.

Australia won't support NATO-style alliance: They're selling uranium to China!

Purnendra Jain, 18 Mar 2006, "A 'little NATO' against China," ASIA TIMES, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html%20) (brackets added)

Indeed, [Australian Foreign Minister Alexander] Downer has emphasized that the intent of the process is not to form a "little NATO", nor does Australia support a policy of containing China. Downer believes that China's economic power should be harnessed to the advantage of the region - a position quite different from the current US thinking. Australia has a huge economic interest in China and sees potential for further growth. Canberra is poised to sign an agreement to sell uranium to China.

Japan won't support alliance against China

Purnendra Jain, 18 Mar 2006, "A 'little NATO' against China," ASIA TIMES, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html%20) (brackets added)

As far as Japan is concerned, it is unlikely that it would favor ganging up against China even though there are serious Sino-Japanese frictions. It is not in the overall interest of Japan's foreign policy openly to support a containment policy when trade and economic relations with China are prospering and Tokyo is trying to improve its relations with Beijing.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Self-fulfilling prophecy: If we treat China like an enemy, it will become one

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10824/](www.cfr.org/publication/10824/%20) (brackets added)

He [Richard C. Bush III, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution] and other experts warn that politicians and diplomats must focus on the generally beneficial political and economic relations between the two countries, while keeping the military competition on the back burner. "Our Pentagon is in charge of seeing a threat and building against a threat. Unless political leadership is out in front, keeping the cooperative elements higher in priority and reassuring the other guys, the self-fulfilling prophecy is in danger of taking hold," he says. "As Joseph Nye says, if we treat China as the enemy, it will become the enemy because of how it perceives what we do."

2. Worrying about China distracts from dealing with the real enemy

William S. Lind (Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation), 3 June 2006, "The Perils of Threat Inflation," <www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084>

China is, to coin a Rumsfeldism, the threat we want, not the threat we face. By dint of much puffery, China can be made into the devoutly prayed for "peer competitor," an opponent against whom our "transformed," hi-tech, video-game future military can employ its toys, or more importantly, justify their acquisition. Our real enemy, the thousand faces of the Fourth Generation, fails to meet that all-important test and is therefore deflated into "rejectionists" and "bad guys."

3. Treating China as an enemy = global disorder

William S. Lind (Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation), 3 June 2006, "The Perils of Threat Inflation," <www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084>

In a 21st century where the most important division will be between centers of order and centers or sources of disorder, it is vital to American interests that China remain a center of order. America needs to handle a rising China the way Britain handled a rising America, not a rising Germany. From that perspective, the proper place for DOD’s China report, the threat inflation it represents and the strategic rivalry it stokes is in the trash can marked "bad ideas."

4. Security turnaround: New alliance against China will not be as good as Status Quo security arrangements

Purnendra Jain, 18 Mar 2006, "A 'little NATO' against China," ASIA TIMES, [www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html](www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html%20) (brackets added)

However, regional reactions to this proposal [US-Japan-Australia cooperation] ranged from concern to outright condemnation. China's state-controlled media strongly condemned the move, describing it as the formation of a US-led policy of containment designed specifically to hem in Chinese strategic aspirations in East Asia. Some commentators in China dubbed the arrangement a "little NATO" in the Asia-Pacific region. Southeast Asian leaders have been generally comfortable with the existing regional security arrangement represented by the ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum] and believe the new development will undermine it.

DARFUR/SUDAN

HARMS

1. It's all hype: The Darfur crisis is really about oil not genocide

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), 25 Nov 2004, "Stay Out of Sudan's Civil War - Against the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act," <http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=4053>

Why does it always seem that when we hear urgent clamor for the United States to intervene, oil or some other valuable commodity just happens to be present? I find it interesting that so much attention is being paid to oil-rich Sudan while right next door in Congo the death toll from its civil war is estimated to be 2 to 3 million – several times the estimated toll in Sudan.

INHERENCY

1. NATO is already providing forces in Darfur

NATO Homepage, "NATO’s Assistance to the African Union for Darfur," June 23, 2006, www.nato.int/issues/darfur/index.html

Following a request by the African Union (AU), NATO has helped the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for additional AU peacekeepers into the region and by training AU forces.

2. Let someone else do it: airlift is being provided by non-NATO member Ukraine

ANATOLIY GRYTSENKO (Ukrainian Defence Minister), 19 Oct 2005, Press Conference, NATO SPEECHES, [http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051019b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051019b.htm%20) (ellipses in original)

Ukraine will provide its airlift capabilities for the transportation of troops, including those of NATO countries, to Sudan. And we are also considering a possibility to provide airlift for transport… or to provide a brigade for the operation in Afghanistan.

3. African Union and UN are doing a lot, and are able and willing to do more

EMBASSY OF FRANCE IN WASHINGTON, 7 Mar 2006, PRESS & COMMUNICATION SERVICE, Standpoint #164, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/standpoint/stand164.asp>

The Abuja negotiations have lasted too long. It is time to reach an agreement. In Darfur, as in Southern Sudan, the international community is determined to support your peace efforts. The African Union and the UN have made a massive commitment in Sudan, and are ready to take it further.

4. Sudan is doing better than it ever has

EMBASSY OF FRANCE IN WASHINGTON, 7 Mar 2006, PRESS & COMMUNICATION SERVICE, Standpoint #164, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/standpoint/stand164.asp>

The conclusion of the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on 9 January 2005, was a historic event for Sudan and for Africa. After terrible years of war, the longest-running conflict on the African continent –over 20 years–, yesterday's protagonists decided to become partners to build a new, peaceful Sudan, a united country that respects cultural, political, ethnic and religious differences. A little over a year after it was signed, the results of the application of the Nairobi agreement are globally positive. A new constitution has been promulgated, the government and the parliament of National Unity and Southern Sudan have been formed, and various joint committees bringing together the National Congress and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement have been set up.

SOLVENCY

1. Intervention will reduce the chance for resolution of Sudan crisis

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), 25 Nov 2004, "Stay Out of Sudan's Civil War - Against the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act," <http://antiwar.com/paul/?articleid=4053>

Inserting ourselves into this civil war in Sudan will do little to solve the crisis. In fact, the promise of U.S. support for one side in the struggle may discourage the progress that has been made recently. What incentive is there to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict when the U.S. government promises massive assistance to one side?

2. Racial animosity will block NATO success in Sudan

Judy Dempsey, 19 Feb 2006, International Herald Tribune, " Pressure rises over NATO's Darfur role," <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/19/news/darfur.php>

Speaking on the condition of anonymity because the issue was so sensitive inside NATO, a diplomat said that neither the Sudanese government nor the African Union, which has major responsibility for the existing peacekeeping mission, "want to see white, European troops coming into Sudan."

3. Military mission not feasible: NATO cannot go to war with Sudan

Judy Dempsey, 19 Feb 2006, International Herald Tribune, " Pressure rises over NATO's Darfur role," <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/19/news/darfur.php>

NATO said it would be placed in an extremely difficult situation if the United Nations agreed to impose a no- flight zone in Darfur that would require the assistance of NATO to enforced. "Which NATO country would be willing to shoot down a Sudanese plane?" the diplomat said.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Long-term destruction of NATO capabilities and success

A. Link: Deployment in Darfur eliminates resources needed to modernize forces

JAMIE SHEA (Director, Policy Planning, NATO), 19 Dec 2005, STOPWATCH 2 , Debate 4: Transforming NATO, NATO SPEECHES, [http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051219a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051219a.htm%20) (ellipses in original)

I mean, this operation issue is one that I wanted to explore, John, particularly with you, because it's true that NATO seems to be sort of stuck in a... sort of on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand there's the need to modernize, to transform, what you were talking about, which Ludwig and John were talking about, but on the other hand, NATO is constantly deploying its forces in distant places like Afghanistan or a training mission in Iraq, helping the African Union in Darfur.

B. Impact: Modernization is essential to NATO success

General James L. Jones (NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe), Spring 2004, "Military matters - Transforming NATO's military structures," NATO REVIEW, <www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/main_pr.html>

In the words of former NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson: "This is not business as usual, but the emergence of a new and modernised NATO, fit for the challenges of the new century." This necessary transformation bridges the physical and conceptual differences between two different eras of warfare. During the Cold War, the Alliance focused on mass and firepower in preparation for the expected war of attrition – any unit or capability offered by a member state would have helped deter the enemy. Today's forces have to be agile, proactive and maneuverable on a battlefield with no clear front lines. During the Cold War, Allied forces would have fought close to home and relied on national logistics located only a short distance from the battlefield. Today, NATO forces must be prepared to deploy to, and sustain themselves in, any location in the world.

2. Link to Hegemony Disads: NATO intervention now would be without international community approval -- Status Quo policy has international acceptance

Judy Dempsey, 19 Feb 2006, International Herald Tribune, " Pressure rises over NATO's Darfur role," <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/19/news/darfur.php>

James Appathurai, a NATO spokesman, said the alliance had not yet been formally asked to play a bigger role in Sudan. "We will have to see what happens over the coming days," he said Sunday. "In the meantime, we are continuing to airlift soldiers from the African Union into Sudan. We are also involved in training for a mission that is led by the African Union."

3. Undermining the African Union and Africa's long-term future

A. Link: NATO intervention would undermine the African Union

Judy Dempsey, 19 Feb 2006, International Herald Tribune, " Pressure rises over NATO's Darfur role," <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/19/news/darfur.php>

NATO started providing support to the African Union more than six months ago in what was the alliance's first mission in Africa. Since then the U.S.-led 26-member military organization has kept a low profile, unwilling to undermine efforts by the African Union in its first attempts to carve out its own role as a multinational peacekeeping organization.

B. Impact: African Union is essential to Africa's long term success

Banjul Daily Observer (Gambia, Africa, newspaper) 26 June 2006, "PanAfrica: AU: the Pride of Africa," <http://allafrica.com/stories/200606261446.html>

Governments in Africa are conscious that United Africa under the banner of the African Union could garner more economic prospects for the African people, provided Africans become the architects of their own destiny, and support their leaders in the struggle for economic development. The future of the continent will to a greater extent dependent on the outcome of the deliberations that emerge from the African Union summit. No doubt the fight against poverty that bedevil the African continent could only be reversed by our own efforts as no amount of external aid can solve our problems.

DECISION-MAKING / CONSENSUS REFORM

INHERENCY

1. NATO is reforming decision-making methods

Amb. Robert E. Hunter (NATO Ambassador Under President Clinton) 29 Mar 2004, World: NATO, WASHINGTGON POST, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33595-2004Mar29.html>

At the same time, NATO must increasingly be able to act speedily, especially of there are crises, or even with "routing" efforts like the current NATO engagement in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of "how many" allies, however, but of the methods and procedures the alliance follows to get decisions made quickly. To this end, the new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk is crafting new means of achieving "decision superiority" for NATO, and all the allies are working toward that end.

2. Some decision-making processes have been streamlined

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

It should be noted, however, that NATO has taken modest steps over the past year to streamline its decision making process in other areas--for example, by reducing the number of its committees and increasing the Secretary General's authority in day-to-day management and budgetary decisions.

3. CJTF solves for consensus paralysis on controversial missions

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., 4 Oct 2004, "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, [http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1803.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1803.cfm%20) (brackets added0

In April 1999, the NATO governments ratified the CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] mechanism that adds a needed dimen­sion of flexibility to the alliance. Until recently, alliance members had only two decision-making options: Either agree en masse to take on a mission or have one member or more block the consensus required for a mission to proceed. Through the CJTF mechanism, NATO member states do not have to participate actively in a specific mission if they do not feel their vital interests are involved, but their opting out of a mission would not stop other NATO members from participating in an intervention if they so desired.

4. Other alliances will fight any wars that NATO cannot agree on by consensus

NATO official web page, NATO REVIEW, Spring 2006, <www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

Nor is NATO politically suited to fighting conventional wars, which will likely take place beyond Europe, if at all, thereby affecting the Alliance's ever-growing membership to different degrees of intensity. In such circumstances, Alliance consensus would be elusive. Conventional war-fighting would not unite NATO but rather expose its disunity and undermine its credibility. Conventional campaigns will therefore likely be waged either by the United States alone or by a coalition of the willing, comprising fewer members than the Alliance total as well as non-NATO countries.

HARMS

1. No paralysis – NATO can solve dissension and make decisions

James B. Steinberg (V.P. and Director, The Brookings Institution), 2003, CROSSING THE ATLANTIC, A Report From the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops, p. 28

In practice, NATO has always been able to develop the means to allow the most powerful states to play a proportionately influential role – for example, the role of the "quint" during the Kosovo War – and to prevent dissenters from paralyzing NATO action.

2. Consensus decision-making is successful – creates legitimacy and does not prevent effectiveness

Mr. Jean-Louis Gergorin. Executive Vice President, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), May 2004, Center for Strategic Decision Research, The Security Threat and its Political, Military, Technological and Industrial Responses <http://www.csdr.org/2004book/gergorin.htm>

This integration, by the way, is a perfect example of why NATO is successful. It is successful because it is based on multilateral consensus, something that is very important in terms of legitimacy although it is sometimes hated in Washington. It is a consensus that does not prevent NATO from being effective, as was demonstrated in Kosovo.

3. NATO decisions are not delayed

NATO Official Web Page, NATO TOPICS, 18 Feb 2005, "The consultation process - Reaching consensus," <http://www.nato.int/issues/consultation/index.html>

Consultation between member states is a key part of the decision-making process at NATO, allowing Allies to exchange views and information prior to reaching agreement and taking action. The process is continuous and takes place both on an informal and a formal basis with a minimum of delay or inconvenience, due to the fact that all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

4. NATO internal negotiations proceed rapidly

NATO Official Web Page, NATO TOPICS, 1 Mar 2005, "Consensus decision-making at NATO - A fundamental principle," <http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html>

Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance.

5. Consensus respects the capabilities and local constitutions of each member

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

At the same time, the consensus rule allows NATO to respect distinctive national legislation that may bear upon the ability of Allies to contribute to certain NATO operations. For example, Norway and Denmark do not allow peacetime stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons. Similarly, German law requires a simple parliamentary majority to approve military deployments outside Germany, whereas Hungarian law requires a two-thirds majority. Iceland, for its part, does not have a national military force. Through the rule, NATO can build political and military solidarity through the Alliance as a whole without imposing one-size-fits-all standards on its diverse membership.

6. Kosovo proved success of consensus

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

Kosovo. The 1999 NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been widely described--and decried by some--as a "war by committee." Accounts differ regarding the NATO decision making process during the campaign, but few challenge the existence of severe intra-Alliance strains; these ranged from issues regarding the legitimacy of NATO military action without an explicit UNSC resolution to the military strategy and tactics pursued during the conflict. On balance, however, the consensus rule probably did more to help than hinder an ultimately successful NATO effort.

7. Consensus is fast and flexible

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, [www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao](http://www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao)= (brackets added)

The inherent flexibility of the consensus rule also was demonstrated in decision making on the timing, strategy, and tactics of Allied Force [in Yugoslavia]. For example, during the crisis, the NAC frequently decided not to engage subordinate committees. This kept sensitive NAC discussions as private as possible and facilitated its rapid decisions, normally with a 48-hour (or less) turnaround.

8. NATO consensus rule worked within 24 hours after 9/11

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The consensus rule did not prevent NATO from acting quickly--that is, within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001--to invoke, for the first time in its history, Article 5.

9. Colin Powell said Status Quo decision rules "work well"

Col. Pavel Necas PhD (Assoc. Prof. at Slovak Air Force Academy), Nov 2004, BEYOND TRADITION: NEW ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, NATO Defense College, p. 89 (ellipses in original)

US Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed the administration’s position: "We believe that the current decision-making procedures work well and serve United States interests". . . "NATO is an alliance, and no NATO member, including the United States, would agree to allow Alliance decisions to be made on defense commitments without its agreement."

SOLVENCY

1. Decision turnaround: Consensus allows dissenters to hide – other methods will increase dissent by forcing a public vote

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The rule allowed Allies with differing views--some emphasizing the humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses, others worried by the precedent of NATO "offensive" action against a sovereign state--to find enough common ground to endorse, or at least not to block, Allied Force. The rule was particularly important for the Greek government, which ultimately decided not to break silence on key NAC decisions authorizing the use of force despite polls showing that some 95 percent of its public opposed NATO intervention. At the same time, Greece opted out of direct involvement in the combat operations.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Impact of loss of political cohesion would be worse than harms of Status Quo

James B. Steinberg (V.P. and Director, The Brookings Institution), 2003, CROSSING THE ATLANTIC, A Report From the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops, p. 28

But the cost of substantial departure from consensus is likely to be even more devastating to NATO’s relevance. Political solidarity as much as military muscle has been the key to NATO’s success, from the Cold War to the conflict in Kosovo.

2. Loss of consensus = violation of democratic principles

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The consensus rule represents more than a mechanistic decision making procedure. It reflects the NATO structure as an alliance of independent and sovereign countries, as opposed to a supranational body, and exemplifies for many the "one for all, all for one" ethos of the organization's collective defense commitment. NATO decisions are the expression of the collective will of its member governments, arrived at by common consent. Under the rule, no Ally can be forced to approve a position or take an action against its will. This is especially important for decisions on the potential use of military force, which are among the most politically sensitive for any Ally.

3. Bad decisions: Consensus rule creates better outcomes through wider consultation

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The consensus rule forces Allies to undertake the widest possible consultations to build support for their ideas. No Ally, large or small, can be taken for granted. Despite its prominent role in the Alliance, the United States also relies on the consensus rule to protect its interests, to shape the views of others, and to integrate ideas offered by others to improve its proposals.

4. US constitutional violation: Consensus assures no loss of Congress’ power to declare war

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

Even Article 5, the treaty's key collective defense provision, stops short of mandating the type of assistance to be provided by each Ally in the event of an attack against the territory of another. It is important to recall that the United States insisted on qualified language in this article largely to assuage concerns in Congress that its constitutional power to declare war not be ceded to any multilateral organization.

Impact: Democracy depends on Congress maintaining control of war powers

David Boaz (executive vice president of the Cato Institute), 18 Jan 2005, "Congress Should Restrain the President," CATO INSTUTUTE, <http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-18-05.html>

In affairs of state, no more momentous decision can be made than the decision to go to war. For that reason, in a democratic republic it is essential that that decision be made by the most broadly representative body: the legislature. That is where our Constitution lodges the power to declare war. As James Madison put it, "In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department."

5. Paralysis turn: Status Quo non-voting methodology avoids paralysis better than actual voting

Leo G. Michel (senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University), 1 Aug 2003, " NATO Decisionmaking: au revoir to the consensus rule? (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)" STRATEGIC FORUM, <www.highbeam.com/library/docfree.asp?DOCID=1G1:131076344&ctrlInfo=Round20%3AMode20d%3ADocG%3AResult&ao=>

The nuance between a decision-making procedure that allows an Ally to acquiesce in a collective decision (despite its public or private reservations) and a procedure that would oblige that state to cast a yea or nay vote in the NAC may appear, at first blush, insignificant. In practice, the nuance matters enormously. If PermReps had been required to "raise hands" to approve Allied Force, the Greek government may not have been able to resist the domestic political pressure to vote against it. Such a move by Greece might have made it easier for one or two other reluctant Allies to follow suit.

DEFENSE-ONLY - NEGATIVE

INHERENCY

1. Status Quo has adequate political restrictions against NATO aggression

US Department of State, 31 Mar 2004, "NATO's Defense Role, Operation by Consensus Remain Same," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=March&x=20040331184118FRllehctiM0.1473963&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html>

So there is a proactive role for defense. I think where your question might be leading is a question of preemption, or, you know, targeting or an aggressive role. I think in a organization that runs by consensus, where it requires the agreement of all the members of NATO to take on any operation, just as a practical matter, it's hard to be on the aggressive like that.

HARMS

1. Proactive posture is justified: Needed to help democracy and prevent terrorism

General James Jones (highest ranking military officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), NATO’s HQ), 9 Jan 2006, "Global War on Terror and Future of NATO," interview in HUMAN EVENTS online, <http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374>

Fundamentally, all our societies are being challenged by the new transnational actors. That is why being proactive is so very important. We must prevent the creation of future Iraqs or Afghanistans, since large ungoverned or ungovernable spaces are potential breeding grounds for terrorism of all sorts. I am afraid the potential of regions of Africa to be exploited in just such a way remains great. We must deny sanctuary to those who think it is justifiable to kill innocents in the name of an ideology or a religion they have perverted. We must be vigorously present where we need to be in order to help struggling democracies flourish and prosper. And there are practical as well as idealistic reasons to support such a commitment.

2. No violation of moral standards: Pre-emptive attacks are justified in some cases

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 37

As reason and common sense would dictate, in a world where the price of inaction might be written in uncountable numbers of victims and physical destruction the right of states to defend in order to pre-empt attacks on their territory cannot be in dispute

3. Pre-emption against clear and immediate dangers is justified

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 36

As was boldly stated in the US National Security Strategy document of September 2002: "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if necessary, act preemptively." This position is quite understandable in as much as governments’ political fortunes will depend on their ability and resolve to forestall clear and immediate present dangers.

SOLVENCY

1. Defensive retaliation won't work: Suicide terrorist aren't deterred

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 36

Clearly, the traditional policy of containment and deterrence applied against states offers insufficient protection from attacks by these organizations. Terrorists whose hatred towards others is stronger than love of their own life cannot be deterred by threats of retaliation, in as much as these threats could be implemented in the first place. Indeed, terrorists do not represent a state that can be hit by attacking its territory and/or population. Responsible governments cannot be expected to passively wait for the moment when a terrorist attack had destroyed one or more valuable targets in their societies.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Terrorism: Impossible to deal with terrorism with defense-only

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, <www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm>

But the military, too, has a role to play, for a variety of reasons. First, because terrorist groups like Al-Qaida operate at an ever-higher level in the spectrum of violence, blurring the distinction between terrorism and warfare. Second, because the difference between internal and external security is also fading, and the military may have to deal with challenges that police forces are simply unable to handle. And third, because it will sometimes be impossible to deal with terrorist threats using defensive measures only. If the military has a role to play in fighting this new kind of terrorism, so must NATO as the world’s most effective military alliance.

2. Irresponsible and deadly: Can't wait until a WMD attack is imminent

Prof. Michael J. Glennon (international law at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University), Feb 2005, "Idealism at the U.N.," POLICY REVIEW, <http://www.policyreview.org/feb05/glennon.html>

The gravity of a threat and the probability of its occurrence are factors far more likely to determine whether a state will use defensive force than whether the threat is imminent. No responsible policymaker, knowing that some rogue state or terrorist group is planning a nuclear strike, would recommend sitting tight until the attack becomes imminent.

3. Citizens at risk: Defense-only is riskier than a proactive policy

José María Aznar (former Spanish Prime Minister), Spring 2006, "Reforming NATO: The focus must be terrorism," EUROPE'S WORLD, p. 1

September 11, 2001 represented a revolution for NATO. Traditional concepts like containment and deterrence were no longer viable. To rely on the sort of passive defences that had been NATO’s deterrent for four decades or more would put at risk the lives of far too many of our citizens.

DEMOCRACY SPREADING - BAD

GOAL

Democracy is not an adequate goal: Achieving democracy does not justify an AFF ballot

Paul Saunders, 1 June 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Promoting democracy is and should remain an important component of U.S. foreign policy. Ultimately, however, any administration's foreign policy success will be measured by two criteria: whether it makes Americans safer and whether it helps Americans and others lead better lives. Success will be judged by results, not rhetoric.

Military defense and US national security are more important than spreading democracy

Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, 9 May 2006, Pew Research Center, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism," <http://pewresearch.org/obdeck/?ObDeckID=23>

A Gallup poll taken in February 2005, just days after President George W. Bush's State of the Union address in which he made far reaching and eloquent calls for increased democracy in the Middle East, found that only 31 percent of the U.S. public thought that building democracy should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy. Their real priorities were preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and maintaining U.S. military power, not planting the flag of American-style democracy in far-away places.

SOLVENCY

NATO does not spread democracy in Europe

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 90

It is legitimate to argue that NATO protected the democracies of Western Europe from the threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. But the alliance did not bring democracy and civil society to Western Europe when it was established in 1949, because Western Europe already had a long democratic tradition. In like manner, NATO has not and will not carry democracy and civil society east.

NATO can't spread democracy: Countries must have democracy BEFORE they can join NATO

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 90

As Dan Reiter concludes after a study of democracy in Central Europe, "NATO membership was not necessary for democratization because each [new NATO country] already has a strong national commitment to democracy." There also is a theoretical and practical problem with this rationale. NATO requires that aspirant countries have a working democratic system in place before they are accepted as members. So, by definition, NATO can’t carry democracy to countries that already must have it established as a prerequisite for membership.

Forcing democracy where the target nation is not ready fails 2 ways: lowering the goals or target nation alienation

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 12 Apr 2005, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO's EVOLVING REL IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, p. 9

Thus, public opinion in NATO nations often requires establishing democratic structures in countries that do not have a tradition of democratic participation. This can pose several dilemmas for national governments: Propagating goals that fall short of western, democratic standards can gradually erode public support for longer-term presence in countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc. On the other hand, trying to establish democratic structures in countries that are not yet 'ready' to embrace them, can easily lead to alienation among recipient countries.

Spread of democracy will not reduce terrorism

F. Gregory Gause III ( Associate Prof. of Political Science at the Univ. of Vermont) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Sept/Oct 2005, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html)

Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization would end the current campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the Arab world would "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public and reducing the number of potential recruits for them.

NMIPT Study: No historical correlation between democracy and reduction of terrorism

F. Gregory Gause III ( Associate Prof. of Political Science at the Univ. of Vermont) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Sept/Oct 2005, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html)

A list of terrorist incidents between 1976 and 2004, compiled by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, shows more than 400 in India and only 18 in China. Even if China underreports such incidents by a factor of ten, it still endures substantially fewer terrorist attacks than India. If the relationship between authoritarianism and terrorism were as strong as the Bush administration implies, the discrepancy between the number of terrorist incidents in China and the number in India would run the other way.

Democratization not the best way to fight Islamic extremism

F. Gregory Gause III ( Associate Prof. of Political Science at the Univ. of Vermont) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Sept/Oct 2005, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html)

In her highly praised post-September 11 study of religious militants, Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stern argues that "democratization is not necessarily the best way to fight Islamic extremism," because the transition to democracy "has been found to be an especially vulnerable period for states across the board." Terrorism springs from sources other than the form of government of a state. There is no reason to believe that a more democratic Arab world will, simply by virtue of being more democratic, generate fewer terrorists.

DISADVANTAGES to "Spread of Democracy" plans

1. Armed resistance

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 58

As was underlined in this study, the exercise of power that is not rooted in legitimacy involves political cost that is likely to rise prohibitively high as campaigns to enforce democracy and modernization meet firm local resistance. The Iraqi imbroglio would be a clear case in point.

2. Harms of destabilization offset the opportunity for democracy

Vlad Sobell, 23 June 2006, "Nato at Ukraine’s door," RUSSIA PROFILE, <http://russiaprofile.org/cdi/2006/6/23/3947.wbp>

While volumes have been written on the neocon philosophy, its practical impact on the US foreign policy can be summarised as the eagerness to act by destabilising and eventually removing, if necessary by military means, regimes perceived as authoritarian (anti-democratic). The caution embraced by the realist school tends to be dismissed as "appeasement". The hallmark of the neocon approach is that destabilisation is promoted virtually without any regard for the potentially risky consequences entailed in the undertaking. The policy is long on destabilisation, but short on (subsequent) stabilisation, in the idealistic belief that democracy and lawful state somehow spring into being automatically, following a dictator’s removal.

3. Democratically elected leaders in some countries would be worse than Status Quo

F. Gregory Gause III ( Associate Prof. of Political Science at the Univ. of Vermont) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Sept/Oct 2005, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html)

Even if democracy were achieved in the Middle East, what kind of governments would it produce? Would they cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives besides curbing terrorism, such as advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process, maintaining security in the Persian Gulf, and ensuring steady supplies of oil? No one can predict the course a new democracy will take, but based on public opinion surveys and recent elections in the Arab world, the advent of democracy there seems likely to produce new Islamist governments that would be much less willing to cooperate with the United States than are the current authoritarian rulers.

4. Terrorism turn: Pushing for democracy now will hurt war on terror because radical Islamists will win elections

F. Gregory Gause III ( Associate Prof. of Political Science at the Univ. of Vermont) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Sept/Oct 2005, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html)

The emphasis on electoral democracy will not, however, serve immediate U.S. interests either in the war on terrorism or in other important Middle East policies. It is thus time to rethink the U.S. emphasis on democracy promotion in the Arab world. Rather than push for quick elections, the United States should instead focus its energy on encouraging the development of secular, nationalist, and liberal political organizations that could compete on an equal footing with Islamist parties. Only by doing so can Washington help ensure that when elections finally do occur, the results are more in line with U.S. interests.

5. Democracy turn #1: Quiet diplomacy more likely to succeed then ineffectual "spread democracy" policy

Paul Saunders, 1 June 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

But we must stay focused on achieving results rather than simply satisfying constituencies or making ourselves feel better about having "done something" that really does nothing. Our human rights dialogue with China has achieved more in private discussions than through megaphone diplomacy.

Status Quo and small changes are more likely to support democracy

Paul Saunders, 1 June 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

There are a variety of practical and effective ways to help build democracy and democratic institutions, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through training, exchanges, and other programs. It is neither practical nor effective to try to force change, and acknowledging as much is not giving in to fear—on the contrary, it demonstrates considerably more courage, morally, politically, and otherwise, to be honest with ourselves and others and to engage in this slow and patient work over the time necessary to succeed. It is that effort, not self-righteous rhetoric, that can change the world.

6. Democracy turn #2: Because short-term democratization produces too many unexpected side-effects, slow gradual change is more likely to succeed

Paul Saunders, 26 May 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Many proponents of democracy promotion seriously underestimate the ease with which we can promote democracy and overestimate the results we should expect. This has led to a mismatch between our stated goals and the human, financial, and other resources committed to achieving them. It has also led to a focus on superficial elements of democracy at the expense of those that are more substantial and lasting. No one disagrees with the notion that in the long run, a world of democracies is desirable—but short-term miscalculations can be very damaging.

7. Nuclear proliferation through loss of Russian cooperation

A. Link: Selective promotion of democracy leads to accusations of hypocrisy

Paul Saunders, 30 May 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Thus we focus more on democratic shortcomings in some countries, like Iran, than others, like Pakistan. And officials try to make up for the cases they pass over with strong statements demonstrating our commitment to democracy elsewhere. The problem is that other governments notice that despite our exaggerated rhetoric, we clearly make decisions based at least in part on other interests. Yet precisely because American officials justify so many aspects of our foreign policy in moralistic terms, others are left to wonder about our "real" motivations and to accuse the United States of hypocrisy and double standards.

B. Impact: Russia despises US hypocrisy and declines to support efforts against nuclear proliferation

Paul Saunders, 30 May 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

U.S. treatment of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and current Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has certainly raised these kinds of questions in Moscow. Mr. Halperin may be right that we can accept the security risks of applying greater pressure on the Egyptian government, though some might dispute his assertion. But can the United States settle for less than full cooperation from Russia in combating nuclear proliferation, when the price of failure could be incalculable?

8. Civil wars and human suffering

Paul Saunders, 30 May 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Moving beyond that—attempting to force change—often carries the greatest risks for those we are trying to help. Americans can decide to cut off Egypt, but Egyptians must shoulder the consequences. And anything short of complete success could be worse than the current status quo: According to a recent article in the National Interest, countries in incomplete transitions to democracy are involved in more civil and interstate wars than autocracies. Are we so sure that we can succeed? Can we make these decisions for others? If we want to build a road with our good intentions, we should be certain where it leads.

9. Crushed expectations lead to bloody results

Paul Saunders, 1 June 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Oversimplification of democracy's contribution to peace and prosperity also reinforces a tendency to see democracy as an end rather than a means to achieve even greater goals. Viewing democracy as an end in itself actually puts greater pressure on the U.S. government to deliver visible results, which in turn feeds the tendency to focus on events like elections rather than the process of building institutional machinery of democracy, which is far more important. But in ethnically, religiously, and politically fractured societies without strong institutions, like the former Yugoslavia (or Iraq), voting often empowers dividers rather than uniters, and can have explosive and bloody results.

DEMOCRACY SPREAD - GOOD

Turkey proves democracy can be spread to the Islamic world through integration with Europe

Eric Edelma (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), 20 Sept 2005, "Speech Presented to the Center for Strategic and International Studies," Center for Strategic and International Studies, [www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public\_statements/speeches/usdp/edelman/2005/september\_20\_2005.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public_statements/speeches/usdp/edelman/2005/september_20_2005.html)

As Ambassador to Turkey, I became increasingly convinced that a Turkey fully embraced by Europe could one day have a central role to play in helping spread our common ideals and principles. For all those who believe democracy cannot work in that volatile region, who think the task of spreading democracy is too daunting or isn’t worth it, Turkey is the refutation. Turkey’s long term commitment to the principles of democracy and their commitment to undertaking the reforms Europe demanded before even the first round of accession negotiations -- have produced economic opportunity, stable political institutions, and the peaceful rule of law. Turkey is proof that our strategy of spreading democracy in the Islamic world can work.

Supporting Status Quo friendly dictators is more harmful than promoting changes toward democracy

Morton Halperin, 2 June 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Democracy Promotion as Policy [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

My reference to fear was to Mr. Saunders' warning about the danger of states starting on a path to democracy but not fully succeeding. We should have no fear of that. Not only because there is no evidence to support the alleged dangers, but because we owe this much to those struggling to establish democratic regimes. I agree that we should proceed with modesty and with the first goal of doing no harm. The problem is that it is not always easy to know what United States government actions will actually do no harm. I think the record is clear that we have done far more harm in the world by supporting "friendly" dictatorships than we have by providing support for those struggling to establish democracy. We should do more of the latter and less of the former.

Promoting democracy does not have to be "consistent" all the time

Paul Saunders, 1 June 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Democracy Promotion as Policy [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Mr. Halperin's response to the inconsistency of American democracy promotion efforts, like that of many other activists, is to say that U.S. policy should be more consistent in its application across countries. This is attractive as rhetoric, and even important as a general aspiration, but quite unlikely as policy. Who honestly expects that America's own unique democracy will ever produce a consistent and coherent foreign policy?

Promoting democracy increases Western security and reduces likelihood of war

Morton Halperin, 31 May 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Democracy Promotion as Policy [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

As I and my co-authors have shown in a recent book, The Democracy Advantage, democratizing states are, in fact, less likely to be engaged in wars of any kind than are autocratic states. (Among the many errors in that article is treating autocracies such Yugoslavia under Milosevic as a democratizing state.) If one uses objective measures of democracy and focuses on the recent past, the evidence is clear that democratizing states are better performers and contribute to international security. Complete success in the short run is never possible; the path to democracy will always be long and hard. It is never all or nothing, but we enhance our security by helping those in the struggle for democracy not by holding back in fear.

Problems in Iraq and Russia do not disprove the benefits of spreading democracy

Morton Halperin, 30 May 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Democracy Promotion as Policy [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

Those who sought to impose democracy in Iraq, no less than those who sought democracy on the cheap in Russia, have unfortunately given democracy promotion a bad name. But we have learned the wrong lesson from these failures if we conclude that we cannot do better or that the United States should ratchet down its commitment to promoting democracy abroad. The basic lessons we should take from the spectacular march of democracy since the end of World War II are that successful democracies are the most productive and cooperative states, and that each society must build its own democracy. We can assist this process if we are guided by those who are struggling to establish or advance democracy in their state—but we must, as Saunders suggests, be patient.

NATO is very successful at promoting and sustaining democracy

Morton Halperin, 30 May 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Democracy Promotion as Policy [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

The most stunning success is in Europe, which saw first the consolidation of democracy in Western Europe and then, after the fall of communism, its consolidation in Central Europe. There is much more to be done before all of Europe is firmly democratic, but by continuing to offer a home in the European Union and NATO to those countries that make irreversible commitments to democracy we can strengthen the hand of democrats.

Need for security does not justify supporting non-democratic regimes

Morton Halperin, 30 May 2006, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Democracy Promotion as Policy [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the developing world, the humility that Saunders rightly commends should lead us not to despair but rather to heed and support the growing number of democracy advocates in the region. We should stop providing assistance and legitimacy to authoritarian governments in the false belief that this will, even in the short run, increase our security or our prosperity.

EUROPEAN-US RELATIONSHIP - NOT A PROBLEM

European governments have no strategic differences with the U.S.

Vince Crawley (Staff Writer), US State Department, 3 May 2006, State's Fried Says NATO Not "Counterweight to United Nations," <www.usembassy.org.uk/euro348.html>

Fried acknowledged that European publics remain "skeptical about the Bush administration" but said European governments no longer seek to "strategically" differ with the United States by promoting a unified Europe as a counterweight to the American superpower. "The differences we have with Europe are, frankly, trivial compared to the magnitude of the problems that await us both in the world, and this is now the view that European governments share," Fried said.

Unprecedented US/Europe agreement and cooperation in military operations

Andrew Moravcsik 3 Mar 2005, "An Ocean Apart," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=9211>

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western powers have intervened repeatedly outside the NATO homeland -- the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Afghanistan -- and every one of those interventions was, at least in the end, strongly supported by both the United States and Europe. European nations now deploy more than 100,000 troops abroad, most of them in defense of U.S. commitments. Twenty years ago, the possibility that European troops would be stationed in Afghanistan to back a U.S. intervention would have been treated as an absurd fantasy. This unheralded revolution in European policy demonstrates substantial Western consensus even on the use of force, contrary to Robert Kagan’s oversimpliﬁed distinction between America as "Mars" and Europe as "Venus."

Divisions over the Iraq war have healed: US and Europe are working together again

Daniel Fried (Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), 8 Mar 2006, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, "The U.S.-European Relationship: Opportunities and Challenges"

We have differences with some in Europe on certain issues, including, famously, the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein. But I have seen over the last year a shift in emphasis among Europeans from a focus on past differences to a commitment to work together to take on global challenges. President Bush and Secretary Rice believe in America’s alliance with Europe. In his Second Inaugural address, the President said it very clearly: "All the allies of the United States can know we honor your friendship, we rely on your counsel and we depend on your help. The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies’ defeat." Our European counterparts share that commitment and vision.

Not at odds: Broad agreement on democracy in Europe, Middle East policy, Iran and terrorism

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, May 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, p. 2

The United States and Europe are not at odds across the board. They share many interests and goals in the world at large. For instance, they have similar views on the democratization of the former Soviet Union, as their united stance on Ukraine's elections shows. Nor are they wholly polarized on the Middle East, where they agree on the need for a democratic Palestinian state and on the criticality of secure oil supplies. Approaches to Iran are being harmonized. NATO leaders are cooperating in many aspects of the war on terrorism and policy toward Afghanistan.

Future is bright: Increased US-European cooperation will happen in Status Quo

Madeleine Albright and Kurt Campbell (Editors), 2003, CROSSING THE ATLANTIC: A Repot from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops, p. 9

Recent developments inside the EU, including the Union’s new security strategy and its WMD policy statement, offer a bright prognosis in terms of EU-U.S. cooperation. Furthermore, increased transatlantic cooperation in the area of homeland security suggests that the threat perception gap has not prevented Europe and the United States from creating common transatlantic counter-terrorism strategies.

Europeans support cooperation with the US to spread democracy

Daniel Fried (Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), 8 Mar 2006, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, "The U.S.-European Relationship: Opportunities and Challenges"

According to a German Marshall Fund poll released last September, an enormous majority of the European public – 74 percent – supports joint European-American action to advance democracy in the world. While the same poll reflected a desire for Europe to take on "superpower status," the Europeans would use such status to work with the United States to promote the number one U.S. foreign policy objective – the advancement of freedom.

EXPANSION OF NATO - NO PROBLEM

HARMS

1. Russia says NATO expansion is no big deal

MosNews (Russian news agency), 3 June 2006, "Putin Challenges U.S. on Human Rights, NATO Expansion," <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/06/03/putintalks.shtml>

Russian President Vladimir Putin challenged the United States on Friday over human rights and NATO expansion but said the two nations are more partners than opponents, The Associated Press news agency reported. In some of his warmest comments about the United States in months of sliding relations, Putin minimized disagreements between the two powers as "tactical" while asserting "the things that unite us are of a strategic character."

2. Nothing Russia can do about NATO expansion anyway

Strategic Forecasting (research firm that gathers intelligence in the areas of geopolitics, security and public policy), 11 Feb 2004, "Battle for the FSU: Russia's Gambit, NATO's Checkmate," [www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read\_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1](http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1)

In the end, Moscow's options outside the political arena are severely limited. The Kremlin knows this and will do the majority of its negotiating in behind-the-scenes meetings, accompanied by public threats aimed at convincing NATO of Russia's firm stance -- even if that stance is only ignored.

3. "Legal wrangling" is all Russia will do about NATO expansion

Strategic Forecasting (research firm that gathers intelligence in the areas of geopolitics, security and public policy), 11 Feb 2004, "Battle for the FSU: Russia's Gambit, NATO's Checkmate," [www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read\_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1](http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1)

NATO's eastward expansion is inevitable, and Russia has few substantive countermeasures available. Overt military conflict is out of the question, and an opposing military buildup would cost Moscow more than it is willing to risk financially. Instead, Russia's strategy will include the legal wrangling to which Ivanov alluded in Munich.

4. There will be no Russian military response to NATO expansion

Strategic Forecasting (research firm that gathers intelligence in the areas of geopolitics, security and public policy), 11 Feb 2004, "Battle for the FSU: Russia's Gambit, NATO's Checkmate," [www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read\_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1](http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?selected=Special%20Reports&id=227996&showForecasts=1&specialReports=1)

Aside from raking NATO over the legal coals, Russia has a few other options to limit the military expansion. The most obvious one would be to redeploy a large, permanent presence into the westernmost regions of Russia -- such as the Russian province of Kaliningrad -- but such a deployment would carry a great deal of risk. First, a Russian military buildup in these areas would cool warming relations between Russia and the European Union -- Germany in particular -- an alliance Moscow sees as much more strategically important than the threat of NATO troops in the Baltics. Second, the cost of such a move also would place a significant burden on Russia's limited defense budget.

5. NATO expansion is good for democracy in Eastern Europe

Plamen Ralchev, 2005, GEORGIA’S RUSSIAN HURDLES: Negotiating Russian Troops Withdrawal from Georgia, INSTITUTE FOR REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, p. 15

Moscow is intent on steadily rebuilding Russia as a major power on the Eurasian stage. As Bugajski observes, a modification of what can be described as a neo-containment policy on the part of the West towards Russia may well suit the democratization and developmental strategies of countries in Russia’s proximity like Georgia.

6. NATO expansion is needed to counter Russian aggression

Bruce P. Jackson ( president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), 18 Feb 2005, "Democracy in Russia," Based on testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, [www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2) (brackets added)

Third, the United States should work with our partners in NATO and the European Union to develop common strategies to deal with the death of democracy inside Russia and with its imperial interventions abroad. The recent enlargements of the EU and NATO added many European countries with first-hand knowledge of what it means to be an object of Russia's predatory policies. For Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Balts and others, Russian imperialism is not an abstraction. We can and must expend the political capital to develop a common Western approach that promotes democracy inside and alongside the Russian Federation.

7. Expansion brings huge benefits to European countries

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

And it was not just membership, but the realistic prospect of membership that made the difference. In their pursuit of NATO and EU membership, these countries pursued reforms that improved the lives and opportunities of their citizens in ways far beyond basic security and defense. These reforms strengthened individual rights and freedoms, institutionalized democratic systems, fostered market economies, resolved border disputes, and protected minorities. This process continues today as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine pursue reforms and seek NATO membership.

8. Expansion does not weaken the alliance

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

During the NATO enlargement debates of the 1990’s, it was often suggested that enlargement would somehow "dilute" NATO. Or that reaching consensus would be more difficult at 26 than at 16 or 19. I never believed this. In my view, any issue that commanded consensus among France, the United States, Greece and Turkey and the existing 16 Allies was likely to command consensus in Europe as a whole. Moreover, the addition of like-minded democracies committed to collective defense and the advance of freedom would only strengthen NATO. And this has indeed been the case. Rather than being diluted, NATO at 26 is stronger as a result.

7. NATO expansion succeeds where the European Union fails: promotes needed reforms in candidate countries

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

And just as in the past, the realistic prospect of NATO membership has the potential to inspire countries to make difficult reforms that benefit their own citizens. And just as in the past, we anticipate NATO will again lead, especially as the EU sorts out its own views on the extent of its future enlargement in the wake of the 2005 referenda against the EU Constitution.

8. Expansion promotes democracy, market economies and dispute resolution

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

And it was not just membership, but the realistic prospect of membership that made the difference. In their pursuit of NATO and EU membership, these countries pursued reforms that improved the lives and opportunities of their citizens in ways far beyond basic security and defense. These reforms strengthened individual rights and freedoms, institutionalized democratic systems, fostered market economies, resolved border disputes, and protected minorities. This process continues today as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine pursue reforms and seek NATO membership.

INHERENCY

1. NATO is cooling its expansion plans

The Economist (British news magazine), 15 June 2006, "Surrounding Russia," <http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=7064507>

The Kremlin need not panic yet. The Americans want to bring in both Georgia and Ukraine, but other NATO governments are less gung-ho. One reason is that some of the democratic sheen has come off both revolutions. Another is that many Europeans feel that the alliance is already big enough, and that some newer members joined too soon. Some members also do not want NATO to move further and faster than the European Union. And a few are against because they fear antagonising the Russians.

2. Georgia and Ukraine are on hold for NATO membership

The Economist (British news magazine), 15 June 2006, "Surrounding Russia," [http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story\_ID=7064507](http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=7064507%20%20)  (brackets added)

[Georgian leader] Mr Saakashvili and [Ukrainian leader] Mr Yushchenko are looking for a concrete foreign-policy achievement. For both, NATO membership looks more attainable than early entry into the EU. Mr Buteiko asserts that Ukraine might still join in 2008. But both countries may well find themselves lapping each other on a jargon-littered circuit of "dialogue" and "action plans" for a lot longer than that.

3. Status Quo already working on it: Expansion is being conducted without aggravating Russia

Vice President Richard Cheney, quoted in 5 May 2006, "U.S.’s Cheney Rebukes Russian ‘Blackmail’ " ST PETERSBURG TIMES, [http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=17520](http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=17520%20) (brackets added)

"We will make the case, clearly and confidently, that Russia has nothing to fear and everything to gain from having strong, stable democracies on its borders and that by aligning with the West, Russia joins all of us on a course to prosperity and greatness,’’ Cheney said. "None of us believes that Russia is fated to become an enemy.’’

DISADVANTAGES

1. Increased interference by Russia in internal affairs of its neighbors

A. Link: NATO increases protection of Eastern European nations

Col. Stanislav Lunev (highest-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer ever to defect from Russia), 31 Oct 2002, "Baltic States Eyed for NATO Expansion", NEWSMAX, <www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/10/31/120824.shtml>

The enlargement question has helped fuel a larger debate on the future of NATO, which no longer has its Cold War mission and has not been a major factor in the global war on terror. However, there is no doubt that by inviting the Baltic states and other former Eastern Bloc nations that qualify for membership, the NATO alliance will dramatically increase its capabilities and the level of protection provided to its member nations.

B. Impact: Russia is trying to interfere and build an empire

Roman Kupchinsky, 26 Nov 2004, " Analysis: Russia's New Imperialism," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=11&y=2004&id=216C44D1-159B-44DF-ABB8-72DA74B35039>

The Russian president set the tone of future Russian behavior when, at a 26 July Ukrainian-Russian summit in Crimea, he told reporters that: "The intelligence networks of our Western partners are trying in every way to hamper our movement towards each other." Putin has often seemed more interested in exercising power over Ukraine than in maintaining good neighborly relations with Washington or the European Union. The full extent of Russia's neo-imperial ambitions is still unclear. But the statements coming out of Moscow often seem unequivocal. On 28 September, Anatoliy Chubais, the head of Russia's Unified Energy Systems, appearing on the television program "Vremya," told the audience that Russia must become a "liberal empire."

2. Loss of democracy in newly democratic Eastern European states

A. Link: Cross apply Disad #1 link card above: NATO protects Eastern Europe. Stopping expansion = stopping protection from new countries that want it

B. Impact: Russian intervention and loss of democracy

Simeon Mitropolitski (former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency), Jan 2006, "Russia loses 'gas war' against Ukraine," INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE DIGEST, <http://www.ired.com/news/mkt/ru-gaswar.htm> (brackets added)

This war made obsolete the 6-year old question "Who are you Mr. Putin?" The most recent episode suggests that the right answer is "an autocrat and Russian imperialist". It's imperialism not in the Soviet ideological meaning; it's rather imperialism in the old-fashioned Russian meaning, recorded in so many history books for 19th c[entury]. In the light of this 'revelation', which may surprise only those who had skipped the evolution of the Russian regime in the last 6 years, the Russian interference in the Ukrainian election of 2004 doesn't look like a pure accident.

3. Loss of territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors

Brendan Murray, 5 May 2006, "U.S.’s Cheney Rebukes Russian ‘Blackmail’ " ST PETERSBURG TIMES, [http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=17520](http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=17520%20) (brackets added)

In the speech, [Vice President] Cheney also made a reference to what the U.S. views as Russian interference with neighboring separatist conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, saying "no one can justify actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor or interfere with democratic movements.’’

4. Reduction of peace and stability in Central Europe: Past NATO expansions were a big success

Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus, 14 Mar 2006, "Next Step for NATO," WASHINGTON POST, p. A19

Today, that decision [to expand NATO] looks like a no-brainer; it is hard even to remember how contentious it was. The critics, although few have ever acknowledged it, were wrong. Without NATO's enlargement, we would face greater instability in Central Europe, especially in the Balkans, as well as greater problems with a semi-irredentist and increasingly authoritarian Russia.

COMMON FUNDING

HARMS

1. Harms don't justify change: Status Quo funding works OK

Peter Struck (German Minister of Defence), 13 Sept 2005, "Joint Press Point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the German Defence Minister, Peter Struck," Informal meeting of Defence Ministers, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050913e.htm> (ellipses in original)

Germany believes that first of all we should follow the principle of "costs lie where they fall." So each nation base its share in certain operations. But we know that nations... certain nations will not be able to do that in certain missions, and so we are willing to help other nations, particularly during the exercise on the Cape Verde islands, and we will participate in the discussion on the funding of NATO operations, and I think we will reach an acceptable result for all those involved.

2. NRF funding is not endangered: US and Greece will pay for it

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman), 8 June 2006, Press Briefing after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers, <http://152.152.96.1/docu/speech/2006/s060608m.htm>

You saw the Secretary General's opening statement; discussions until I left the room revolved around, of course, the NATO Response Force. There was a general commitment around the table first to ensure that we have full operational capability by the time of the Riga Summit but also a recognition that we're getting closer and closer. For example, the United States has very recently along with Greece made another substantial contribution to meeting full operational capability of the NRF.

3. Lack of common funding isn't blocking NRF: It works fine today

Gen. James L. Jones, quoted in Global War on Terror and Future of NATO, by Sebestyen L. v. Gorka, 9 Jan 2006, HUMAN EVENTS, [www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374](http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374)

The most telling transformation is that of NATO’s Response Force (NRF), which will be fully operational at the beginning of next year. This formation is in my opinion an instrument of change, with missions that will be shaped by the tasks set and not vice-versa. In fact, we have proof that the new system already functions, since our mission to Pakistan is NRF-based. It works.

4. Non-commonly-funded mission costs are insignificant and covered by European allies

Antonio Missiroli, June 2003, European Union, Institute for Security Studies, "Euros for ESDP: financing EU operations," p. 19

It is therefore important to stress that 1) 'operating' costs for non-Art. 5 peace support missions (covered through the 'costs lie where they fall' formula) have long been negligible in the overall NATO balance; b) they have often been softened by the use of assets and capabilities whose costs have already been shared by NATO 'nations'; c) when they have started to grow and take hold, namely with SFOR and KFOR, an ever-increasing share thereof has been taken over by the European allies, which currently put up more than two-thirds of NATO's military personnel engaged on the ground.

INHERENCY

1. NATO is already expanding cost-sharing policies -- "a lot of progress" is being made

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman), 8 June 2006, Press Briefing after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers, <http://152.152.96.1/docu/speech/2006/s060608m.htm>

First, since the Allies agreed to a new revised cost-share to the overall NATO budget which is something that they did just last year which provides a more equitable percentage share to each country, the Alliance has in the broader sense expanded the eligibility criteria as we call it for common funding. So more things fall under the common funding rubric, more things can be commonly funded. For example, when it comes to hospitals, when it comes to more parts of headquarters, when it comes to different areas of logistics, things that are used together, more things that are used by all of the Allies can now be commonly funded. So we're already made progress, quite a lot of progress I have to say since the Secretary General put this under the agenda.

2. No funding barrier: NATO countries could already do more missions if they wanted to

Gen. James L. Jones, quoted in Global War on Terror and Future of NATO, by Sebestyen L. v. Gorka, 9 Jan 2006, HUMAN EVENTS, [www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374](http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374)

As a result, I am less than optimistic about near-future Alliance capabilities in key short-falls such as strategic lift and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) defence. The Prague Capabilities Commitment deals with high-end items that have very long gestation periods before they become true capabilities, and I don’t see them emerging as they should just yet. Maybe the summit in 2006 can reverse this trend. But if you look at the worrying fact that in the aftermath of serious terrorist attacks on the European soil of NATO most of the responses were national and not Alliance responses, then this is a disturbing trend. More could be done if nations really wanted to.

3. NATO members are stepping up to share costs

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO’s Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Education, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

Three Allies have already agreed to increase their cost shares so that the larger Allies can slightly reduce theirs and NATO has also started to make greater use of Trust Funds. When Hungary recently donated T72 tanks to the Iraqi armed forces, it was Greece and Luxembourg who picked up the bill for transporting this equipment to Baghdad. Similarly Turkish helicopters recently deployed to Afghanistan were financed by Iceland and Luxembourg.

SOLVENCY

1. Resolving proportion of spending won't help until you resolve the amount of European defense spending

Dr. Julian Lindley-French, 14 Dec 2005, "The Coherence Between ESDP and NATO in the Field of Enhancing Military Capabilities," p. 2 (underline in original)

Indeed, whilst there is much talk at present of the need for a transatlantic strategic dialogue, and a NATO-EU strategic dialogue, what we need above all is a strategic dialogue between European leaders and their peoples if social security is not to continue to kill European security. One thing is for sure; it will take some time before European leaders in most European countries feel comfortable enough to a) raise security investment; and b) close the gap between the task list implied in both the globalizing NATO Strategic Concept and the European Security Strategy and the size and capabilities of European armed forces.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Common funding allows some nations to escape their responsibilities

Defense and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 12-13 Nov 2005, "SUMMARY of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee," <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=855>

He [Tiny Kox, Dutch representative at NATO] was also concerned about the modalities of increasing common funding and the danger that it could be seen as a way for some members to avoid their national responsibilities.

FUNDING SOURCES FOR PLANS

UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

$4.9 billion: Eliminate federal subsidy for School Improvement Programs

Office of Management and Budget, Jan 2006, "Budget of the United States Government FY 2007," Dept. of Education, p. 345 [FY= "Fiscal Year", the year that runs from Oct 1, 2006 to Sep 30, 2007]

"SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS – For carrying out school improvement activities authorized by title II, part B of title IV, part A and subpart 9 of part D of title V, parts A and B of title VI, and parts B and C of title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"); the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act; section 203 of the Educational Technical Assistance Act of 2002; the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2003; and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, $4,973,158,000, of which $3,353,117,000 shall become available on July 1, 2007, and remain available through September 30,2008, and of which $1,435,000,00 shall become available on October 1, 2007, and shall remain available through September 30, 2008, for academic year 2007-2008:"

$1.1 billion: Cut federal funding for HEA, MECEA, and Carl D. Perkins Act

Office of Management and Budget, Jan 2006, "Budget of the United States Government FY 2007," Dept. of Education, p. 355 [FY= "Fiscal Year", the year that runs from Oct 1, 2006 to Sep 30, 2007]

"For carrying out, to the extent not otherwise provided, titles III, IV, V, VI, and VII of the Higher Education Act of 1965 ("HEA"), as amended, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, and section 117 of the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act, $1,108,711,000:"

$237 million: Cut federal subsidy to Howard University

Office of Management and Budget, Jan 2006, "Budget of the United States Government FY 2007," Dept. of Education, p. 357 [FY= "Fiscal Year", the year that runs from Oct 1, 2006 to Sep 30, 2007]

For partial support of Howard University (20 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), $237,392,000, of which not less than 3,600,000 shall be for a matching endowment grant pursuant to the Howard University Endowment Act (Public Law 98-480) and shall remain available until expended.

$1 billion: Eliminate the National Institute on Aging

Office of Management and Budget, Jan 2006, "Budget of the United States Government FY 2007," Dept. of Health and Human Services, p. 436 [FY= "Fiscal Year", the year that runs from Oct 1, 2006 to Sep 30, 2007]

NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING For carrying out section 301 and title IV of the Public Health Service Act with respect to aging, $1,039,828,000.

$6.7 billion: Eliminate "Head Start" (federal pre-school program)

Office of Management and Budget, Jan 2006, "Budget of the United States Government FY 2007," Dept. of Health and Human Services, p. 458 [FY= "Fiscal Year", the year that runs from Oct 1, 2006 to Sep 30, 2007]

"Provided, That $6,785,771,000 shall be for making payments under the Head Start Act, of which $1,388,800,000 shall be become available October 1,2007, and remain available through September 30, 2007:"

Head Start money is wasted

Citizens Against Government Waste, 5 Apr 2005, "CAGW Warns: Head Start Needs to Clean House - Congressional Hearings Scheduled" <http://www.cagw.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8800>

Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) today underscored a recent report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that confirmed a plague of ongoing mismanagement and financial irregularity in Head Start—the federal preschool program for poor children.

$1.25 million: Eliminate federal subsidy for Center of Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law

Office of Management and Budget, Jan 2006, "Budget of the United States Government FY 2007," Dept. of Education, p. 345 [FY= "Fiscal Year", the year that runs from Oct 1, 2006 to Sep 30, 2007]

"Provided further, That from the funds referred to in the preceding proviso, not less than $1,250,000 shall be for a grant to the Department of Education of the State of Hawaii for the activities described in such proviso, and $1,250,000 shall be for a grant to the University of Hawaii School of Law for a Center of Excellence in Native Hawaiian law:"

EUROPE

Common Agricultural Policy subsidies - €40 billion euros ($47 billion)

THE ECONOMIST (British news magazine), 8 Dec 2005, "Europe's farm follies" [www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story\_id=5278374](http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5278374)

The CAP costs European taxpayers over €40 billion ($47 billion) a year, or around 40% of the total EU budget.

Most NATO members are also members of EU

Frances G. Burwell, David C. Gompert, Leslie S. Lebl, Jan M. Lodal, Walter B. Slocombe, Atlantic Council of the United States, Mar 2006, Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, p. 27

But most of NATO’s members are also members of the EU, and the European states are determined to build the capability of the EU to act on behalf of its member states.

HEGEMONY DISADVANTAGE

Definition of "hegemony"

Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006, <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/hegemony>

preponderant influence or authority over others

Definition of "imperialism"

Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006, [www.m-w.com/dictionary/imperialism](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/imperialism)

the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; *broadly* : the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence

NATO links to hegemony:

1. Allies enable US hegemony

Peter Rudolf (senior fellow at German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin), 2006, "Return of a Benevolent Hegemony?" p. 81

The occupation of Iraq exposed the limits of US military power; an "imperial" policy is impossible without substantial cooperation from allied states.

2. Promoting NATO = promoting US hegemony

Tom Berry (policy director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center), 2 Apr 2004, "Long Live NATO," FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig4/barry-tom4.html>

Given that most European nations lack strong militaries of their own and that EU still lacks a unified security infrastructure, the ever-expanding NATO operating under U.S. direction will likely remain an effective instrument of U.S. hegemony, not only in North Atlantic but also from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea, and from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf.

IMPACTS (Not all of these will apply to every AFF case. Choose carefully.)

General Hegemony Impact: Hegemony provokes violent reaction -- more terrorism

Stephen Zunes, 1 May 2003, "The U.S. and Post-War Iraq: An Analysis," FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/1546>

Still, in proving that the U.S. can decisively defeat any Middle Eastern government that challenges American prerogatives, policymakers hope that--as a result of the Pentagon's overwhelming and devastating display of force--those who oppose U.S. hegemony will somehow now meekly accept American dictates. However, the more likely result will be an increased sense that the nation-state is incapable of resisting American hegemony, and it is therefore up to nonstate actors utilizing various forms of asymmetrical warfare--such as terrorism--to fight back.

Hegemony in the Middle East: Costs exceed benefits and leads to bankruptcy

Andrew J. Bacevich, 1 Aug 2005, The American Conservative, "Middle East Paradigm Shift, Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East," [www.amconmag.com/2005\_08\_01/article2.html](http://www.amconmag.com/2005_08_01/article2.html)

For at least three reasons, according to Hadar, devising an alternative to the MEP is becoming an increasingly urgent priority. First, as 9/11 and its aftermath have made plain, the American imperial project in the Middle East has already exacted costs far in excess of those predicted by its supporters. The further pursuit of hegemony in the region is an invitation to bankruptcy.

Hegemony in Asia: Provokes anti-US alliances

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10824/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10824/)

While some U.S. observers are concerned that China and Russia are trying to build a new sphere of influence in the region, others say the two countries are reacting to U.S. efforts to encourage democracy in Central Asia, which are seen as threatening to both Moscow and Beijing. "It's a mutually reinforcing process," says Carpenter. "The reactions of Russia and China are influenced by the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the U.S. hegemonic presence in the world. That, particularly, is drawing together two natural adversaries."

HEGEMONY - NOT A PROBLEM

HARMS

1. It's absurd to say the US is practicing imperialism today

Peter Rudolf (senior fellow at German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin), 2006, "Return of a Benevolent Hegemony?" p. 80

Vis-à-vis democratic allies, it was a benevolent hegemony resting on "soft power" and an orientation toward consensus, while vis-à-vis authoritarian states, it relied on hard power resources and exercising coercion—in some instances even assuming imperial form. This kind of imperial policy applied to the periphery of the international state system and, especially, to the original Western sphere of influence. But today, whether with regard to the United States’ European and Asian allies or to Russia and China, such a characterization of US foreign policy is absurd, and no further qualification of the word imperial changes this verdict.

2. Just being large and influential does not make the US imperialistic

Peter Rudolf (senior fellow at German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin), 2006, "Return of a Benevolent Hegemony?" p. 77

Second, the terms empire and imperial are applied very loosely. Rarely is it ever really specified what constitutes this American empire nor is it specified how the content of this term differs from other terms which express the simple fact that the United States is a state of unparalleled resources and power that is expansive in the sense that it seeks to impose its understanding of political and economic order around the world.

3. Historically no impact: Unilateralism and hegemony have been accepted by Americans throughout history

Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, 9 May 2006, Pew Research Center, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism," <http://pewresearch.org/obdeck/?ObDeckID=23>

While we have no public opinion data dating back to the early days of the republic, it is fair to say that unilateralism and hegemony (at least with regard to the Western Hemisphere) have been accepted by the American people for most of their history. In the view of Yale University historian John Gaddis, it was not until the mid-1930s that the United States began to pursue a more multilateralist course in foreign affairs.

DISADVANTAGE

1. Reversing hegemony would hurt Europe

Daniel Brumberg (Assoc. Professor of Government at Georgetown University), HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Spring 2003, "Hegemony or Leadership?" From Development and Modernization, Vol. 25 (1) <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1081/>

European peace and prosperity are founded on a quest for economic, political, and social integration whose very success hinges on having the United States shoulder the primary economic and even human costs of acting as military hegemony.

ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE - GOOD

INHERENCY

1. NATO is setting up processes to work on democracy in the Gulf States

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 30 Nov 2005, "NATO LEGISLATORS HOLD FIRST SEMINAR IN THE GULF" [http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=847](http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=847%20%20)  (brackets added)

The seminar, a first in the region, represented a further stage in the development of contacts between the NATO PA [Parliamentary Assembly] and the Gulf States. It provided a timely opportunity for the sharing of perspectives and interests on regional security concerns and on the scale and nature of the political reforms needed in Gulf countries and elsewhere in the Arab world and the compatibility of such reforms with Islam. Sufficient common ground was shown to exist to constitute a basis for further contacts. Paramount was the sense that engagement by the parliamentary side of the Alliance was a crucial corollary to NATO's own activities within the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

2. Other initiatives are increasing democracy in the Gulf States - they are parallel to ICI increasing security

Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 Nov 2005, "NATO and Security in the Gulf - Istanbul Cooperation Initiative," <http://www.nato-qatar.com/security/istanbul.html>

Taking into account other international efforts for reforms in the democracy and civil society fields in the countries of the region, NATO’s offer to those countries of dialogue and cooperation will contribute to those efforts where it can have an added value: in particular, NATO could make a notable contribution in the security field as a result of its particular strengths and the experience gained with the PfP and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

HARMS

1. Not subverting democracy: NATO military cooperation actually increases democracy

Scott Carpenter (US State Department) 3 June 2005, NATO's Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, "NATO and the Future of the Arab World -- How is NATO contributing to the new dynamic of reform and change in the region?," Panel discussion transcript, Henry L. Stimson Center p. 24

I believe, and I think the Administration believes, that the institutions, especially like NATO, which have contributed to much to security, and stability in many parts of the world, that to the degree in which they interact with, the security forces in the military of the region, that ultimately that is a democratizing element.

2. Turkey example proves: NATO intervention influences countries towards democracy

Gen. Wesley Clark, May 2004, "Broken Engagement," WASHINGTON MONTHLY, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0405.clark.html>

One Islamic country in the Middle East that has made the transition to democracy is Turkey. But it did not do so overnight. After decades of tight military supervision of the political process, during which the United States and Western Europe embraced the country as part of NATO and urged subtle reforms, Turkey has only within the last few years overcome the last obstacles to full democracy.

3. Gulf Cooperation Council states are establishing democracy in Status Quo

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, Winter 2004, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0412_kechichian.asp> (ellipses in original)

According to the president, who identified five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members by name in this seminal lecture (the exception was the United Arab Emirates), several governments were "beginning to see the need for change." "In Bahrain last year," professed Mr. Bush, "citizens elected their own parliament for the first time in nearly three decades. Oman has extended the vote to all adult citizens; Qatar has a new constitution. . . . Kuwait has a directly elected national assembly." Even "the Saudi government is taking first steps toward reform, including a plan for gradual introduction of elections. By giving the Saudi people a greater role in their own society, the Saudi government can demonstrate true leadership in the region," concluded the cheerful leader.

4. Security risks in Middle East justify NATO intervention

Rosemary Hollis, 2005, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SPIRI YEARBOOK 2005, "Chapter 5: The Greater Middle East," <http://yearbook2005.sipri.org/ch5/ch5>

The greater Middle East is a region little penetrated by the political effects of globalization, but highly prone to ‘new-style’ transnational threats as well as older-style inter-state tensions. The apparent security deficit has recently drawn new efforts at international engagement and ‘region building’, by NATO and the EU among other organizations.

5. Slow reforms are best: Risks to security outweigh demand for immediate reform

Ruprecht Polenz, 2005, Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "177 PCTR 05 E - NATO AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY" [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676)

Trying to establish collective security agreements, even if they can be achieved only gradually over a longer period of time, is of vital importance in this volatile area. In the past, Western, i.e. US military presence has helped to tackle military problems. A military presence of Allied forces will remain important for the foreseeable future. However, today's regional security challenges are much more complex and any Western military presence in the Gulf, which might be required if Iran became nuclear and pursued a more aggressive foreign policy, would have a negative impact on combating terrorism and maintaining internal stability in the Gulf states. Therefore, it is crucial that the Allies, perhaps in close co-ordination with the EU, assist the reform process in these countries, even if they are likely to be incremental since the ruling elites prefer to manage reform in such a way as to ensure their own survival.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Now is not the time to abandon cooperative Middle East nations: They need help to avoid multiple disasters

Dr Michael D. Yaffe, (academic dean, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington), Fall 2004, "The Gulf and a New Middle East Security System" MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, Volume XI, Number 3 [www.mepc.org/journal\_vol11/0409\_yaffe.asp](http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0409_yaffe.asp)

The threat posed by Saddam's regime to neighboring moderate Arab states has been eliminated. Those states are now grappling with the prospect of having either a moderate, Shiite-dominated state at their doorstep or perhaps the emergence of civil war and three new states if Iraq disintegrates. In either case, no longer facing a looming threat from the north, Southern Gulf states can devote more energy to addressing other potential dangers to the region in the form of an unpredictable Iran, radical groups intending to overthrow their governments and commit acts of terrorism, and sundry transnational security problems in the form of environmental disasters, economic stagnation, demographic pressures and political unrest.

2. Canceling ICI would hurt war on terrorism

NATO Online Library, 25 Feb 2005, "Security cooperation with the Mediterranean region and the broader Middle East," [www.nato.int/docu/mediterranean/html\_en/docu/briefing/mediterranean/html\_en/mediterranean04.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/mediterranean/html_en/docu/briefing/mediterranean/html_en/mediterranean04.html)

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative aims to enhance security and stability by fostering mutually beneficial bilateral relationships with interested countries in the broader Middle East region. The Initiative is open to all countries in the region which subscribe to its aims, particularly the fight against terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Canceling ICI would hurt efforts against WMD

NATO Online Library, 25 Feb 2005, "Security cooperation with the Mediterranean region and the broader Middle East," [www.nato.int/docu/mediterranean/html\_en/docu/briefing/mediterranean/html\_en/mediterranean04.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/mediterranean/html_en/docu/briefing/mediterranean/html_en/mediterranean04.html)

The Initiative proposes tailored advice in a number of specific areas where the Alliance has developed expertise and can add value. One key area is defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations. Another is military-to-military cooperation focused primarily on improving the ability of participating countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities. Important priorities for cooperation would be fighting terrorism, including through information-sharing and possibly maritime cooperation, and addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

ICI is urgently needed to combat terrorism and WMD in the Persian Gulf region

Ruprecht Polenz, 2005, Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "177 PCTR 05 E - NATO AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY" [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676)

The Persian Gulf region has become increasingly relevant for Euro-Atlantic security, particularly as the most likely challenges, those originating from terrorism and WMD proliferation, originate in the South and the South-East of Europe. As NATO continues operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and expands its presence beyond its traditional area, a more active NATO policy towards this region is urgently needed. The ICI is in recognition of this need: it provides a broad set of instruments to assist interested countries of the region in meeting their security requirements.

4. Saudi Arabia needs Western help: Without it, the region will blow up

Ruprecht Polenz, 2005, Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "177 PCTR 05 E - NATO AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY" [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676)

However, the ruling elite does not appear united on how to best tackle the threat posed by terrorist groups and if, respectively how, to proceed with political reform. If Saudi Arabia imploded, there is a serious risk that an extremist regime might follow which, in turn, could throw the whole region into turmoil. King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud, who succeeded the late King Fahd bin Abdel Aziz in August 2005, has been the major force behind the recent reform drive. However, given the age of the ruler, the success of the reform process will also depend on who will replace him and whether his successor will prefer to work with or against the West in the future.

5. Democracy turn: Ending Gulf States cooperation would reverse trend toward democracy and rule of law

Wayne White, The Middle East Institute, 3 June 2005, NATO’s Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, "NATO’s Role in Gulf Security and US interests"

Unfortunately, it has already been mentioned here, there is considerable mistrust of the US among populations in the Gulf. All you have to do is look at the polls; the numbers are there. Also, mistrust of the "West" as well, and I think this initiative is an excellent opportunity for a variety of types of cooperation that can help reduce that over time by putting everything in a broader NATO context. With that being said, this begins with a fairly limited government to government cooperation, which will not expand to a broader people to people level of understanding until that process moves further along. But I very much think that it can get there and get that far along. So it can be an important beginning in that respect, and it also gives governments incentives to develop and improve means to confront issues of interests to the US, NATO, and themselves, in the long run to go well beyond the early requirements of this kind of exchange in dialogue interaction; such as transparency increased by lateral trust and understanding, which can be extended to other areas related to the rule of law, et cetera, things that we discuss constantly as the requirements of civil society and preparation for democratization, and other related issues.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION -- BAD

Sovereignty matters: It is the best method to preserve human rights, civil society and economic development

International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, ICISS REPORT: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, [www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications](http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications)

All that said, sovereignty does still matter. It is strongly arguable that effective and legitimate states remain the best way to ensure that the benefits of the internationalization of trade, investment, technology and communication will be equitably shared. Those states which can call upon strong regional alliances, internal peace, and a strong and independent civil society, seem clearly best placed to benefit from globalization. They will also be likely to be those most respectful of human rights. And in security terms, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states, confident of their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.

Stop calling it "Humanitarian Intervention" -- the term is offensive and prejudicial

International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, ICISS REPORT: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, [www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications](http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications)

We have responded in this respect to the very strong opposition expressed by humanitarian agencies, humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers towards any militarization of the word "humanitarian": whatever the motives of those engaging in the intervention, it is anathema for the humanitarian relief and assistance sector to have this word appropriated to describe any kind of military action. The Commission has also been responsive to the suggestion in some political quarters that use in this context of an inherently approving word like "humanitarian" tends to prejudge the very question in issue - that is, whether the intervention is in fact defensible.

Even intervention to save internal regime victims will trigger the disads of global resentment

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 43

The first thing to recognize is the resistance in the world organization to taking over the responsibility of national governments for the maintenance of domestic peace and order, particularly when intervention in one of the larger member states is under discussion. Surely, the idea of the international responsibility to act in order to protect the people of a country when the government of that country itself abdicated responsibility has, as indicated before, gained momentum. But a large number of member states are still staunch defenders of the idea of national sovereignty.

Pre-emptive intervention can and should be done through the UN Security Council

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 60

But for any appeal to the right of self-defense to be legal and legitimate, the threat in question has to be imminent, in other words there has to be a clear and present danger. It is up to the state that justifies unilateral military action by referring to the right of anticipatory self-defense to convince the Security Council of the high-level of urgency of the threat. It should also be understood that preventive strikes, in contradistinction to preemptive strikes, would require the prior authorization by the Security Council. Those strikes are in response to threats that could materialize in the future, lacking the urgency to act unilaterally.

"Failed States" don't justify intervention: Most failed states are not a security threat

Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, July 2006, "Are Failed States a Threat to America?" REASON, <http://www.reason.com/0607/fe.jl.are.shtml>

It would be absurd to claim that the ongoing state failure in Haiti poses a national security threat of the same order as would state failure in Indonesia, with its population of 240 million, or in nuclear-armed Pakistan. In fact, the overwhelming majority of failed states have posed no security threat to the United States.

List of "Failed States" doesn't correlate with actual world security threats

Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, July 2006, "Are Failed States a Threat to America?" REASON, <http://www.reason.com/0607/fe.jl.are.shtml>

Using 12 different indicators of state failure, the researchers derived state failure scores, and then listed 60 countries whose cumulative scores marked them as "critical," "in danger," or "borderline," ranked in order. If state failure is itself threatening, then we should get very concerned about the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Chad, Bangladesh, and on and on. In short, state failure ranks rather low as an accurate metric for measuring threats.

Most "Failed States" are no threat at all

Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, July 2006, "Are Failed States a Threat to America?" REASON, <http://www.reason.com/0607/fe.jl.are.shtml>

Afghanistan under the Taliban was both a failed state and a threat, but in that respect it was a rarity. More common are failed states, from the Ivory Coast to Burma, that pose no threat to us at all.

Dershowitz is wrong: Democracies are not automatically entitled to pre-emptive military force

Neal Ascherson (journalist and writer, he was for many years a foreign correspondent for the London Observer), 18 May 2006, "The case for pre-emption: Alan M Dershowitz reviewed," OPEN DEMOCRACY, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/dershowitz_3561.jsp> (ellipses in original)

As he dismisses any known supranational body, including the International Court of Justice, as a possible mechanism for applying his jurisprudence, he has to fall back on individual governments: "A widely accepted international jurisprudence will impose domestic constraints on the unilateral actions of democracies…". Unless, presumably, that country is "under the gun", or imagines it is. And as Dershowitz appears to think that only democracies are entitled to use preventive or pre-emptive force, who decides which state is a democracy?

Troubled times do not justify new pre-emptive attacks

Neal Ascherson (journalist and writer, he was for many years a foreign correspondent for the London Observer), 18 May 2006, "The case for pre-emption: Alan M Dershowitz reviewed," OPEN DEMOCRACY, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/dershowitz_3561.jsp> (ellipses in original)

And Dershowitz's rhetoric about new times in which we must move from reactive to proactive behaviour – that too brings sinister echoes. All dictators, and some demagogues, like to maintain a climate of emergency in which they can reduce liberties and suppress critics in the name of "hard measures for hard times". Hitler used the medical metaphor to proclaim that in times of terror and crisis, society must shift from passive to active mode.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Link to Russia Disads: Aggressive strategy triggers Russian response [see Blue Book brief: Russia Is Good]

Sergei Blagov, 5 May 2004, ''Russia Views N.A.T.O. Expansion as a Strategic Threat'' POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, [www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_report&report\_id=166](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=166)

Despite heated objections, the Kremlin has said that Russia would continue to cooperate with N.A.T.O. However, Moscow indicated it could reassess its military planning in view of what it called N.A.T.O.'s aggressive strategy.

2. Intervention violates human dignity, freedom, and human rights

International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, ICISS REPORT: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, [www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications](http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications)

In a dangerous world marked by overwhelming inequalities of power and resources, sovereignty is for many states their best - and sometimes seemingly their only - line of defence. But sovereignty is more than just a functional principle of international relations. For many states and peoples, it is also a recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of their unique identities and their national freedom, and an affirmation of their right to shape and determine their own destiny. In recognition of this, the principle that all states are equally sovereign under international law was established as a cornerstone of the UN Charter (Article 2.1).

3. Intervention fuels global resentment

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 14

President Bush’s rather self-congratulatory characterization of the US as "the greatest force for good on this earth" starkly contrasts with the periodic flashes of anti-Americanism in many capitals of the world. Not surprisingly, America’s primacy fuels resentment and envy on the part of less developed countries, particularly in the Arab world. Those who want to entrust the planet’s destiny to the US seems oblivious to the age-old question: Who guards the guardian?

4. Intervention fuels terrorism

A. Link: NATO intervention is perceived as US intervention

Ruprecht Polenz, 2005, Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "177 PCTR 05 E - NATO AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY" [www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676](http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=676)

In addition to assisting defence reform, a NATO presence in the region can help introduce or strengthen security dialogue and confidence building. As a start, your Rapporteur suggests that the ICI [Istanbul Cooperation Initiative] be further developed by including a clause that allows for consultations if a participant country felt threatened in its security, similar to that of Partnership for Peace (PfP). However, the perception of NATO in the Broader Middle East region is generally that of something like "a foreign policy arm of the US".

B. Impact: Intervention motivates terrorism

Charles V. Pena, July/Aug 2004, "Strategy for the War on Terrorism," CATO Policy Report, p. 16

Because the United States is in a unique geostrategic position with no rivals and relatively secure from conventional military attack, the guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy must be: if core U.S. national security interests -- the American homeland, population, and way of life -- are not threatened, the United States can minimize the risks of terrorism by being less involved in the problems of other countries.

Almost all suicide attacks are in response to outside intervention

Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, July 2006, "Are Failed States a Threat to America?" REASON, <http://www.reason.com/0607/fe.jl.are.shtml> (ellipses in original)

In a survey of suicide terrorism between 1980 and 2003, University of Chicago political scientist Robert A. Pape concluded that almost all suicide attacks "have in common…a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland."

5. Legitimizing preventive war is fatal to civilization

Prof. David C. Hendrickson (political science at Colorado College), Fall 2002, "Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security," WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-3/hendrickson.html>

The embrace of a doctrine of preventive war is a highly significant step. It represents a radical departure from the twin pillars of national security policy during the Cold War—containment and deterrence. It is also contrary to a long established rule in international society that forbids the first use of force altogether or save in narrowly drawn circumstances. The norm against preventive war became embedded because experience with the contrary practice, which permitted states perfect discretion in the use of force, had led to results nearly fatal to civilization.

6. Pre-emptive posture justifies evil behavior by aggressive nations

Gareth Evans (former Australian Foreign Minister), quoted in 18 May 2006, "The case for pre-emption: Alan M Dershowitz reviewed," OPEN DEMOCRACY, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/dershowitz_3561.jsp> (ellipses in original)

"…What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, legitimising the prospect of preventive strikes in any number of volatile regions … To undermine so comprehensively the norm of non-intervention on which any system of global order must be painstakingly built is to invite a slide into anarchy"

North Korea is claiming the same right to pre-emption as the USA

A.A. Seul, 8 Apr 2006, "N. Korea: Pre-emptive Strike is not US Monopoly," ZAMAN (Turkish newspaper), <http://www.zaman.com/?bl=hotnews&alt=&trh=20060408&hn=31820>

According to official North Korean news agency, KCNA, Kim [Il Chol, North Korean Defense Minister] said: "We will not sit with arms folded and watch until the US attacks us. The pre-emptive strike is not the monopoly of the United States."

7. Net benefits: Violating sovereignty is worse than whatever problem you were trying to fix

Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, July 2006, "Are Failed States a Threat to America?" REASON, <http://www.reason.com/0607/fe.jl.are.shtml>

If state failure does not in itself pose a threat to U.S. security, an ambitious program of nation building would, in turn, be a cure worse than the disease. One particularly troubling prospect is the erosion of internationally recognized sovereignty. As Winston Churchill said of democracy, sovereignty may be the worst system around, except for all the others. A system of sovereignty grants a kernel of legitimacy to regimes that rule barbarically; it values as equals countries that clearly are not; and it frequently enforces borders that were capriciously drawn by imperial powers. But it’s far from clear that any available alternative is better.

Violating standards of conduct in the name of "fighting terrorism" is more dangerous than terrorism itself

Neal Ascherson (journalist and writer, he was for many years a foreign correspondent for the London Observer), 18 May 2006, "The case for pre-emption: Alan M Dershowitz reviewed," OPEN DEMOCRACY, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/dershowitz_3561.jsp> (brackets added)

History, [Professor Eric] Hobsbawm said, showed that there was nothing essentially new about the contemporary threat from terrorism. The threat itself, he went on, was serious but certainly not apocalyptic or terminal in its present form. But it suited certain states and political forces to pretend that the world had suddenly changed out of recognition, and they were using this false scenario of doom to cover the introduction of new rules of domestic and international practice which suited their own purposes. Hobsbawm concluded, as many others have done before him, that the measures taken to win the "'war on terror" are more dangerous to liberty and democracy than terrorism itself.

8. Morally repugnant: Justifying pre-emptive attack is evil

Neal Ascherson (journalist and writer, he was for many years a foreign correspondent for the London Observer), 18 May 2006, "The case for pre-emption: Alan M Dershowitz reviewed," OPEN DEMOCRACY, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/dershowitz_3561.jsp> (brackets added)

As he [Hitler] told the Nazi doctors, "you are biological soldiers" who are now – after millennia of restraint – allowed to launch pre-emptive attacks on genetic causes instead of merely treating symptoms. And in that proactive, life-and-death struggle against racial pollution, the old Hippocratic oath could be thrown away at last. These voices were also heard in Salem. Now they are heard in the debates over Iranian weaponry and Palestinian suicide-bombers. Those who preach new proactive moralities should only be approached with a clove of garlic, and that includes Professor Alan M Dershowitz.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION -- JUSTIFIED

Intervention in state sovereignty is justified to stop genocide and pandemics

Prof. Bruce W. Jentleson (Public Policy and Political Science at Duke Univ.), 21 June 2006, "How Sacrosanct State Sovereignty?" [www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226](http://www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226)

But in an era in which intrastate conflict has become the dominant and most lethal form, and in which what happens inside states can have major effects on others in the international community, it has become harder to readily accept the invocation of state sovereignty as a normative barrier behind which genocide and proliferation, as well as other dangers such as cover-ups of pandemics, can hide.

UN Charter does not prohibit intervention to prevent genocide

Prof. Bruce W. Jentleson (Public Policy and Political Science at Duke Univ.), 21 June 2006, "How Sacrosanct State Sovereignty?" [www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226](http://www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226)

The UN Charter "was issued in the name of ‘the people’, not the governments, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed with particular reference to genocides and ethnic cleansings. " It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity."

Nuclear non-proliferation justifies intervention

Prof. Bruce W. Jentleson (Public Policy and Political Science at Duke Univ.), 21 June 2006, "How Sacrosanct State Sovereignty?" [www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226](http://www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226)

Efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime along comparable lines of responsibilities and not just rights is what earned the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the Nobel Peace Prize. States can’t be allowed to rationalize away the interests of the international community by claiming my business so bud out. No question that the U.S. war in Iraq as well as other Bush unilateralism have made this much more difficult. But buying into invocations of sovereignty by Sudan, North Korea, Iran and/or others poses its own dangers to international peace, security and justice.

Punitive raids into neighboring countries to respond to attacks can be justified

Prof. Bruce W. Jentleson (Public Policy and Political Science at Duke Univ.), 21 June 2006, "How Sacrosanct State Sovereignty?" [www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226](http://www.tpmcafe.com/taxonomy/term/226)

The established and universally acknowledged right to self-defence, embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter, was sometimes extended to include the right to launch punitive raids into neighbouring countries that had shown themselves unwilling or unable to stop their territory from being used as a launching pad for cross-border armed raids or terrorist attacks.

Millions of people are at risk of dying and outside intervention is the only way to save them

International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, ICISS REPORT: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, [www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications](http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications)

Millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. This is a stark and undeniable reality, and it is at the heart of all the issues with which this Commission has been wrestling. What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling unable to protect them.

Intervention justified when major harm to civilians is occurring, even without prior UN approval

International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, ICISS REPORT: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, [www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications](http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications)

The emerging principle in question is that intervention for human protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator. The Security Council itself has been increasingly prepared in recent years to act on this basis, most obviously in Somalia, defining what was essentially an internal situation as constituting a threat to international peace and security such as to justify enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is also the basis on which the interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone were essentially justified by the interveners, as was the intervention mounted without Security Council authorization by NATO allies in Kosovo.

Nations have a "responsibility to protect" that can override state sovereignty

International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, ICISS REPORT: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, [www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications](http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#implications)

Thus the "responsibility to protect" is more of a linking concept that bridges the divide between intervention and sovereignty; the language of the "right or duty to intervene" is intrinsically more confrontational. Thirdly, the responsibility to protect means not just the "responsibility to react," but the "responsibility to prevent" and the "responsibility to rebuild" as well. It directs our attention to the costs and results of action versus no action, and provides conceptual, normative and operational linkages between assistance, intervention and reconstruction.

Afghanistan is an example of effective intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation

Georgy Kunadze, June 2006, NEW TIMES, "BETWEEN THE WEST AND EURASIA," <http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=335>

All foreign ministers of the Shanghai organization member states should be aware that the antiterrorist operation continues in Afghanistan and an interim government has been put together there, against heavy odds, through the efforts (or "interference") of all countries deeply concerned over the country's destiny; and that non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs was to blame for the long years of decimating civil war in that country abandoned to its own fate by all.

UN Security Council is not morally competent to decide whether intervention is justified

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 34-35

The legal regime of the UN underscores the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. But the legitimacy of the Council to determine the lawfulness of military actions by member states may be questioned. Not only does the composition of the Security Council hardly mirror the balance of political and economic forces in today’s world, too many of its members are susceptible to criticism because of their poor human rights record.

UN is politically incompetent to decide when intervention is justified

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 37 (P-5 = 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council: US, Britain, France, China, Russia)

It is one thing to block the road to unilateral decisions by member states when it comes to dealing with future threats. It is quite another, however, to acquiesce to the paralysis the Security Council has repeatedly demonstrated in the past because of the lack of consensus among the P-5. The failure of the Security Council to act is also particularly relevant when one faces acts of genocide or large-scale violations of human rights.

NATO is not "unilateral" intervention

Vince Crawley (US State Department), 3 May 2006, "State's Fried Says NATO Not "Counterweight to United Nations" [www.usembassy.org.uk/euro348.html](http://www.usembassy.org.uk/euro348.html)

"Unilateralism is out. Effective multilateralism is in," Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, said May 2 at a national conference of editorial writers in Washington. Fried said the United States and Europe are "working to make NATO the centerpiece alliance through which the trans-Atlantic democratic community deals with security challenges around the world."

NATO is not imperialism -- security problems justify limited intervention

Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus, 14 Mar 2006, "Next Step for NATO," WASHINGTON POST, p. A19

This does not mean that NATO should, or could, become a globo-cop; not every security problem in the world is of direct concern to NATO, and not every issue can be solved by it. Nor is this a call for a new age of Western imperialism; we are talking here of dealing with issues of national security vital to all NATO members -- issues that happen to lie outside NATO's traditional area of concern but on which NATO can make a difference.

Pre-emptive attack: Justified when enemy has moved forces and issued public threats

Seth Cropsey (served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict in the administration of President George H.W. Bush), May 2006, "Striking first - Debating the moral case for pre-emption," ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, [www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/05/1657828](http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/05/1657828) (brackets added)

[Harvard Law Professor Alan] Dershowitz's analysis dwells heavily on the distinction between pre-emption and prevention, which he separates according to imminence. Pre-emption is permissible without qualification when an enemy has moved forces and issued public threats. Had the U.S. known of the Japanese fleet heading toward Pearl Harbor in December 1941, a pre-emptive attack would have been justified. Israel's 1967 pre-emptive strike, following the withdrawal of U.N. observers from the Sinai Peninsula, the coordinated movement of Egyptian and Syrian troops to their borders, and public threats from Cairo and Damascus, was likewise prudent.

Pre-emptive attack: UN is not qualified to judge validity of pre-emption

Seth Cropsey (served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict in the administration of President George H.W. Bush), May 2006, "Striking first - Debating the moral case for pre-emption," ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, [www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/05/1657828](http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/05/1657828) (brackets added)

Indeed, one of the book's most remarkable points is its all-but-stated wish that an international institution might exist to fairly and impartially administer the jurisprudence of pre-emption and prevention. Dershowitz has no illusions about the ability of the United Nations to assume this role, however, and derides the Security Council as ineffective, unprincipled and self-serving. The Security Council's decisions, he observes, "are predictable on the basis of whose ox is being gored, and which entity is accused of goring it."

KOREA

HARMS

1. South Korea can take care of itself

Doug Bandow ( political writer and policy analyst, served as a special assistant to President Reagan), 7 July 2006, "Can't We Drop Even One Alliance?" <http://antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248>

Moreover, South Korea (ROK) has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. Why does the U.S. have some 33,000 troops on station defending a country that can take care of itself – a country that doesn't even believe it is in danger?

2. No new alliance needed: Regional powers can handle North Korea in Status Quo

Robert Robb (columnist), 23 June 2006, "Rethinking North Korea," ARIZONA REPUBLIC, <http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/0623robb23.html>

In fact, we should strongly indicate that we regard North Korea as primarily an issue for other regional powers, specifically China, Japan, South Korea and Australia. In reality, North Korea poses a minor military threat to the United States, but a much more substantial one to those regional powers. And they are more than capable of handling North Korea without U.S. involvement or assistance. Collectively they have an economy that is 228 times as large as that of North Korea, a population 65 times as big, and spend 33 times as much on their military capabilities.

3. No need for alliance: Outside countries can safely ignore North Korea

Doug Bandow, (political writer and policy analyst; served as a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan), 7 July 2006, "Can't We Drop Even One Alliance? " [www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248](http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248)

If North Korea threatens anyone, it is its neighbors, not the globe's most powerful nation. Kim Jong-Il is a nasty character, yes, but the U.S. spent most of its history blissfully ignoring similar nasty characters running similarly isolated and desperately poor states.

MINOR REPAIR: Simply declare that the US doesn't care about North Korea

1. Letting S. Korea solve is the best policy

Doug Bandow ( political writer and policy analyst, served as a special assistant to President Reagan), 7 July 2006, "Can't We Drop Even One Alliance?" <http://antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248>

South Korea, a short artillery shell or SCUD missile away from the demilitarized zone, prefers to conciliate rather than confront. America, a big ocean away, is more willing to threaten preventive war. Neither nation should be expected to submerge its perceived national interest to the other's wishes (though attacking North Korea would be even more foolish for Washington than was invading Iraq). The way to resolve this and other policy conflicts, however, is simple: declare that the North is the ROK's problem.

2. US drop-out would force China to take action to solve the threat

Robert Robb (columnist), 23 June 2006, "Rethinking North Korea," ARIZONA REPUBLIC, <http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/0623robb23.html>

At present, China appears to fear instability in North Korea more than anything else. It has nothing to lose by allowing North Korea the opportunity to try to shake down more economic assistance from others, particularly the United States. However, largely remove the United States from the equation, and the strategic calculation for China changes. It wants military predominance in the region. It does not want to see Japan and South Korea substantially increase their military capabilities in response to a North Korean threat. If it became clear that the United States was willing to let the North Korean threat stew, the odds would improve that China would take the action that only it can take to abate the threat.

INHERENCY

1. US already guarantees S. Korea security

Ted Galen Carpenter and Justin Logan, 16 May 2005, "Eastern Fronts," AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=9670>

Although its neighbor is ruled by a bizarre, murderous tyrant who by most accounts possesses nuclear weapons, Seoul seems to prefer a combination of ignoring and appeasing Pyongyang rather than preparing for worst-case scenarios: a collapse in the North, or worse yet, an assault on the South. As a result of Seoul’s breezy attitude, the United States remains the final guarantor of the South’s security.

SOLVENCY

1. No help for Asian security: S. Korea will not allow its troops to be used elsewhere in Asian conflicts

Ted Galen Carpenter and Justin Logan, 16 May 2005, "Eastern Fronts," AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=9670>

South Korean President Roo Moo-hyun pointedly said on March 8, "We will not be embroiled in any conflict in Northeast Asia against our will. This is an absolutely firm principle we cannot yield under any circumstance." That position no doubt rankled the Pentagon, which has been seeking to portray its forces in South Korea as "strategically flexible" -- that is, as forces that could be used in a regional contingency involving Taiwan. South Korea has linked itself closely to China’s economic growth and regional leadership, and is unlikely to support a defense of Taiwan. Seoul’s policy on the North Korean issue is also closer to Beijing’s approach than it is to Washington’s strategy.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Further assistance to S. Korea would reduce S. Korea's incentives to solve the conflict

Selig S. Harrision, 11 Apr 2006, "South Korea-U.S. Alliance Under the Roh Government," NAUTILIS INSTITUTE, Policy Forum Online 06-28A, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0628Harrison.html>

The subsidy provided by the U.S. presence enables South Koreans to postpone hard choices concerning how fast, and how far, to move toward reunification, and thus it postpones hard choices between civilian and military budgetary priorities. The U.S. presence enables the South to minimize the sacrifices that would otherwise be necessary to maintain its existing high levels of defense spending. By the same token, the withdrawal of U.S. forces would force Seoul to decide whether it should seek the same level of security now provided by the U.S. presence by upgrading defense expenditures - or whether, instead, the goal of accommodation and reunification with the North would be better served by negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with the North.

2. S. Koreans don't want the alliance: SOLVENCY/DISAD Dilemma

**Solvency: S. Koreans don't want an alliance, so they won't join if AFF offers a new one**

Democracy violation Disad: If AFF forces S. Korea to join by fiat, it violates the will of the S. Korean people

Doug Bandow ( political writer and policy analyst, served as a special assistant to President Reagan), 7 July 2006, "Can't We Drop Even One Alliance?" <http://antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248>

The South can defend itself, and North Korea is essentially friendless, with China and Russia having more, and closer, contact with South Korea than with Pyongyang. The ROK is no longer particularly friendly toward America and willing to reflexively follow Washington's international lead.

Doug Bandow ( political writer and policy analyst, served as a special assistant to President Reagan), 7 July 2006, "Can't We Drop Even One Alliance?" <http://antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9248>

But younger South Koreans remember Washington's support for various dictatorships rather than intervention and rescue from DPRK aggression in the Korean War. Although the polls vary over time, many South Koreans have soured on their country's reliance on the U.S.: majorities prefer China to America, view Washington as a greater threat to peace than North Korea, and don't believe the North poses any military threat. Protests of American installations and boycotts of Americans no longer seem unusual.

3. Security turn: Alliance with US causes S. Korea to reduce its military preparedness

Ted Galen Carpenter and Justin Logan, 16 May 2005, "Eastern Fronts," AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=9670>

Moreover, South Korea continues to under invest in its own defense. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ The Military Balance, South Korea’s defense budget in 2003 was $14.6 billion -- a mere 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product. The United States currently spends roughly 3.6 percent of its GDP on defense -- without a crazed neighbor on its border. South Korea is even reducing the size of its military forces. Clearly, Seoul has chosen to rely on its alliance with the United States while diverting military spending to domestic priorities.

KOSOVO FAILURE

NATO failed to stop ethnic violence in Kosovo

Nikolas K. Gvosdev (senior fellow for strategic studies at the Nixon Center), 22 Mar 2004, "Carnage in Kosovo - Where's the Western resolve?" NATIONAL REVIEW, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MDQ2OWQ5Y2Q1MTRjOTI1ZGI3MzQ0MTU2NjZhODAyY2Q>=

It was an embarrassment, of course, that in the first weeks of NATO's deployment nearly 100 Serbian Orthodox holy sites were destroyed and some two-thirds of the province's Serb population (along with other non-Albanian ethnic groups) were ethnically cleansed. But the line adopted in Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris was that once NATO was firmly in control of Kosovo these outrages would cease. The Serbs who remained in the province took the West at its word. The latest outbreak of violence, which in a three-day period has already left 25 churches and monasteries—including UNESCO-protected sites—in ruins and made nearly 4,000 people homeless took place under the noses of 18,000 international peacekeepers and exposes the hollowness of Western guarantees.

Kosovo failure dooms other NATO interventions

Nikolas K. Gvosdev (senior fellow for strategic studies at the Nixon Center), 22 Mar 2004, "Carnage in Kosovo - Where's the Western resolve?" NATIONAL REVIEW, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MDQ2OWQ5Y2Q1MTRjOTI1ZGI3MzQ0MTU2NjZhODAyY2Q>=

International officials have used the terms "pogrom" and "Kristallnacht" to describe the violence against the Serbs. And yet, even in the last few weeks, the NATO mission in Kosovo has been touted as an example of successful peacekeeping. Over the last year, proposals have been advanced for deploying NATO forces to keep the peace in other sensitive areas in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East such as Moldova and Georgia, among the two communities in Cyprus, and between Israel and the Palestinians once a settlement is reached. After the events of this past week, does anyone believe that others will trust NATO promises?

Kosovo makes NATO look foolish

Nikolas K. Gvosdev (senior fellow for strategic studies at the Nixon Center), 22 Mar 2004, "Carnage in Kosovo - Where's the Western resolve?" NATIONAL REVIEW, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MDQ2OWQ5Y2Q1MTRjOTI1ZGI3MzQ0MTU2NjZhODAyY2Q>=

The whole justification for ending actual Serbian jurisdiction over Kosovo and placing it in the hands of an international authority backed by NATO firepower was to prevent any further ethnic cleansing. And now you find that many of the same people who pushed for intervention in 1999 are arguing that, regretfully, the only solution is to push for an independent Kosovo. Yet the attempt to advance a political agenda through the use of violence and terror tactics should be of particular concern to the West. Apparently NATO, the grand alliance prepared to stop the forces of the Soviet Union from overwhelming Western Europe, is unable to prevent mobs from frustrating the West's stated desire to ensure that ethnic cleansing will not be legitimized.

Human rights abuses go on even years after NATO intervention

Edward P. Joseph (spent over a decade in the Balkans with US Army and UN, former Macedonia Director for the International Crisis Group), Jan/Feb 2005, "Back to the Balkans," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 112

In the five years since a NATO air campaign forced out Serbian troops and allowed the province's Albanian refugees to return, human-rights workers have documented chronic Albanian abuse of minorities, especially of Serbs dispersed south of the flashpoint town of Mitrovica. Meanwhile, the Serbs holed up in Mitrovica have compiled their own shameful record of persecution and violence.

Don't believe the hype: Western intervention in the Balkans is NOT a success

Edward P. Joseph (spent over a decade in the Balkans with US Army and UN, former Macedonia Director for the International Crisis Group), Jan/Feb 2005, "Back to the Balkans," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 114

Western officials regularly tout Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia as success stories, assuring themselves and the press that economic development and the prospect of EU membership have swept away the messy national, ethnic, and territorial disputes of the past. Reality, however, keeps intruding. Last March, ethnic riots in Kosovo (sparked by a rumor that Serbs had chased Albanian youths to their deaths) caught international officials by surprise. Some 50,000 Albanians took part in the disturbances, leaving a score dead, hundreds wounded, and a few thousand more Serbs expelled from their homes in Albanian areas.

MIDDLE EAST INTERVENTION

INHERENCY

1. NATO is already working with Middle East nations

Tom Berry (policy director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center), 2 Apr 2004, "Long Live NATO," FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig4/barry-tom4.html>

During the White House welcoming ceremony, President Bush noted that NATO’s mission extended far beyond the perimeter of the alliance. "NATO members are reaching out to the nations of the Middle East, to strengthen our ability to fight terror, and to provide for our common security," he said. But NATO’s mission extends beyond global security. "We’re discussing," said Bush, "how we can support and increase the momentum of freedom in the greater Middle East."

2. NATO is already committed long-term to the Middle East

Fred Tanner (Deputy Directory, Geneva Centre for Security Policy), 2004, "NATO's Role in Defence Cooperation and Democratisation in the Middle East," p. 105

With the most recent round of enlargement, the Cold War 'eastern border' has all but disappeared. Instead, the US has been pushing for NATO to get involved in the Middle East, both militarily and in terms of partnership-building. US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns argued that NATO's mandate to defend Europe and North America can only be achieved by deploying "our conceptual attention and our military forces east and south. NATO's future, we believe, is east and is south. It's in the Greater Middle East."

3. The US is already providing security in the region

Dr Michael D. Yaffe, (academic dean, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington), Fall 2004, "The Gulf and a New Middle East Security System" MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, Volume XI, Number 3 [www.mepc.org/journal\_vol11/0409\_yaffe.asp](http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0409_yaffe.asp)

Even when the U.S. military presence in the Gulf monarchies goes back to a pre-1990, over-the-horizon posture of less than 10,000 troops (but one that is more reliant on in-region pre-positioned stocks and so-called "warm bases" for ramping up quickly), the bedrock of GCC and Iraqi security will remain the bilateral agreements between individual Gulf states and the United States.

SOLVENCY

1. NATO cannot do much about root causes of Middle East conflicts

Peter Rudolf (analyst with the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik specialising in transatlantic relations), Spring 2004, NATO REVIEW, "Should the Middle East be NATO's new central front?" <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/debate.html>

What I question is the emerging assumption in the US foreign policy debate that the Middle East will become the predominant conflict region of this century – not the fact that we are confronted with a mortal, transnational terrorist threat of unprecedented historic proportions. This transnational threat does originate in the Middle East, but it has already been present within European societies for some time and cannot be dealt with primarily by military means. As a result, NATO will be of limited value in this struggle.

2. NATO cannot bridge the ideological divides that cause Middle East conflicts

Michael Kraig (Stanley Foundation), 3 June 2005, NATO's Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, "NATO and the Future of the Arab World -- How is NATO contributing to the new dynamic of reform and change in the region?," Panel discussion transcript, Henry L. Stimson Center p. 13 (ellipses in original)

Now what we're missing in the Middle East in the Gulf is this second idea of going across the ideological divide. In going back to the issues I mentioned earlier, the Arab Persian or Arab/Iranian divide in the Gulf...Iran and Israeli...Israeli/Arab...US/Iranian, these are ideological divides that need crossing and even if NATO does the best job in the world of engaging the region, it won't be the organization, I think that crosses these divides.

3. Outside intervention cannot solve the Israeli-Palestinian struggle

Michael Young (opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Lebanon), 15 June 2006, "Unpromising Land," REASON, <http://www.reason.com/links/links061506.shtml>

The U.S. has suffered unrelenting criticism for failing to resolve the Palestinian problem, no matter how much effort it has exerted. It has nothing to lose by pulling out of a no-win situation and making itself indispensable down the road, which would increase its diplomatic clout. It’s also time for Israelis and Palestinians to see just where their declared positions lead them, without the luxury of drafting outside anxieties into their struggle.

4. Middle East alliances / security organizations don't work

Dr. Micheal D. Yaffe (academic dean, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University) , Fall 2004, "The Gulf and a New Middle East Security System," MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL JOURNAL, [www.mepc.org/journal\_vol11/0409\_yaffe.asp](http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0409_yaffe.asp)

These initiatives would join a host of ongoing activities, including the EU's Barcelona Process, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, and the OSCE's Mediterranean Partnership initiative. Such pan-Middle East strategies have a single major problem: they don't work. The Middle East is an area marked more by its diversities than its commonalities. It has numerous interstate rivalries limited to distinct locales, lacks a common norm of cooperation and effective pan-regional institutions, has a dearth of interregional economic interactions, lacks many cultural commonalities and comprises states with greatly varying threat perceptions and interests. That the war in Iraq had virtually no effect on the Levant and North Africa while the Gulf was greatly affected is emblematic of the lack of uniformity in regional security. Further, without significant progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will be difficult for Arab parties to focus on the vast array of regional security problems and domestic reforms in any pan-regional forum with Israelis present.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lack of credibility means NATO will only stir up more terrorism by involvement in the Middle East

MosNews (Russian news agency), 3 June 2006, "Putin Challenges U.S. on Human Rights, NATO Expansion," <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/06/03/putintalks.shtm> l (brackets added)

He [Russian President Vladimir Putin] questioned the point of NATO’s growth — "How does it help against terrorism?" - and said the West needed to work on winning trust in the Middle East. "The more you talk about NATO in the Middle East, the more terrorism there will be there," Putin said. "Before you go with missiles and more weapons you should work on credibility."

MISSILE DEFENSE

INHERENCY

1. Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense program has already been started

Boeing Corporation Press Release, 6 Sept 2005, Boeing Leads Formation of "Alliance Shield" Team To Support NATO's Theater Missile Defense Capability, [www.boeing.com/ids/news/2005/q3/nr\_050906m.html](http://www.boeing.com/ids/news/2005/q3/nr_050906m.html)

In March 2005 the North Atlantic Council approved NATO's new Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence program, aimed at providing protection against the threat of ballistic missiles to deployed NATO forces. With approval of that charter, a new NATO program office was formed to procure the NATO theater missile defense capability.

2. Missile defense feasibility study has been started

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., 9 Jan 2006, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Heritage Lecture #919, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

An agreement was reached on a military concept for defense against terrorism, and five specific initiatives in the area of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons defense were endorsed to enhance the Alliance’s defense capabilities against weap­ons of mass destruction. Heads of state and government also decided to strengthen NATO’s defense against cyber attacks and initiate a missile defense feasibility study.

3. NATO members will integrate their own defense systems into NATO

Nicole C. Evans, Sept/Oct 2004, "Missile defense: Winning minds, not hearts," BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, <http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so04evans>

At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO member states agreed to initiate a missile defense feasibility study to examine options for a layered TMD. The successful bidders for the study were announced in September 2003, and work is slowly progressing. Several member states are developing their own missile defense capabilities, which may later be integrated with a NATO system.

SOLVENCY

1. Russia has enough warheads to defeat any missile shield

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Nor is the Kremlin powerless in direct dealings with the West. It can mount more than enough warheads to defeat any missile shield and illusion of "nuclear primacy."

2. Missile defense isn't working and corrections aren't being made

U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2006, "Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense," REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, p. 1

GAO [Government Accountability Office] is recommending that DOD [Dept. of Defense] develop operational criteria that must be met and a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be taken before declaring BMDS operational, and provide Congress and DOD complete data on BMDS operational costs. Although DOD concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations, DOD did not state that they planned to take corrective actions.

3. Not worth the money: Missile defense is not feasible yet

LEON BRUNEAU, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 24 May 2006, " Europe Skeptical About Missile Shield Plans," [www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1822863&C=europe](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1822863&C=europe) (brackets added)

Another obstacle — and a big one — to accepting the U.S. plan is that it remains to be seen whether such a missile shield can actually work. "We are being asked — us, the Europeans — to make a huge investment to by a program which, even in the United States, is not believed to be ready," said [Rik] Coolsaet [Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels]. "It isn’t working," [Andrew] Brookes [at International Institute for Strategic Studies] said of the missile shield plan.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Security turn: Missile defense makes the world more dangerous through nuclear proliferation

Nicole C. Evans, Sept/Oct 2004, "Missile defense: Winning minds, not hearts," BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, <http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so04evans> (brackets added)

The real danger lies in the potential of GMD [global missile defense] to disrupt delicate regional balances and to encourage the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. The United States, China, and Russia have all stepped up their offensive weapons programs since the dissolution of the ABM Treaty. The danger has been succinctly summarized by Mohamed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency: "If we don't stop using double standards, we shall be piled high with an even greater number of nuclear weapons." That would create the exact opposite of the professed objective of global missile defense: security for all who want it.

NATO IS BAD - DON'T STRENGTHEN IT

DISADVANTAGES TO STRENGTHENING NATO

1. Side-tracking stability and democracy in Russia

Uniqueness: In Status Quo, weak NATO encourages Russian cooperation

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 88 (italics in original)

Third, as NATO’s relevance has declined as a security organization in the West, it also has become less important for Russian security interests. For a while after the Cold War, NATO enlargement was a top Russian foreign policy concern, and Russia’s leaders almost uniformly opposed enlargement as a direct threat to their country’s vital interests. But while opposition to NATO remains strong in the Russian military, for President Putin and his primary leadership circle, the salience of NATO for Russia’s security interests has declined dramatically since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For example, the opposition of Putin and other Russian officials to the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO—a crisis in Russian-Western relations just a few years ago—has become virtually a non-issue.

Link: Stronger NATO isolates and aggravates Russia

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 86

Essentially, we are following a modified version of the post-World War I model, which excluded the defeated Germany from European and Western councils, rather than the more positive post-1815 and post-1945 models of including former enemies as quickly and completely as possible into the new security system. Consequently, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the old Permanent Joint Council, and the new NATO-Russia Council speak more to separation and isolation than they do to cooperation and inclusion. They reinforce the fault line in Europe, unnecessarily dividing the continent into "ins" and "outs," with Russia clearly still "out."

Impact: Isolation of Russia reverses democracy and creates dictatorship

Igor Torbakov, 10 Sept 2004, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, "DEBATES WITHIN RUSSIAN POLITICAL CLASS SHOW MOSCOW'S SUSPICIONS OF THE WEST" [www.cdi.org/russia/321-4.cfm](http://www.cdi.org/russia/321-4.cfm)

Among the Russian political class there is a dominant perception that the assault on the country and the West's ambiguous, if not suspicious, position has left Russia to face this invisible and dangerous enemy by itself. There is no international coalition, claims Kholmogorov. "Russia stands alone against the pack of big and small predators seeking to tear it to pieces," he argues. Kokoshin commented that just as the Soviet Union fought a "total war" during World War II, Putin is trying to frame this conflict as an existential conflict for the nation that requires the mobilization of all resources under a single command.

2. Stronger NATO reduces Russian cooperation on terrorism

Cross-apply the Uniqueness and Link cards above on how stronger NATO is bad for relations with Russia

Impact: Russia is more likely to cooperate on terrorism without NATO

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 89

Especially since 9/11, Moscow sees a convergence of interests between the US struggle against al Qaeda and the Russian struggle against Muslim separatists in the Caucus region, accusing "Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda of being behind the problems in Chechnya." Washington’s guarded public recognition that Moscow is facing a "terrorism" issue in Chechnya was welcomed by Putin, even as he looks for more support. For most Russian leaders—more so than for their American counterparts— the events of 11 September 2001 finally brought the Cold War to an end. Concern about terrorism has prompted Putin to seek a new strategic relationship with the West that preferably would replace NATO and end the artificial divide between east and west.

3. Undermines democracy in Central and Eastern Europe through excessive defense spending requirements

A. Link: NATO demands defense spending higher than poor countries can afford

Harold Kennedy, Jan 2006, "Europe-Based NATO Reaches Deep into Asia, Africa," NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE, [www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/jan/europe-based.htm](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/jan/europe-based.htm)

At the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, he noted, the alliance agreed that member nations would fund their defense budgets at least to 2 percent of their gross domestic product. U.S. defense spending amounts to about 3 percent of GDP. The problem is that many nations, especially newer, poorer NATO members, cannot afford to spend that much on defense. Latvia, for example, allocates only 1.3 percent of its GDP for defense.

B. Impact: Excessive defense spending undermines new European democracies

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 90-91

Hungary faces similar restraints, and even larger Poland is so strapped that it agreed in early 2003 to buy 48 Lockheed Martin Block 52 F-16 C/D aircraft for $3.5 to $4.0 billion, but only if Warsaw was granted a 100-percent offset. Ironically, if anything undermines the budding democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, it will be the inability to fund critical economic and social programs because of NATO’s demands.

NATO IS GOOD

NATO strengthens democracy in Central Europe

Morton Halperin, May 30 2006, "Democracy Promotion as Policy," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy\_promotion\_as\_policy.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10784/democracy_promotion_as_policy.html)

The most stunning success is in Europe, which saw first the consolidation of democracy in Western Europe and then, after the fall of communism, its consolidation in Central Europe. There is much more to be done before all of Europe is firmly democratic, but by continuing to offer a home in the European Union and NATO to those countries that make irreversible commitments to democracy we can strengthen the hand of democrats.

NATO is healthy: No countries want to leave and more want to join

US State Department, 9 Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," [www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\_02/alia/a6020910.htm](http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_02/alia/a6020910.htm) (brackets added)

Despite these problems, the alliance is strong and "visible, vital and vibrant," he said, adding that confirmation of its credibility and strength is evident in the fact that not one nation is seeking to leave the alliance but there is a waiting list of countries seeking to gain membership. And, although there are only 26 NATO members, 42 nations willingly serve under its flag, he [General James Jones] said.

NATO brings stability and security to struggling democracy + disaster relief

US State Department, 9 Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," [www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\_02/alia/a6020910.htm](http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_02/alia/a6020910.htm) (first brackets in original, second brackets added)

"[W]hether it’s in the case of disaster relief or humanitarian operations or training missions in remote parts of the world where NATO can bring stability and security and help struggling democracies achieve their ultimate goals for their people – which is a better life and a more secure life and economic opportunities – that’s the will of nations, that NATO will bring its capacity to do those kinds of things," he {General James Jones] said.

NATO successfully secured freedom, democracy, and human rights in Central and Eastern Europe

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

NATO started as an alliance of 12 countries in 1949, and grew gradually. First with Greece and Turkey in 1952. Next with Germany in 1955 and again with Spain in 1982. So in nearly 50 years, NATO had added only four countries. Then in just five years, we added ten more members – three at the Madrid Summit in 1997, and seven more at the Prague Summit in 2002 – securing a future of freedom, democracy, market economy, human rights, and the rule of law for over 100 million people. It is easy to forget today, but back in 1989 and 1991, people spoke of a "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe, and debated how it could be filled. With American leadership, NATO acted boldly, and the security vacuum never came to be. The democratic future of the Central Europe was secured.

US action alone is not effective: Need European allies

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., 4 Oct 2004, "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1803.cfm>

Whatever the global issue—be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Doha free trade round, Iran’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Arab–Israeli conflict, or Iraq—the United States simply cannot act effec­tively without the support of at least some Euro­pean powers.

NATO effectively projects power and can pre-emptively act

Nicola De Santis, The Middle East Institute, 3 June 2005, NATO’s Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, "NATO’s Role in Gulf Security and US interests"

So NATO adapted itself and moved from territorial defense to power projection. And that is what it did in Bosnia – it did project power. But that power was also projected pre-emptively, like during the air campaign over Kosovo, when NATO achieved consensus on the assessment of the threat to the international community represented by what Milosevic was doing to Kosovo. So it is not even true that NATO countries cannot agree to act pre-emptively. They did act pre-emptively during the air campaign over Kosovo.

NATO capabilities should be maintained even if allies sometimes disagree on how to use them

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, May 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, p. 1

Perhaps the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General will succeed in organizing a deep dialogue from which an agreed strategy will emerge. But even in the absence of a new grand accord, NATO can accomplish work of grand importance. The focus should be on developing a comprehensive, common framework for NATO defense capabilities and then proceeding programmatically to put real flesh on that framework. The logic is straightforward:

Capabilities for common action are needed, even though this action may not always be chosen (for non-Article V contingencies).

If and when a common strategy emerges, NATO must have the capabilities to execute it.

The United States and its European allies must be able to agree on necessary capabilities, even while unable to agree on grand strategy or on when and where those capabilities should be used.

World is more peaceful if US works with NATO instead of without it

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 58-59

Although in the more distant future China and perhaps India may pose the most serious challenge to American power, in the short term Europe is in the best position to moderate the worst impulses of the US. While the EU is no match to the US in terms of military capabilities, the experience with supporting nascent democracies demonstrates the Union has something to offer America which is clearly needs: an extensive arsenal of civilian foreign-policy tools. Since the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable pillars of the international order, the survival of NATO should be of immediate concern to all those who care about a more peaceful world.

European restraint keeps US military power under constitutional limits

Prof. David P. Calleo (Johns Hopkins University, Director of European Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies), Fall 2003, "Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU," WORLD POLICY JOURNAL Volume XX, No 3, Fall 2003 [www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-3/calleo.html](http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-3/calleo.html)

America’s military power risks growing too great to be controlled purely by America’s own constitutional structure. A vigorous Europe—America’s intimate ally and friend, but with a strong mind of its own and the capacity to act effectively—has become a critical element in preserving America’s own constitutional balance, indeed America’s sanity.

NATO is better than "coalitions of the willing"

Mr. Jean-Louis Gergorin. Executive Vice President, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), May 2004, Center for Strategic Decision Research, The Security Threat and its Political, Military, Technological and Industrial Responses <http://www.csdr.org/2004book/gergorin.htm>

So NATO is the best solution, especially since the concept of the "coalition of the willing," which was so fashionable in Washington two years ago, has been found to quickly turn into the "coalition of the unwilling" when things go wrong. What is happening now with the coalition of the willing in Iraq clearly demonstrates that this is not the right way to proceed.

NATO is more reliable than "coalitions of the willing"

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO’s Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Education, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

Currently Partners make up over ten per cent of NATO’s deployed forces, which is a significant sharing of the burden. Compare this to ad hoc coalitions of the willing where small nations have far less a say in the decision-making process, let alone participation in the political discussions regarding the future of the states where they deploy forces. Ad hoc coalitions may be fast but they are highly unstable. People drop in and out all the time. On the other hand, NATO missions may take a while to launch due to the consensus-building process but they have proved to be remarkably stable and resilient.

NATO succeeds compared to other international organizations because it has military power to back up threats

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), Aug 2004, "New Missions, New Means," Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, [www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:P4129F0AA814EB/](http://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:P4129F0AA814EB/)

First, capabilities are essential to everything NATO does. NATO’s political clout is directly related to its military competence. The Alliance enjoys such a strong international standing because it can convert, when necessary, political decisions into concrete military action. We have seen in Bosnia that moral condemnations or the use of economic sanctions availed us little without the backing of military power. In Kosovo, our military competence was essential in reversing a humanitarian disaster. Without our military capabilities, Afghanistan would risk a return to the Taliban boot and to become again a safe haven for Al Qaida. In short, to quote Kofi Annan, diplomacy works better when it is supported by credible military power.

NATO makes military operations more likely to succeed due to planning and training

Maj. Thomas S. Mowle (Associate Prof. of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy), Sept 2004, "Why We Must Take European Opinion Seriously," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9

NATO enhances American power, and NATO defense planning creates the ability for the United States to lead a coalition of willing and able states. Allies and partners develop their militaries to be interoperable in both equipment and operations. Without peacetime planning and training, multilateral military operations would be inefficient or ineffective.

NATO creates critical mass of moral authority for democratic nations

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

Third, we know the value of the world’s core democratic community speaking with a united and clear voice. We need to work together with Europe as a single democratic, transatlantic community – not just for our combined resources, but for our combined political weight, which embodies a critical mass of moral authority that exceeds what each of us can provide individually.

NATO successful: World leaders turn to NATO when they really want something done

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

This means more missions across a wider geography – from Afghanistan to Louisiana. Missions that span a wide array of activities, from high-intensity peacekeeping to airlift in support of other humanitarian or peacekeeping goals. And missions that therefore demand a broad and dynamic set of military capabilities. And this trend will only going to continue, because our leaders, when faced with daunting security problems, always ask, "who can help deliver a solution." And despite the tensions over the Iraq war, they have turned to NATO with increasing frequency when they want to get something done.

Effectiveness: NATO is conducting 8 simultaneous military operations

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

If you think about 1994, NATO was an alliance of 16 countries that had done a lot of exercises but had never conducted a military operation. It had no partners. If you look at the NATO of 2005, you see an organization that was running, eight military operations simultaneously, which had 26 members, and partnership relationships with another 20 countries in Eurasia, 7 in the Mediterranean, and a growing number in the Persian Gulf.

NATO delivers humanitarian/disaster assistance

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

NATO’s 2005 humanitarian missions in the Gulf Coast and Pakistan are unlikely to be its last. NATO must have the manpower and means to be as generous and responsive as it can when disaster strikes. It must also reform further to ensure it has the capability and flexibility it needs to meet threats wherever and whenever they arise. NATO activated the NATO Response Force (NRF) for the first time after the earthquake in Pakistan.

NATO is useful as a framework for political dialogue and action

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

First and foremost, I would emphasise NATO’s utility as a framework for political dialogue and action. It is an alliance of 26 sovereign and democratic nations and it binds together Europe and North America in a multi-lateral approach to security.

NATO promotes widespread international cooperation and builds experience

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

But it is also a framework which facilitates participation by other nations. During NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the contributions from NATO’s partners were indispensable, as were the contributions from other nations. Overall, troops from all five continents, from more than 20 non-NATO nations, served effectively under NATO military command and alongside NATO troops. This framework for action is tried and tested, and it has accumulated a wealth of experience.

NATO has the right mix of capabilities to handle everything

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

NATO also has a unique capacity to back up its political decisions with serious peacekeeping and peacemaking power. And that power is flexible and easily tailored to the different demands placed up on it. It encompasses training and advice to troops likely to be called upon to carry out peacekeeping duties, through activities such as participation in NATO-led exercises; advice on interoperability issues; and the sharing of doctrine and documentation.

Only NATO has the mechanism to allow international military cooperation

JAMES B. STEINBERG (VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION), 2003, "AN ELECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY" CROSSING THE ATLANTIC: A Repot from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops, p. 24

Fourth, they assert that while the political dimensions of security challenges may be growing in importance, military cooperation will continue to be essential in meeting many of these new challenges, as the conflict in Afghanistan and war with Iraq (not to mention lesser contingencies, like Sierra Leone or the Ivory Coast) make clear. Only NATO has the kinds of mechanisms – including command structures, common operating principles and shared assets – that can make on-the-ground military cooperation effective.

NATO is better than EU: military force of EU is feeble

RICHARD PERLE (Chairman, U.S. Defence Policy Board and Consultant to the U.S. Secretary of Defence), 20 Oct 2002, THE STATE OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP, <http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=4865>

There are alternatives, Chris says, to the use of force, and indeed there are, and by and large they are to be preferred. But this easily slides into the cliché which we hear all the time, that force must be a last resort. In the case of Europe, it is often not even the last resort because there's no capacity to apply force. On this point I certainly agree with Chris' assessment of the feeble defence capabilities of the European Union.

Better than EU: EU cannot succeed without US support

Criton M. Z. Oakos, Winter 2005, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, "The New US-European Detente," p. 5

The EU military is trained and equipped for "peacekeeping" and "nation-building" operations, but is completely unprepared and unequipped for modern combat. In every one of its deployments in the past decade—Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Congo, and Afghanistan—the EU military did not engage in actual combat except when the United States supplied them with these capabilities on the spot. Even so, close combat cooperation with U.S. forces often proved impossible because of the vast gulf in training and equipment.

Better than the EU or the UN: No other organisation can do what NATO does

Bert Koenders, (General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly), 12 Apr 2005, NATO'S EVOLVING RLE IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, p. 2-3

Further demands on NATO to take on additional post-conflict jobs are highly likely: The UN suffers from an 'overload of operations' and the EU's fledgling military capabilities remain very limited for years to come. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said as much to the Political Committee last spring. No other organisation can generate, deploy, command and sustain large, multinational military operations such as NATO.

NATO is better than US unilateral action

Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 20 Sept 2005, "Speech Presented to the Center for Strategic and International Studies," Center for Strategic and International Studies, [www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public\_statements/speeches/usdp/edelman/2005/september\_20\_2005.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public_statements/speeches/usdp/edelman/2005/september_20_2005.html)

First, let me dispel an "urban legend" that seems to be a view held by some in the European press that the Administration, especially the Department of Defense, is convinced that it can "go it alone" in confronting crises and believes it is a "burden" to bring along Allies or NATO. Multilateral diplomacy is hard work and building consensus at NATO can be frustrating. But the hard work the US has put into NATO and coalition efforts in Afghanistan, Darfur, the Balkans and in dealing with Iran and its nuclear weapons program help illustrate that the US does not go it alone, but prefers to work in partnership with other nations and institutions.

Unilateral action fails: NATO is the best way to solve today's threats

José María Aznar (former Spanish Prime Minister), Spring 2006, "Reforming NATO: The focus must be terrorism," EUROPE'S WORLD, p. 4

It is a global phenomenon that cannot be separated from the problem of nuclear proliferation; we know that some Islamists are willing to kill as many people as they can. That is why an effective counter-terrorism policy must be global and must take into consideration counter-proliferation measures. It is also why any effective counter-terrorist strategy must be collective, because the battlefield has become truly global and multi-dimensional. No nation, not even the US, can prevail on its own in this struggle. NATO is the best collective organisation available to the western democracies facing this challenge.

DISADVANTAGES TO ABOLISHING NATO

1. Wasted defense spending: European defense is cheaper inside NATO than without it

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH35/DH35.htm>

Perhaps the Europeans could fund a big defense buildup to compensate for loss of American military guarantees, but the price could be quite high, because a European buildup absent NATO would be costlier than a buildup under its auspices; NATO offers many economies of scale and opportunities to avoid redundancy through integrated planning.

2. Loss of European self-defense capability

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH35/DH35.htm>

Is there any reason to believe that European parliaments would surmount their current anti-military attitudes to fund bigger defense budgets? Their reaction might be to slash budgets further on the premise that the collapse of NATO made defense strength less necessary and that Europe could avoid war through diplomacy.

3. WMDs and terrorism become more likely without NATO

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH35/DH35.htm>

Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.

NATO IS IRRELEVANT

NATO has no relevance to freedom, peace, security and liberty -- they aren't threatened!

Prof. Steven E. Meyer (Political Science, National Defense Univ.), Winter 2003, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," PARAMETERS - US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY, p. 85

In October 2002, in an address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, another Administration official noted that NATO "remains the essential link between Europe and North America—the place for free nations to secure peace, security, and liberty." But no one explains what all of this means—whose freedom, peace, security, and liberty are endangered? Who, after all, is the enemy? How is it possible to argue that there is any sense of political solidarity in the wake of the alliance’s deep split over Iraq? NATO enthusiasts repeat their mantra by rote, but none of it justifies supporting a failing alliance.

The world is not becoming more dangerous: Deaths from violence are down in the last decade

Lee Feinstein (Deputy Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) , 18 May 2006, "Key Challenges in Today’s UN Peacekeeping Operations," Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key\_challenges\_in\_todays\_un\_peacekeeping\_operations\_rush\_transcript\_federal\_news\_service\_inc.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key_challenges_in_todays_un_peacekeeping_operations_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html)

"The sharp overall decline in deaths from armed conflict around the world in the past decade also points to the efficacy of nation-building. During the 1990s, deaths from armed conflict were averaging over 200,000 per year. Most were in Africa. In 2003, the last year for which figures exist, that number had come down to 27,000, a fivefold decrease in deaths in civil and international conflict. In fact, despite the daily dosage of horrific violence displayed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world has not become a more violent place within the past decade; rather, the reverse is true."

NATO cannot even assure peace among its own members

Andrew Borowiec, 18 June 2006, The Washington Times, "Greece-Turkey tension mars Aegean paradise" [www.wpherald.com/print.php?StoryID=20060618-083519-8764r](http://www.wpherald.com/print.php?StoryID=20060618-083519-8764r)

Their joint membership in NATO has had little impact on the animosity between the two countries. "There is only one threat, and that is the threat from Turkey," has become the watchword in the Greek Defense Ministry since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its global ambitions.

NATO is just a political honor society, not an effective military organization

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author or editor of five books on NATO), 28 June 2004, "NATO: A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage," [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=2712](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2712)

Instead of confronting the question of whether an elaborate, formal transatlantic alliance makes sense in the fluid post-Cold War era, NATO has acted like a married couple in denial. It issues ever more vague platitudes about new missions in other parts of the world. It also has expanded its membership, taking in a dozen countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In the process, the alliance has become more of a political honor society than an effective military organization.

NATO lacks the cohesion to accomplish anything significant

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author or editor of five books on NATO), 28 June 2004, "NATO: A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage," [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=2712](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2712)

The alliance that once faced down the powerful Soviet Union across the heart of Europe now strains to fulfill a meager mission in Afghanistan and squabbles over a host of policy issues. NATO remains superficially an impressive organization. But as Gertrude Stein famously said of Oakland: "There is no there there." The alliance lacks either the cohesion or the seriousness of purpose to play a significant role in the 21st century.

Too many fundamental divisions for NATO to do anything, even in time of crisis

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, May 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, p. 1

Yet there remain deep differences over more basic issues: reliance on the use of force, the legitimacy of preemptive war, and whether to foment sweeping political change throughout the Middle East. Until these differences are settled, it will be difficult for the United States and its major European allies to formulate a serious common strategy or to act in unison in crises.

NATO officials admit: NATO cannot effectively fight a war

Wim van EEKELEN, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2002, "Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation. 'The transatlantic Defence Relationship after September 11, 2001'," <http://natopa.ibicenter.net/default.asp?SHORTCUT=246> (brackets in original)

It would be naïve to pretend that lines on a map entirely explain the US decision to bypass the NATO structure in running the campaign. The experience of the Kosovo campaign, where all 19 members of the Alliance had to approve targeting lists, left some in the United States convinced that NATO is too unwieldy a body to run a war. Gen. Wesley Clark, SACEUR during that campaign, described how even NATO lawyers imposed operational restrictions on forces. Citing the lessons that Kosovo held about the risks of delaying battlefield decisions in order to hold allied consultations, former French Defence Minister Alain Richard noted, "There were overwhelming arguments for the United States to handle that action [in Afghanistan] by itself, with little involvement by Allies."

NATO adds nothing to strategic power nor European security

Cato Institute, Dec 2004, CATO HANDBOOK ON POLICY, Chap. 53 - Transatlantic Relations, p. 537

The time has come to recognize what has become obvious: NATO, as an institution, does not enhance America’s strategic power. By the same token, Europe no longer needs to rely on American military guarantees for its security. Europe can take care of itself and should be encouraged to do so.

NATO is too weak to project power anywhere significant

Martin Sieff , 14 July 2006, United Press International, "NATO's crisis in Afghanistan" <http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/aa8e81dc17f7b0eb87256c030066e73b/b5aad62beed5427e872571ab004d25d7?OpenDocument>

The second false assumption of U.S. policymakers was even more serious. It was that NATO -- which has been steadily expanding in member states and total population since the collapse of communism, could project any real military power outside the borders of its constituent nations. Instead, NATO's fate since the collapse of communism has been that of a rapidly expanding ink blot: The further it grows, the feebler it becomes. Far from growing in military power, NATO has been steadily losing it, precisely because none of its new members is capable of exporting military and security beyond their own borders.

Europeans don't care about NATO solving terrorism or WMD

Dr. Jan Willem Honig, Senior Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King's College, 21 Jan 2005, "A Future Role for NATO in the Greater Middle East?" [www.ataedu.org/article\_new.php?id=97](http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=97)

NATO is no longer an organisation of necessity for the Europeans, but one of choice. Despite all the talk about the seriousness of the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, they are not in the same league as the Soviet threat. Europe’s survival is no longer at stake.

NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

HARMS

1. Rapid response is not very important

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 70

The deployment to Afghanistan was not particularly speedy. The first air strikes did not occur until 7 October 2001. The U.S. took some care to ensure the political legitimacy of its actions, even though it did not intend to use NATO or the UN as the basis for command. Although several special forces units were deployed throughout the conflict, the first major units, (Marines) arrived in Kandahar on 25 November, two and a half months after the September 11 attacks.

INHERENCY

1. Europeans already planning to adequately fund the NRF

Lt. Col. Carsten Helmut Jahnel (German Army), June 2005 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey Calif., "Relations -- Are Alliances a Function of an External Threat?" p. 77

With the decision to build a European Defense Agency (EDA), Europe is undertaking an important step in the improvement of its collective military capability. By combining of interests Europe can take the important first steps toward transformation without increasing defense expenditures that can thus be used to build the necessary capabilities of the NRF-force.

2. Existing NATO forces can already do what NRF is supposed to do

Canada Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 18 Feb 2005, "NATO Transformation," <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_transformation-en.asp>

While naval and air forces are highly mobile, over the past 10 years NATO has taken measures to enable its land forces to react more quickly to a wider range of security challenges. The troops, ships and planes that NATO allies have earmarked for NATO operations are already deployable on short notice. They are to a large extent interoperable with other nations' forces and equipped with the weapons, equipment, vehicles and personnel to carry out a wide range of operations.

3. General Jones says NRF is doing fine

Elizabeteh G. Book, 29 Nov 2003, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union," p. 3 (ellipses in original)

Indeed, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. James Jones said that the force's stand-up was one of the most important changes in NATO's structure since the signing of the Washington Treaty. His optimism about the good the force would be able to perform was clear. "Today...we have taken a major step forward in creating the expeditionary capability, essential to countering the globalization of new threats to peace and security," Jones said.

4. NRF is already being used since late 2004

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorfer Institut fur Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], <www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec_def/051115_33>

At the end of 2002 the heads of state and government of NATO ushered in a period of intensified transformation. A centrepiece of this effort was the so-called NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is scheduled to reach full operational capability by October 2006. Elements of the NRF have already been used since late 2004.

5. NRF has been used several times and is working fine

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], <http://www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec_def/051115_33> (ellipses in original)

NATO has been eager to put the NRF to use as a quote from Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer makes clear: "When circumstances demand that we use the NRF…we should not hesitate…to do so. If you look at the mandate of the NRF, it is quite a far reaching mandate." In fact, the mandate is pretty much what the NAC decides it to be. It is thus not surprising that the NRF has been engaged several times already. In the summer of 2004 elements helped secure the Athens Olympic Games, and in September 2004 provided additional support for the Afghan presidential elections.

6. US Marine Expeditionary Brigade can already do what NRF does

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 72

For operations against terrorists, the NRF would need to rely on special operation forces, so the composition of the NRF matters as much as its size. And, in fact, the SHAPE FAQ reads very much like the requirements for the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

7. NRF simply duplicates the European Union Rapid Reaction Force

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 78 (brackets in original)

Nevertheless, certain European politicians view the NRF as simply a more responsive EU Rapid Reaction Force. The German Defense Minister Peter Struck said in November 2002, "[T]he missions of the NATO force will differ from the EU crisis reaction force only to the extent that it is to be available more rapidly." Some European politicians see little difference between the two.

SOLVENCY

1. NRF will not substantially improve the capabilities of NATO forces

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], <http://www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec_def/051115_33>

The NRF is based on a spiral model of capabilities development. This means that new capabilities are included in the requirements and certifications process as they become available. Hence, the certification practice will not be able to generate guidance and drive the transformation process as only what is available will enter the process. Certification might end up following the development of new capabilities instead of leading it. If, then, operational necessities trump the overall transformational agenda, the low intensity missions the NRF has been engaged in are likely to limit the benefits of rotation and certification further, as these missions are not demanding enough to make the process work overall.

**2. Solvency/Disad dilemma:**

Solvency: The NRF will not be used for military intervention because NATO won't agree to use it

**Disad: If NATO does agree to use NRF for military intervention, it triggers Disad #2 below**

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 68 (brackets added)

[German Defense Minister Peter] Struck wasn’t even sure that the NRF would be used for offensive operations. When asked whether the NRF could be used for offensive operations, Struck responded, These are matters that must be discussed in detail. So far, there exists only the general idea of installing such a NATO force, while so far many states reserve intervention forces for themselves. But to the new force, also, applies NATO’s principle of consensus.

3. NRF deployments will not be rapid

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 72

The NATO NRF requirement is that the force should be ready to deploy within five days, and that it should be able to sustain itself for thirty days. The SHAPE discussion of the NRF adds an important caveat: "when NATO decides to employ it." So there are several real problems in the speed with which the NRF could be deployed—the time it would take for NATO to use the force, the time it would take to get ready to deploy, and the time it would take to get the force into the field. This whole process would take a minimum of two weeks, and quite possibly longer.

Speed requirements for NRF deployment are unattainable

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 72

According to a recent RAND study assessing the requirement to deploy a Stryker brigade globally within 96 hours, "The main conclusion of this report is that a force with more than 1,000 vehicles cannot be deployed by air from CONUS to the far reaches of the globe in four days. However, with some mobility enhancements, it is possible to achieve deployment timelines on the order of one to two weeks, which is quite rapid for a motorized force." In other words, even the U.S. military would have trouble deploying a brigade quickly; this does not say much for the potential speed of the NRF, which may lack important organic strategic lift capability, at least in the short term.

4. Not enough European manpower to fully staff NRF

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 76 (ellipses in original)

The other problem highlighted by the exercise was what some NATO officials call "usability." Very few of the forces that NATO allies have can be deployed quickly. Lord Robertson said, "Out of 1.4 million non-U.S. soldiers under arms, the eighteen non-American allies have about 55,000 deployed on multinational operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and yet they feel overstretched…. That is a situation that is unacceptable."

5. Not enough European supply capability to sustain NRF for 30 days

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 76

A problem that has not caught the attention of many European policy-makers is the question of the sustainability of the NRF, even with only a thirty-day requirement (which is half that of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade). Several U.S. military officers that I interviewed question the commitment of the Europeans to providing the materiel necessary to sustain operations abroad. They point out that no Western European country has sustained contested ground operations abroad above a battalion level without U.S. help since the Suez crisis in 1956.

Europeans can't sustain NRF for 30 days

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 76

Without continuous exercises and experience from actual operations, and with continuing budgetary pressures that favor force structure over sustainability, European militaries may lack the ability to meet even the thirty-day requirement specified for the NRF.

DISADVANTAGES

1. US hegemony over European policies creates long-term disadvantages to US interests and world peace

A. Link: NRF will take most of Europe's military resources

Elizabeteh G. Book, 29 Nov 2003, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union," p. 2

On the whole, it appears that the proposed EU response force has not gained the momentum that would be required for its stand-up, and that the NRF, as the first to stand-up, is likely to glean the lion's share of Europe's limited resources.

B. Link: European commitment to NATO rapid response force = US control

Elizabeteh G. Book, 29 Nov 2003, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union," p. 2

It is clear that the U.S. position on any multi-national rapid response force is that they would like to have a say in its structure, goals and assignments, making it obvious why they would wish their European allies within NATO to commit to the NATO force.

C. Impact: US hegemony in NATO will backfire and wreck US interests and world peace

David C. Hendrickson (professor of political science at Colorado College), Fall 2002, "Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security," WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Volume XIX, No 3, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-3/hendrickson.html>

Even when the administration makes an approach to international institutions, as it did in its September 2002 demands on the U.N. Security Council, it does so with the explicit reservation that it intends to pursue in any event its chosen course, thus impugning the authority of the council even in the appeal to it. Nor does NATO, the security arm of Western civilization, count in this reckoning. The U.S.-European disparity in military contribution and expenditure— destined to grow even larger over the next several years—is seen to legitimate a power over peace and war that belongs to us alone by virtue of our preeminent power.

Hendrickson goes on to explain the impact to this in the same context:

David C. Hendrickson (professor of political science at Colorado College), Fall 2002, "Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security," WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Volume XIX, No 3, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-3/hendrickson.html>

How far this new orientation in American foreign policy will run can only be speculative, but it is the proposition of this essay that if the tendency runs far it will lead to ruin. It stands in direct antagonism to fundamental values in our political tradition. It will almost certainly give rise to countervailing trends in the international system that are contrary to our interests. Finally, it threatens to wreck an international order that has been patiently built up for 50 years, inviting a fundamental delegitimation of American power.

2. Global intervention backlash: State repression and terrorism

A. Link: NRF will promote non-defensive global intervention for NATO

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorfer Institut fur Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], <http://www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec_def/051115_33>

Second, and more important, the NRF is supposed to give NATO high combat readiness forces that can be used against contemporary threats. It is a clear move away from territorial warfare against clearly identifiable enemies towards expeditionary and asymmetric warfare on a global scale.

NRF will operate without geographical limits

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorfer Institut fur Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], www2.dias-online.org/direktorien/sec\_def/051115\_3

The fully operational NRF is an about 20,000 strong permanently available, multinational and joint force at extremely high readiness. It is supposed to be deployable in 5 days and sustainable for 30 days. Its missions are determined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on a case by case basis and can comprise Article 5 and non-Article 5 – crisis management – tasks without any geographical limits.

B. Impact: Repressive states crack down and terrorist backlash

Prof. Stephen Zunes (chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco), 9 Feb 2005, "President Bush's Foreign Policy Discussion in the 2005 State of the Union Address," FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/1217>

It is noteworthy that reformers in Syria and Iran have been quite critical of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, arguing that it has actually provoked the rise of extremist elements in the Middle East and strengthened the repressive regimes in Damascus and Tehran which rationalize for their tightening control due to security concerns along their border with Iraq. Research by leading think tanks—as well as the Pentagon, State Department, and the CIA—indicate that U.S. intervention in Iraq has actually increased the risks from terrorism through heightened anti-American sentiment and has contributed to the instability of the region by strengthening the appeal of these extremist groups.

3. Resource waste: NRF is merely an expensive humanitarian relief agency

Dr. Bastian Giegerich (expert on EU Security & Defense Policy at International Institute for Strategic Studies), 15 Nov 2005, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, "Sicherheit und Verteidigung" ["Security and Defense"], http://ww2.dias-online.org/ direktorien/sec\_def/051115\_33

A year later, air elements of the NRF were lifting relief goods to the US in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. When, in October 2005, disaster struck in Pakistan, up to 1,000 NRF troops were on crisis response duty in the country after the earthquake. Critics might argue that all these deployments concern soft security issues and that it is a waste to use a highly trained force such as the NRF to deliver aid to the US or Pakistan.

Links to US UNILATERAL COUNTERPLAN:

1. Cross apply Inherency #6 above

2. NRF is not much of a force by US standards

Dr. Michael Mihalka (teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College, Ft. Leavenworth), Summer 2005, CONNECTIONS: THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL, "NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?" p. 67

The NATO Response Force (NRF) was intended to make NATO responsive to the security needs of the twenty-first century. However, by U.S. standards it is unlikely to be rapid, responsive, or much of a force.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Note: "NPT" = Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

HARMS

1. Stable democratic countries getting nukes is not a problem

Ted Galen Carpenter and Charles V. Peña, 1 June 2005, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6337](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6337)

A threat to the peace may exist if an aggressive and erratic regime gets nuclear weapons and then is able to intimidate or blackmail its neighbors. But nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers are not an inherent threat to peace and stability. Kagan and Kristol--and others who share their hostility toward such countries having nuclear weapons--are guilty of embracing a moral equivalence between a potential aggressor and its potential victims.

SOLVENCY

1. Can't solve proliferation without changing the entire direction of US foreign policy

Ted Galen Carpenter and Charles V. Peña, 1 June 2005, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6337](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6337)

North Korean and Iranian leaders noticed that the United States treats nations that possess nuclear weapons quite differently than those that do not. That is not a new phenomenon. Just six years after China began to develop nuclear arms, the United States sought to normalize relations--reversing a policy of isolation that had lasted more than two decades. U.S. leaders show a nuclear-armed Russia a fair amount of respect, even though that country has become a second-rate military power and a third-rate economic power. Washington has treated Pakistan and India with far greater respect since those countries barged into the global nuclear-weapons club in 1998.

2. All forms of proliferation are not bad, and there's not much we can do about it anyway

Ted Galen Carpenter and Charles V. Peña, 1 June 2005, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6337](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6337)

U.S. policymakers must rid themselves of the notion that all forms of proliferation are equally bad. The United States should concentrate on making it difficult for aggressive or unstable regimes to acquire the technology and fissile material needed to develop nuclear weapons. Even then, American leaders should keep in mind that, at best, U.S. actions will likely only delay, not prevent, such states from joining the nuclear club.

3. Enforcement fails: Undeclared nuclear research can avoid detection

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 31 (brackets added)

Moreover, the [International Atomic Energy] Agency cannot inspect beyond what had been declared by member states. Consequently, while the safeguards system may be able to detect inconsistencies in state declarations, safeguards cannot prevent proliferation.

4. Enforcement fails: NPT standards are not coordinated with IAEA

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 31 (brackets added)

Another weakness of the Treaty not only stems from its lacking a permanent administrative body but from the incongruity of the objectives of the Treaty and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], constraining the role of the Security Council. State compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements is not analogous to compliance with obligations under the NPT. Thus, for example, the IAEA safeguards are not applied to technology that could be used for the development of a nuclear device.

5. Enforcement fails: Political problems at the UN create "selective enforcement" of NPT

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 33

This development was generally taken as a clear sign of the failure of the UN system to ensure peace and stability in cases where the strongest member state could not be brought in line with lesser contenders. Dissension among the P-5 about the appropriate action to be taken against other countries being under suspicion of committing arms proliferation (first and foremost North Korea) led to selective enforcement of the NPT treaty.

6. As long as anyone has nuclear weapons, proliferation will occur and no one can stop it

Dr. Morten Bremer Maerli, Senior Research Fellow, 2005, "How long can WMDs be linked to proliferation, solely?" The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=105>

Time has come to revisit the findings of the 1996 Canberra Commission: "Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them".

7. Can't solve proliferation without US and Russian disarmament

By: Dr. Morten Bremer Maerli, Senior Research Fellow, 2005, "How long can WMDs be linked to proliferation, solely?" The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=105>

Less than five years later, however, the vast majority of the steps have been violated by leading nuclear-weapon states. The United States and Russia have been unable to substantially, irreversibly and verifiably dismantle their still massive Cold War-era stockpiles of strategic and tactical weapons. Rather, under their flawed leadership nuclear weapons are undergoing a quiet renaissance. By this they have not only increased the risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. They are also severely undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – the one multilateral mechanism to stem the spreading of nuclear weapons and control the nuclear ambitions of states like Iran.

DISADVANTAGES

1. NPT makes nuclear weapons material more available

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 31 (brackets added)

But the bad news is that NBC [Nuclear, Biological, Chemical] weapons have become more accessible. As to nuclear weapons, ample time has passed for significant diffusion of nuclear technology and know-how. A black market has emerged. Since the NPT actually promotes the peaceful use of nuclear equipment and materials, states cannot be blamed for pursuing this option.

2. Efforts to restrict nukes backfire by creating feeling of being threatened

Ted Galen Carpenter and Charles V. Peña, 1 June 2005, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," [www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6337](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6337)

Washington may have tried to shape the international system with the best of motives, believing that taking action against unsavory states would both enhance America's security and advance the goals of peace and justice in the world. But as generations of realist scholars have shown, other nations may not concede that the motives of an activist power are benign. What might seem to U.S. policymakers justifiable, even noble, behavior may seem threatening to nations that have a less than cordial relationship with the United States.

3. NPT easily allows nuclear weapons development to occur by misbehaving nations

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 31

One of the inherent weaknesses of the NPT is that state parties, under the guise of compliance with treaty obligations, can develop all necessary components for a nuclear weapons program, including the stockpiling of fissile materials, and then withdraw from the treaty – like North Korea did in 1993 – to develop nuclear weapons.

OUT OF AREA MISSIONS - NO PROBLEM

HARMS

1. Global NATO missions are not divisive: Europe and Canada support them

Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus, 14 Mar 2006, "Next Step for NATO," WASHINGTON POST, p. A19

In principle, a more global NATO would pursue precisely the kind of goals embraced in Europe's own security strategy. Defending Europe by dealing with these new threats is a core European -- and U.S.-Canadian -- foreign policy objective.

2. Global NATO missions are justified: Necessary to shut down terrorist havens

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., 9 Jan 2006, Heritage Lecture #919, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm)

Failed leaders produce failed policies. Failed policies generate failed states. Those, like Afghani­stan under the Taliban, spawn safe havens for ter­rorists. It is happening in Somalia and other parts of Africa, and in the Northwestern province of Pakistan. It is happening in southern Afghanistan, where thankfully NATO is expanding its opera­tions. And it may happen in Gaza, the Northern Caucasus, the Ferghana Valley, and in the highlands of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

3. Global NATO missions justified: Effective promotion of security, stability and humanitarian good

Kurt Volker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 Mar 2006, "NATO: Where Is It Headed?" <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63860.htm>

NATO’s third core accomplishment was transforming itself – from a static alliance engaged in planning the territorial defense of its members, to an effective instrument for putting the vast political and military resources of its members to work in ending conflict and promoting security, stability, and humanitarian good well beyond transatlantic geography. NATO helped win the Cold War without firing a shot. After the Cold War, NATO has realized that it must be willing to fire shots against terrorists and extremists – whether in the Balkans or Afghanistan – as security and development in conflict zones go hand in hand.

INHERENCY

1. NATO is not committed to global missions

Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus, 14 Mar 2006, "Next Step for NATO," WASHINGTON POST, p. A19

In fact, NATO has put its toe in some global waters by (belatedly) taking over a major mission in Afghanistan authorized by the United Nations, starting a modest training mission for Iraq, flying relief missions to the earthquake zone in Pakistan, and beginning (again, belatedly) to discuss a significant, U.N.-authorized role in Darfur. These are all commendable actions, but NATO has not yet crossed the Rubicon and explicitly embraced a more global mission.

2. Not a global policeman: NATO is constrained by outside political restraints

US State Department, 9 Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," [www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\_02/alia/a6020910.htm](http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_02/alia/a6020910.htm) (brackets added, ellipses in original)

"I wouldn’t characterize NATO as becoming a global policeman," [NATO Supreme Allied Commander James] Jones said. "NATO will go where political guidance directs us to go, working closely with accepted political decision-making authorities like the United Nations … to see where it can be helpful."

SOLVENCY

1. Most global missions are "coalitions of the willing," not NATO

Cato Handbook on Policy, Dec 2004, "Transatlantic Relations," Cato Institute, p. 533

Simply put, the United States prefers to rely on ad hoc ‘‘coalitions of the willing’’ rather than be constrained by the need to forge consensus among the NATO allies. Except for Britain and France, NATO-Europe lacks the ability to project military power outside of Europe.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Islamic jihad kills Western Civilization

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., 9 Jan 2006, Heritage Lecture #919, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm)

While engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Koso­vo, and Darfur are contributing to providing secu­rity and training the forces, NATO can play a greater role in fighting terrorism and building new relationships and alliances in the Mediterranean, the Greater Middle East, and Eurasia—alliances that are vital to success in the new war. The national interest in opposing the 21st centu­ry networked, borderless, jihadi movements with their terrorist organizations is not clearly articulat­ed. Often, notions of political correctness cloud the threat assessment, the rhetoric, and the judgment of what is really at stake, which is, simply put, the survival of Western civilization.

2. Loss of effective defense of NATO countries

Adam J. Hebert, Senior Editor, Apr 2003, "The Nato Response Force," ARMED FORCES ASSOCIATION MAGAZINE, [www.afa.org/magazine/april2003/0403Nato.html](http://www.afa.org/magazine/april2003/0403Nato.html)

" Prior to 11 September, there was always a theological debate about whether NATO should ever operate outside the NATO area of responsibility," said former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Joseph W. Ralston. "If 11 September did nothing else, it put to bed that argument that a threat to a NATO country has to originate in the country immediately adjacent to its border."

3. Loss of UN-NATO cooperation on resolving international crises

A. Link: NATO out of area missions support UN peacekeeping

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

This decision to go "out of area" in the Balkans was a historical decision for the Alliance. It was NATO’s first peacekeeping operation. But just as importantly, it represented the birth of UN-NATO cooperation. Since 1992, NATO has provided continuous support to the United Nations in the Balkans. In 1995, some 65,000 troops deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina, under a United Nations’ mandate, to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. United Nations and NATO cooperation has resulted in a safe and secure environment.

B. Impact: Stopping out-of-area missions would block future crisis resolution

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

Given our joint success in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not surprising that NATO support to the United Nations there has been viewed as a template to be applied to other demanding crises. This template involves close cooperation with other major international players, including the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

4. Western nations will be less safe against the gravest threats without active intervention

Richard Holbrooke (former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations) and Ronald D. Asmus, 14 Mar 2006, "Next Step for NATO," WASHINGTON POST, p. A19

In the new global security environment, NATO has to address the gravest threats to its members' collective security. But now those threats come thousands of miles from the European heartland, not just a few yards away on the East Berlin side of Checkpoint Charlie. If NATO does not take on more of these problems, we will all be less safe, and the alliance will again risk becoming irrelevant.

5. Net-benefits: More costly to not-intervene than to intervene in some cases

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

I would draw attention to some of the lessons that I believe to be key. The first is anticipate spill-over. As we have seen in the Balkans, when states fail they tend to threaten security and stability not just in their own region, but well beyond. This does not mean that NATO must intervene in each and every instance. But we should always be aware that indifference might be more costly, over time, than timely engagement.

RUSSIA IS DANGEROUS

Russia is upset with NATO over multiple issues

Dr. Marcel de Haas, 29 May 2006, ''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, [www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_printable&report\_id=498&language\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1)

Russia was not informed prior to most of these decisions and feels ignored as a major power in Europe and even more as a former superpower. Furthermore, considering its traditional security perceptions -- pointing at encirclement by its enemies and an insatiable desire for security, demanding buffer zones such as the former Warsaw Pact satellites -- Russia has difficulty in understanding and accepting N.A.T.O.'s move eastward and conducting operations close to Russia's borders. The result of this is two-fold: disappointment and aversion. Facing N.A.T.O., Russia feels a number of disappointments. For instance, Russia has no influence in N.A.T.O.'s decision-making process on the use of military force. Russia does not have access to the North Atlantic Council -- N.A.T.O.'s primary organ -- and, therefore, has no "veto right" to prevent certain decisions.

Even if Russia seems OK now, provoking Russia can lead to future crisis

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) and Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst), Jan 2006, Cato Institute, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

Moreover, Vladimir Putin has adopted a surprisingly accommodating policy in an effort to secure economic and political benefits from the United States and its allies. But who knows what Putin’s successor might be like? Who would dare predict the political environment in Russia a decade or a generation from now? All that would be required to trigger a crisis is a Russian president who tires of a neighboring state’s treatment of its Russian inhabitants as second-class citizens and decides that Moscow should rectify that situation by force if necessary.

Russia can call NATO's bluff over intervention in Eastern Europe

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) and Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst), Jan 2006, Cato Institute, "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=542> 1

Indeed, a crisis could be triggered if a future Russian president concludes that a Western military presence itself is an intolerable intrusion into what should rightfully be Moscow's sphere of influence. And a Russian president might well conclude that the United States would not really risk war over South Ossetia or a similar obscure conflict.

Russia is blocking democracy in neighboring countries

Roman Kupchinsky, 26 Nov 2004, " Analysis: Russia's New Imperialism," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=11&y=2004&id=216C44D1-159B-44DF-ABB8-72DA74B35039>

"Russian democracy ends on the border with Ukraine" is an oft-repeated maxim among the Ukrainian political elite. It was reputedly coined by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the 1918 Ukrainian national revolution, after Lenin sent the Red Army to reconquer Ukraine after the fall of the Tsarist Russian empire. In recent years, Russia has sought to revive its historical influence over Ukraine. This is closely related to the emergence of a new Russian imperial idea, which roughly coincides with the election of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000.

Russia is blackmailing its neighbors and reversing its own democracy

Brendan Murray, 5 May 2006, "U.S.’s Cheney Rebukes Russian ‘Blackmail’ " ST PETERSBURG TIMES, <http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=17520> (brackets added)

"No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation," [US Vice President Richard] Cheney said in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, where he’s attending a conference of Baltic and Black Sea countries. The U.S. and Europe "want to see Russia in the category of healthy, vibrant democracies,’’ Cheney said in the speech. "Yet in Russia today, opponents of reform are seeking to reverse the gains of the past decade.’’

Russia is reversing civil rights

Brendan Murray, 5 May 2006, "U.S.’s Cheney Rebukes Russian ‘Blackmail’ " ST PETERSBURG TIMES, <http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=17520> (brackets added)

[US Vice President Richard] Cheney said "in many areas of civil society’’ Russia has infringed on individual freedoms, including "from religion and the news media, to advocacy groups and political parties.’’

Russia is destroying freedom and democracy

Bruce P. Jackson ( president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), 18 Feb 2005, "Democracy in Russia," Based on testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, [www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2) (brackets added)

In May 2004, Putin formalized the attack on the civil sector in his state-of-the-nation address by accusing NGO's [Non-Governmental Organizations] of working for foreign interests and against the interests of Russia and its citizens. Coupled with the conviction of academics Igor Sutyagin and Valentin Danilov on fabricated charges of espionage, the NGO sector in Russia has been effectively silenced. Human Rights Watch reports that "opposition parties have been either decimated or eliminated altogether, partially as a result of the deeply flawed elections of December 2003."

Russian policy is violent vulgar thuggery

Bruce P. Jackson ( president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), 18 Feb 2005, "Democracy in Russia," Based on testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, [www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2) (brackets added)

Putin's insistence in an interview with Russia journalists at the time that there were no casualties in the slaughter in the Nord-Ost Theater is revealing. Putin was only conscious of casualties among the Russian security services; the lives of civilians did not figure in his calculus. As everyone knows, the unpredictable and uncalculated use of power in international politics is highly dangerous. In a word, we are not dealing with a benevolent autocracy; we are now dealing with a violent and vulgar "thuggery."

Russia is destabilizing Europe and blocking the spread of democracy

Bruce P. Jackson ( president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), 18 Feb 2005, "Democracy in Russia," Based on testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, [www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2) (brackets added)

Russia will actively contest the growth of democratic governments along its Western border with Europe, throughout the Black Sea and Caucasus region, and in Central Asia. President Putin intends to block the resolution of the frozen conflicts from Transdnistria to South Ossetia to Nagorno-Karabakh and to maintain the Soviet-era military bases which serve as occupying forces and prolong these conflicts. The instability this policy will cause in the governments throughout the post-Soviet space will be a long-term threat to the interests of Europe and the United States in stabilizing and democratizing this region.

Russia will not help against terrorism

Bruce P. Jackson ( president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), 18 Feb 2005, "Democracy in Russia," Based on testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, [www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/254ctvvn.asp?pg=2) (brackets added)

To put it bluntly, the growing view in Putin's inner circle is that in order to regain the status of a world power in the 21st century, Russia must be undemocratic at home (in order to consolidate the power of the state) and it must be anti-democratic in its "near abroad" (in order to block the entry of perceived political competitors, such as the European Union or NATO, invited into post-Soviet space by new democracies.) The war on terror is not central to this calculation and is little more than something to discuss with credulous Americans from time to time.

Russia is a time bomb with unprecedented threats to international security waiting to happen

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

The huge military is equally unstable, its ranks torn by a lack of funds, abuses of authority and discontent. No wonder serious analysts worry that one or more sudden developments--a sharp fall in world oil prices, more major episodes of ethnic violence or terrorism, or Putin's disappearance--might plunge Russia into an even worse crisis. Pointing to the disorder spreading from Chechnya through the country's southern rim, for example, the eminent scholar Peter Reddaway even asks "whether Russia is stable enough to hold together." As long as catastrophic possibilities exist in that nation, so do the unprecedented threats to US and international security.

Russia's WMD are an enormous threat

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, [www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2](http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2)

Experts differ as to which danger is the gravest--proliferation of Russia's enormous stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological materials; ill-maintained nuclear reactors on land and on decommissioned submarines; an impaired early-warning system controlling missiles on hair-trigger alert; or the first-ever civil war in a shattered superpower, the terror-ridden Chechen conflict. But no one should doubt that together they constitute a much greater constant threat than any the United States faced during the Soviet era.

Russia and its neighbors are all spinning out of control

Rajan Menon and Peter Reddaway, 14 Mar 2005, "The Real Crisis In Putin's Russia," NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, [www.literati-magazine.com/magazine\_features/spring05/commentary/reddaway-menon.html](http://www.literati-magazine.com/magazine_features/spring05/commentary/reddaway-menon.html)

Few Russia watchers would suggest the country is on the verge of disintegration. Yet it could be. Certainly, its present boundaries are likely to be altered. The epicenter for change is the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus, consisting of seven ethnic republics (Adygea, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan) framed by the Caucasus Mountains, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. It's the sort of place few outside the Kremlin pay much attention to. But we should, for it's not just war-torn Chechnya that's spinning out of control. It's the entire region, where a combustible synergy of terrorism, poverty, ethnic tensions, pervasive crime, corruption and radical Islam has left Moscow reeling.

Russia is building dangerous anti-democracy coalitions

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Interpreting US-backed "color revolutions" as a quest for military outposts on Russia's borders, the Kremlin now opposes pro-democracy movements in former Soviet republics more than ever, while supporting the most authoritarian regimes in the region, from Belarus to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Moscow is forming a political, economic and military "strategic partnership" with China, lending support to Iran and other anti-American governments in the Middle East and already putting surface-to-air missiles back in Belarus, in effect Russia's western border with NATO.

"Provoking Russia Disad" response: Uniqueness - Status Quo policies are already destabilizing Russia

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Every consequence of this bipartisan American cold war against post-Communist Russia has exacerbated the dangers inherent in the Soviet breakup mentioned above. The crusade to transform Russia during the 1990s, with its disastrous "shock therapy" economic measures and resulting antidemocratic acts, further destabilized the country, fostering an oligarchical system that plundered the state's wealth, deprived essential infrastructures of investment, impoverished the people and nurtured dangerous corruption.

RUSSIA IS GOOD - DON'T PROVOKE THEM

HARMS

Russia has done more to help the US against terrorism than NATO did

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, [www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2](http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2)

A decade later, the tragedy of September 11 gave Washington a second chance for a real partnership with Russia. At a meeting on June 16, 2001, President Bush sensed in Putin's "soul" a partner for America. And so it seemed after September 11, when Putin's Kremlin did more than any NATO government to assist the US war effort in Afghanistan, giving it valuable intelligence, a Moscow-trained Afghan combat force and easy access to crucial air bases in former Soviet Central Asia.

Russia does not consider NATO a potential enemy

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 28 [www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf](http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf)

Second, Russia does not consider NATO to be a potential enemy, and relations with the North Atlantic alliance are beginning to acquire the character of a partnership, while residual or new differences of opinion must be dealt with in a process of political dialog, within the framework of institutions created for just such a dialog.

Russia leads the charge against terrorist financing

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department, 28 Apr 2006, Country Reports on Terrorism, "Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview," [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm)

Russia is an increasingly active member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (FATF). After fulfilling its pledge to create a Eurasian FATF-style regional body (FSRB) in 2004, known as the Eurasia Group on Money Laundering (EAG), Russia was the group's leading force and remained its chair. The EAG, whose members also include Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, made significant progress toward building Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and established the necessary legislative and regulatory frameworks in member states to help those states improve their compliance with international standards.

Russia cooperating with NATO against terrorism

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm)

At the same time, common cause in the fight against terrorism remains at the core of our new relationship. The NATO-Russia Council has agreed on intelligence assessments of various aspects of the problem. And we are examining closer cooperation in airspace management to prevent terrorist threats to civil aviation. Our scientists have pooled their efforts in areas such as explosives detection, the secure decommissioning of nuclear submarines, cyber-security, and the psychological and social causes, effects and responses to terrorism. We have tested and enhanced our capabilities to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks, with the large scale exercise that Russia hosted in Noginsk in 2002, and another planned in Kaliningrad this coming June.

Multiple Russia-US cooperation policies against terrorism

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department, 28 Apr 2006, Country Reports on Terrorism, "Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview," [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm)

The U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG), co-chaired by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak, met in May and December. The group fosters cooperation between numerous U.S. agencies and their Russian counterparts on counterterrorism issues. Notable milestones included the February signing of a comprehensive agreement facilitating information sharing on man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and the November signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on counternarcotics that established closer cooperation and exchange of information. The FBI and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) forged a highly productive joint counterterrorism operational capability that led to several arrests and convictions.

Russia is committed to helping fight terrorism

MosNews (Russian news agency), 3 June 2006, "Putin Challenges U.S. on Human Rights, NATO Expansion," <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/06/03/putintalks.shtml> (brackets added)

As a sign of Russia’s strategic opposition to terrorism, he [Russian President Vladimir Putin] said, "In some areas terrorists thought we would feed terrorism as the United States did in Afghanistan against the Soviets and as the Soviet Union did in Vietnam against the Americans." But he said, "Our relations are so mature that we are not rolling back" on the Russian partnership with the United States.

Russia is building new institutions to fight terrorism

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department, 28 Apr 2006, Country Reports on Terrorism, "Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview," [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm)

Russia used its position in international fora to build cooperative mechanisms and programs to counter terrorism. For example, Russia led efforts to make counterterrorism cooperation a key element in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Russia cooperates on WMDs & nuclear proliferation

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department, 28 Apr 2006, Country Reports on Terrorism, "Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview," [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm)

The United States and Russia continued bilateral cooperation to destroy, safeguard, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush and President Putin made intensified cooperation on nuclear security a centerpiece of their February summit in Bratislava.

Russian intervention in its neighbors isn't bad: US does the same thing

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

When Washington meddles in the politics of Georgia and Ukraine, it is "promoting democracy"; when the Kremlin does so, it is "neoimperialism."

Putin has popular democratic support for stabilizing Russia

Vlad Sobell, 23 June 2006, "Nato at Ukraine’s door," RUSSIA PROFILE, <http://russiaprofile.org/cdi/2006/6/23/3947.wbp>

The stabilisation has not been welcomed by the neocons and figures such as Mr Khodorkovsky simply because they were not at the receiving end of the "liberating chaos". But it has certainly been welcomed by the vast majority of the Russian population, which explains Putin’s phenomenal and persistent popularity. This fundamental harmony between the regime and the population is perhaps the most telling proof that after the decade of chaos, preceded by Soviet totalitarianism, Russia has for the first time in its history established a stable, democratic equilibrium.

Russian military policies are OK when the US does them

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Underpinning these components of the real US policy are familiar cold war double standards condemning Moscow for doing what Washington does--such as seeking allies and military bases in former Soviet republics, using its assets (oil and gas in Russia's case) as aid to friendly governments and regulating foreign money in its political life. More broadly, when NATO expands to Russia's front and back doorsteps, gobbling up former Soviet-bloc members and republics, it is "fighting terrorism" and "protecting new states"; when Moscow protests, it is engaging in "cold war thinking."

DISADVANTAGES TO PROVOKING RUSSIA

Uniqueness: Russia has not yet retaliated

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Contrary to exaggerated US accusations, the Kremlin has not yet resorted to such retaliatory measures in any significant way. But unless Washington stops abasing and encroaching on Russia, there is no "sovereign" reason why it should not do so.

Link: Enacting policies that ignore Russia's needs is insulting and will trigger backlash

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

The decision to treat post-Soviet Russia as a vanquished nation, analogous to postwar Germany and Japan (but without the funding), squandered a historic opportunity for a real partnership and established the bipartisan premise that Moscow's "direction" at home and abroad should be determined by the United States. Applied to a country with Russia's size and long history as a world power, and that had not been militarily defeated, the premise was inherently self-defeating and certain to provoke a resentful backlash.

Impacts: Russian retaliation has multiple impacts

1. Russian retaliation = Economic crippling of Georgia and Moldova

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Economically, the Kremlin could cripple nearly destitute Georgia and Moldova by banning their products and otherwise unemployed migrant workers from Russia and by charging Georgia and Ukraine full "free-market" prices for essential energy. Politically, Moscow could truncate tiny Georgia and Moldova, and big Ukraine, by welcoming their large, pro-Russian territories into the Russian Federation or supporting their demands for independent statehood (as the West has been doing for Kosovo and Montenegro in Serbia).

2. Russian retaliation = anti-NATO "OPEC with nuclear weapons" alliance

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Militarily, Moscow could take further steps toward turning the Shanghai Cooperation Organization--now composed of Russia, China and four Central Asian states, with Iran and India possible members--into an anti-NATO defensive alliance, an "OPEC with nuclear weapons," a Western analyst warned.

3. Russia will cut European natural gas and oppose US national security interests

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

It can shut US businesses out of multibillion-dollar deals in Russia and, as it recently reminded the European Union, which gets 25 percent of its gas from Russia, "redirect supplies" to hungry markets in the East. And Moscow could deploy its resources, connections and UN Security Council veto against US interests involving, for instance, nuclear proliferation, Iran, Afghanistan and possibly even Iraq.

4. Arms race and increased risk of nuclear war

Stephen F. Cohen, 21 June 2006, "The New American Cold War," THE NATION, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen/2>

Military encirclement, the Bush Administration's striving for nuclear supremacy and today's renewed US intrusions into Russian politics are having even worse consequences. They have provoked the Kremlin into undertaking its own conventional and nuclear buildup, relying more rather than less on compromised mechanisms of control and maintenance, while continuing to invest miserly sums in the country's decaying economic base and human resources. The same American policies have also caused Moscow to cooperate less rather than more in existing US-funded programs to reduce the multiple risks represented by Russia's materials of mass destruction and to prevent accidental nuclear war.

RUSSIA JOINING NATO - NEGATIVE

MINOR REPAIR

1. Just invite Russia to some meetings: All they want is better relations with NATO

F. Stephen Larrabee, 2003, "NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era," report prepared for the US Air Force, RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE, p. 156-157

Putin's statement should not be construed as meaning that Russia is likely to apply for NATO membership in the near future. Rather it reflected a desire on Putin's part to end the 'deep freeze' in relations with NATO and reestablish more regularized contacts with the Alliance as part of Russia's broader effort to overcome its isolation in the wake of the Kosovo and Chechnya conflicts.

SOLVENCY

1. Russia is too big: Alliance won't work well if Russia joins

All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (WCIOM), 2006, "HOW THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC VIEWS NATO - An analytical report based on sociological research commissioned by the NATO Information Office in Russia," p. 47

Secondly, NATO will find it too difficult to absorb Russia – the presence in NATO of such a big country will significantly change the Alliance itself and perhaps have an adverse effect on its work.

2. Russian military is completely incompatible with NATO

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2005, "NATO and the European Union," CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, p. 48 (parentheses in original)

Thirdly, there are objective difficulties associated with the need for drastic transformation of the Russian military machine and thus increased expenditure on military requirements. "Join NATO? Well, it’s hard to imagine the Russian army in its current form as a member of the North Atlantic organisation. The officers can’t speak English, which is essential, our weapons are Russian and aren't compatible with NATO armaments, and procedures in our army are radically different from procedures in European armies. It’s too difficult to put these things together. I think that Russia and the Russian army have a long way to go before there can even be talk about any kind of associate membership of NATO" (representative of state agency, Kaliningrad).

DISADVANTAGES

1. Democracy violation: Most Russians don't want Russia in NATO

All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (WCIOM), 2006, "HOW THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC VIEWS NATO - An analytical report based on sociological research commissioned by the NATO Information Office in Russia," p. 45

The public knows hardly anything about the details of NATO-Russia cooperation, but still does not rush to support the idea of joining NATO. Rather, the majority (43% in 2002) is against it, although this figure is appreciably lower than in 1999. Cooperation in the form of possible Russian membership of NATO is seen by Russians in an extremely negative light

2. Net benefits: Joining NATO would wreck Russia's foreign policy

All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (WCIOM), 2006, "HOW THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC VIEWS NATO - An analytical report based on sociological research commissioned by the NATO Information Office in Russia," p. 47

There are many arguments against. Firstly, on joining the Alliance Russia would lose its potential for geopolitical manoeuvring and perhaps even damage its relations with other global players – China, the Muslim world.

3. Internal conflict: Russia's interests and NATO's are so different that they will conflict all the time

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2005, "NATO and the European Union," CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, p. 48 (parentheses in original)

NATO itself is not ready to welcome Russia into its ranks. "I can’t see any point in it. Russia prefers to see most foreign policy issues in the context of its own interests and its own way of seeing things, while NATO's position on many questions, if not diametrically opposed, is at the very least significantly different from Russia’s position. No-one’s going to do this" (journalist, Moscow).

RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP -- BAD TODAY

1. Russia-US relations today are worse than ever since the Cold War

Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, 6 July 2006, "Goldgeier: U.S.-Russia Relations at Lowest Point Since Cold War’s End," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11060/>

James M. Goldgeier, former director of Russian affairs in the National Security Council under President Clinton, says that as leading democracies head to the annual G8 meeting in St. Petersburg, the relationship between the United States and Russia "is as poor as it has been since the end of the Cold War."

2. Russia has no incentive today to cooperate with NATO like they did 10 years ago

James M. Goldgeier, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Europe Studies, 6 July 2006, "Goldgeier: U.S.-Russia Relations at Lowest Point Since Cold War’s End," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11060/>

Fast forward to today and you have a Russia with the high price of energy and the revenues it has coming in looking around thinking, "Hey, you know, we don't need to listen to these American lectures anymore. We don't need to go along with whatever these guys want. We can be more assertive." They were not happy with a lot of things ten years ago—remember the whole debate over NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] enlargement—but they went along with it because they felt they needed the relationship.

3. Russia relationship has deteriorated - days of cooperation are over

James Klurfeld, 5 May 2006, "We need to repair our relationship with Russia," NEWSDAY, <http://www.newsday.com/news/columnists/ny-opklur4729429may05,0,4271470.column?coll=ny-news-columnists>

While the Bush administration has been preoccupied with the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States' relationship with Russia has steadily deteriorated. We're not talking about another Cold War - not yet, at least - but the cooperative pattern of the 1990s has morphed into one that is marked by substantial disagreement.

4. Russia has established an anti-Western foreign policy

James Klurfeld, 5 May 2006, "We need to repair our relationship with Russia," NEWSDAY, <http://www.newsday.com/news/columnists/ny-opklur4729429may05,0,4271470.column?coll=ny-news-columnists>

And Russia's foreign policy has frequently been antagonistic to the West. Putin has not been cooperative in the effort to discourage Iran from pursuing its nuclear weapons program, has said that he will send aid to Hamas when the United States and even Europe have vowed to withhold it, and has been aggressively hostile toward the new nations that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. The decision to temporarily shut down a gas pipeline to Ukraine over a price dispute has had a terribly chilling effect on all nations that must depend on energy supplies coming from Russia.

5. Russia has given up on working with the West

Dmitri Trenin (Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center), July/Aug 2006, "Russia Leaves the West," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, [www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85407/dmitri-trenin/russia-leaves-the-west.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85407/dmitri-trenin/russia-leaves-the-west.html)

Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia's leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system.

6. Russia doesn't trust NATO

NATO-Parliamentary Assembly, 26 June 2006, "NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION STILL HINDERED

*BY MISPERCEPTIONS AND LACK OF TRUST,"* [*http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0606&L=natodata&T=0&F=&S=&P=3728*](http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0606&L=natodata&T=0&F=&S=&P=3728)

Accordingly, some Russian parliamentarians declared their total mistrust of Alliance’s intentions also in the military sphere. One of them defined NATO as "the Pentagon’s foreign legion" and others indicated that they considered the establishment of US military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the conduct of NATO exercises in Crimea, as direct threats to the Russian Federation.

RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP -- GOOD TODAY

HARMS

1. Russia does not consider NATO an enemy

Prof. Yuri Fedorov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Summer/Fall 2004, Digest of the Russian Journal YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL), Vol 9, No. 3-4, published by PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," p. 28 <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Second, Russia does not consider NATO to be a potential enemy, and relations with the North Atlantic alliance are beginning to acquire the character of a partnership, while residual or new differences of opinion must be dealt with in a process of political dialog, within the framework of institutions created for just such a dialog.

2. NATO and Russia are cooperating successfully on many levels

Ahto Lobjakas, 23 Sep 2005, "NATO: U.S. Sees Global Training Role As Key To Transformation," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/faced84c-9ac5-4431-ac21-a7fc2e5ea818.html>

Nuland also noted yesterday that NATO-Russia cooperation has greatly improved and now takes place "in a completely different environment." She said Russia is training a battalion for interoperability with NATO forces. Russia will also provide ships for NATO’s patrolling mission in the Mediterranean -- the first Russian contribution to a NATO operation since Kosovo. Collaboration in theater missile defense is blossoming.

3. NATO is never going to go to war with Russia

Gen. James L. Jones, quoted in Global War on Terror and Future of NATO, by Sebestyen L. v. Gorka, 9 Jan 2006, HUMAN EVENTS, [www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374](http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374)

On the scale of all possible military operations involving the Alliance -- humanitarian operations on the one hand, and forcible entry into a nation at the other extreme -- NATO’s future missions predominantly in the first quarter of the scale. We are not going to be fighting Russia, therefore it would be irresponsible for all our nations to concentrate on high-end warfighting capabilities alone.

4. NATO & Russia don't have to agree on everything -- they work together OK anyway

NATO Official Home Page, 9 May 2006, NATO Topics, NATO-Russia relations - Building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, [www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html)

The Allies and Russia will not always agree on everything and differences remain on some issues, which may take time to resolve. However, the driving force between the new spirit of cooperation is the realisation that they share strategic priorities and face common challenges. In the framework of the NRC, Russia and NATO member states are developing a continuous political dialogue on current security issues.

5. Vladimir Putin says everything's fine -- Russia is a partner in fighting terrorism

MosNews (Russian news agency), 3 June 2006, "Putin Challenges U.S. on Human Rights, NATO Expansion," <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/06/03/putintalks.shtml> (brackets added)

[Russian President Vladimir] Putin said he was "satisfied with the level and quality" of U.S.-Russian relations. "In combating terrorism, "we are more than partners," he told a group of media executives from the Group of Eight nations at a dinner at his suburban residence.

6. NATO has excellent quality relationship with Russia

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm)

But none of our partnerships is more vital than our "new quality" relationship with Russia. We have developed a real spirit of trust and cooperation, which is reflected in regular and frank political dialogue. We have also developed a broad programme of practical cooperation in areas as diverse as theatre missile defence, peacekeeping, and search and rescue at sea. And the expansion of our military-to-military cooperation has been truly spectacular -- from 7 joint exercises and events in 2002, to a planned 57 this year.

7. Russia is cooperating with NATO on Afghanistan

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm)

Speaking about cooperation where it matters, Afghanistan and the wider region around it must be a key concern to Russia as well as to NATO. In the NRC we have conducted regular and detailed consultations on the situation in Afghanistan. I hope that we can make progress soon on Russia’s offers of assistance to ISAF. And I am heartened by Russia’s interest in engaging with the Alliance on the challenges and opportunities in this broader geographic region, and what we in the NATO-Russia Council can contribute to meet them.

8. Talk about bad relations is just "talk" - real cooperation is going on behind the scenes

NATO-Parliamentary Assembly, 26 June 2006, "NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION STILL HINDERED

*BY MISPERCEPTIONS AND LACK OF TRUST,"* [*http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0606&L=natodata&T=0&F=&S=&P=3728*](http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0606&L=natodata&T=0&F=&S=&P=3728)

"The top-level dialogue and media reporting are all tough talk", said a Moscow-based Western academic, "but below the surface, there is much that goes on to contradict that negativity". In particular, Russia and Western countries have developed a successful relationship in the areas of counter-proliferation and the fight against terrorism and organised crime. The G-8 Global Partnership initiative as well as common diplomatic efforts in the context of the United Nations to solve the Iran nuclear crisis were cited as good examples of constructive cooperation.

INHERENCY

1. NATO-Russia Council (NRC) works with Russia as an equal partner, consults regularly

NATO Official Home Page, 9 May 2006, NATO Topics, NATO-Russia relations - Building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, [www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html)

NATO member states and Russia regularly consult on current security issues and are developing practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established in May 2002 as the main forum for advancing NATO-Russia relations, in which the 26 Allies and Russia work together as equal partners to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action.

2. NATO-Russia fully committed to good partnership

NATO Official Home Page, 9 May 2006, NATO Topics, NATO-Russia relations - Building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, [www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html)

The decision to establish the NRC was taken in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, which reinforced the need for coordinated action to respond to common threats. It signaled the determination to give the NATO-Russia partnership new impetus and substance, and demonstrated the shared resolve of NATO member states and Russia to work more closely together towards the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic Area.

3. NRC consults with Russia on all regional issues and is generating concrete benefits

NATO Official Home Page, 9 May 2006, NATO Topics, NATO-Russia relations - Building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, [www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html)

Constructive political consultations have been held on issues, such as the situation in Afghanistan, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the "Greater Middle East" concept. Practical cooperation, directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees, is already generating concrete benefits in many key areas.

4. Russia has diplomatic representation at NATO

NATO Official Home Page, 9 May 2006, NATO Topics, NATO-Russia relations - Building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, [www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html)

To facilitate cooperation, Russia has established a diplomatic mission to NATO and Russian Military Branch Offices have been set up at NATO’s two top military command headquarters. In Moscow, a NATO Information Office seeks to explain NATO and promote the benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, and a Military Liaison Mission is helping improve transparency and coordination on the military side.

SOURCE INDICTMENTS

(alphabetical by last name)

Cato Institute

Curtis Moore, July/Aug 2002, "Rethinking the Think Tanks: How industry-funded "experts" twist the environmental debate," SIERRA MAGAZINE, Sierra Club, <http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200207/thinktank.asp>

Cato and CSE are only 2 of roughly 300 industry-funded groups that are helping businesses and the wealthy convert their vast economic and market power into political might. Their messages are invariably the same: Government regulation–most especially environmental protection–is bad, and any science that justifies it is "junk." Usually these messages are reinforced by money deployed to campaign coffers.

Vice President Richard Cheney

James Carroll, 7 Nov 2005, "Deconstructing Cheney," BOSTON GLOBE, <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/11/07/deconstructing_cheney?mode=PF>

He helped keep the Cold War going longer than it had to, and when it ended (because of initiatives taken by the other side), Cheney refused to believe it. To keep the US war machine up and running, he found a new justification just in time. With Gulf War I, Cheney ignited Osama bin Laden's burning purpose. Responding to 9/11, Cheney fulfilled bin Laden's purpose by joining him in the war-of-civilizations. Iraq, therefore (including the prewar deceit for which Scooter Libby takes the fall), is simply the last link in the chain of disaster which is the public career of Richard Cheney.

Noam Chomsky

Peter Collier, 3 Aug 2004, "The Intellectuals' Michael Moore," FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=14419>

In their contribution to this volume, Paul Postal and Robert Levine, linguists who have known and worked with Chomsky, take the view that the two aspects of his life’s work in fact manifest the same key properties: "a deep disregard of, and contempt for, the truth; a monumental disdain for standards of inquiry; a relentless strain of self-promotion; notable descents into incoherence; and a penchant for verbally abusing those who disagree with him."

Gen. Wesley Clark

Doug Bandow (senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan), 15 Jan 2004, "General Dud - Wes Clark's no foreign-policy wiz," NATIONAL REVIEW, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NDE4ZGUxY2NjNTRhM2JiODRkNzk3ZjhkNDQ3ZmNiMGU>=

In fact, only a genius could have found a way to lose [in Kosovo]. As Clark almost did. First, he, like others in the Clinton administration, thought that a few bombs—indeed, the threat of a few bombs—would solve the problem. When they didn't, the alliance lacked a strategy. Second, after the fighting had ended he ordered British General Sir Mike Jackson to block Russian troops from occupying the airport in Pristina, Kosovo. "I'm not going to start the Third World War for you," Jackson replied. At least most Americans would have known Clark's name had he managed to get NATO into a shooting war with Russia after the West had peacefully won the Cold War.

Alan Dershowitz

Sam Francis (syndicated columnist), 8 Nov 2001, "None Dare Call It Chutzpah: Alan Dershowitiz Now Favors Torture," CREATORS SYNDICATE, INC., <http://www.vdare.com/francis/torture.htm>

If Americans don't have the stomach for tyranny, we have plenty of allies who do. But it's really not the FBI we need to worry about. It's Harvard professors. Last week in St. Louis who should pop up to propose the outright legalization of torture but Harvard law professor and veteran left-winger Alan Dershowitz. Speaking at a book fair at the Jewish Community Center on his new book about the Supreme Court's ruling on last year's presidential election, Mr. Dershowitz managed to sound less like Louis Brandeis than Heinrich Himmler.

Heritage Foundation

Brendan Nyhan, 10 May 2002, "Creaky foundation," SALON, <http://dir.salon.com/story/politics/col/spinsanity/2002/05/10/heritage/index.html>

But his paean fails to acknowledge how ideology and public relations concerns can dictate -- and distort -- much of Heritage's work. What about the foundation's methods, which are more than just an intellectually honest questioning of the "conventional wisdom"? As John Judis describes in his book "The Paradox of American Democracy," the foundation is dedicated to producing good conservative P.R., not rigorous scholarship.

Bruce P. Jackson

John B. Judis, 1 May 2003, "Minister Without Portfolio," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Vol. 14 No. 5, <http://www.prospect.org/print/V14/5/judis-j.html> (brackets added)

[Bruce P.] Jackson maintains that Lockheed actually disapproved of his work on the committee and even tried to fire him, but that seems difficult to believe. In the mid-1990s, Lockheed, like other defense firms, was suffering from the post-Cold War stagnation in the U.S. defense budget. The company knew that once countries from Eastern Europe were admitted into NATO, these nations would have to make their equipment, much of which was manufactured in Russia, "interoperable" with U.S. and Western European military hardware. That might well have meant that they'd have to buy new planes from Lockheed. If the countries didn't have the money, Congress could supply the loan guarantees.

Richard Perle

Tim Shorrock, 3 Apr 2003, THE NATION, " Richard Perle's Corporate Adventures," [www.thenation.com/doc/20030421/shorrock](http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030421/shorrock)

Richard Perle's resignation as chairman of Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board on March 27 capped a tumultuous month for the neoconservative who spent the past decade stoking the fires for the US onslaught on Iraq. The trail to his resignation--as chairman, but not from the board itself--began with Seymour Hersh's New Yorker exposé of Perle's financial stakes in Trireme Partners, a private fund that is currying Saudi investment in homeland security companies, and the Autonomy Corporation, a British company that sells eavesdropping software to the FBI and to US, British and Italian intelligence. Perle's fate was sealed when the New York Times reported that he was also taking money from Global Crossing to lobby the Pentagon to approve his clients' dealings with Hong Kong and mainland China

Vladimir Putin

Masha Lipman (editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Pro et Contra Journal), 21 Aug 2004, "Crushing Democracy and Now the Economy in Russia," [www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1602](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1602)

In Putin's Russia, government control has increasingly become an end in itself, not a means to achieve ambitious economic goals. As in the late Soviet Union, mediocre bureaucrats are in control, while those with skills, talents, high ambitions and, especially, critical opinions are treated with distrust. If Putin ever had a strategic economic vision for Russia, it has been blurred by his Soviet background.

Donald Rumsfeld

SEYMOUR M. HERSH, 31 March 2003, "OFFENSE AND DEFENSE - The battle between Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon," THE NEW YORKER, <http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/030407fa_fact1>

In early February, according to a senior Pentagon official, Rumsfeld appeared at the Army Commanders’ Conference, a biannual business and social gathering of all the four-star generals. Rumsfeld was invited to join the generals for dinner and make a speech. All went well, the official told me, until Rumsfeld, during a question-and-answer session, was asked about his personal involvement in the deployment of combat units, in some cases with only five or six days’ notice. To the astonishment and anger of the generals, Rumsfeld denied responsibility. "He said, ‘I wasn’t involved,’ " the official said. " ‘It was the Joint Staff.’ ""We thought it would be fence-mending, but it was a disaster," the official said of the dinner. "Everybody knew he was looking at these deployment orders. And for him to blame it on the Joint Staff—" The official hesitated a moment, and then said, "It’s all about Rummy and the truth."

Randy Scheunemann

John B. Judis, 1 May 2003, "Minister Without Portfolio," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Vol. 14 No. 5, <http://www.prospect.org/print/V14/5/judis-j.html> (brackets added)

[Bruce P.] Jackson set up the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq with Randy Scheunemann as its president. Scheunemann is another envoy without accountability. While working closely with Jackson on the NATO committee, he has been a registered lobbyist for Latvia, Macedonia and Romania, and a consultant on Iraq policy to Rumsfeld.

Khalil Shikaki

Dr. Leon Hadar (research fellow in foreign policy studies, Cato Institute), 2 Apr 2006, The Economist and the "respected Palestinian pollster," GLOBAL PARADIGMS, <http://globalparadigms.blogspot.com/2006_04_02_globalparadigms_archive.html>

I go on to suggest that there is one major problem in leading respectability as a pollster: his polls. Shikaki conducted three crucial polls that showed the moderate Fatah well ahead of the militant Hamas by a comfortable and growing margin on the eve of the Palestinian parliamentary elections in which Hamas won Big. The problem was that Shikaki's polls helped reinforce expectations in Washington that Fatah would win, noting that his polls have become a font of conventional wisdom (CW) in Washington and elsewhere.

TAIWAN

HARMS

1. China's anti-secession law is not threatening Taiwan

Greg Austin, 16 June 2005, " Testing the Transatlantic Alliance," THE GLOBALIST, <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4580>

Although ill timed, the [anti-secession] law does not represent a hardening of Chinese policy on Taiwan towards a more aggressive stance. In fact, the new law actually represents a hardening of China's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the problem. The law mandates the exhaustion of all possible means for peaceful resolution of the dispute before a resort to military means.

2. European arms sales to China have no impact on Taiwan

Greg Austin, 16 June 2005, " Testing the Transatlantic Alliance," THE GLOBALIST, <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4580>

EU sales after the arms ban is lifted would be insignificant in affecting the Chinese calculus of risk for using force against Taiwan to prevent succession.

INHERENCY

1. Status Quo is best policy: Peaceful resolution is quite possible if we leave things alone

Esther Pan (Staff Writer) 2 June 2006, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, [www.cfr.org/publication/10824/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10824/)

But the "de jure independence by constitutional revision China fears most is probably impossible under the current circumstances," Bush says. Over time, China sees the situation going its way, experts say—particularly if Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou is elected president in 2008. Ma has been much more conciliatory towards China than Taiwan’s current president, Chen Shui-bian, an ardent nationalist and independence advocate. Bush says if Ma wins two terms, he would serve until 2016, and by then China’s "military threat may not be necessary."

2. US already has solid defense commitment to Taiwan

Admiral William J. Fallon (US Navy, Commander US Pacific Command), 7 Mar 2006, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture, p. 4-5

While consistently seeking to assure the PRC [People's Republic of China] of our desire for peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, we retain our strong commitment to the defense of Taiwan should it be threatened by PRC military action. In this regard we have firmly and consistently advocated a stronger commitment and investment by Taiwan in its own defense.

3. US and Japan are allied for Taiwan's defense

Charles Snyder, 3 May 2006, Taipei Times, "US, Japan Reaffirm Pledge on Taiwan" <http://taiwansecurity.org/TT/2006/TT-030506.htm>

The US and Japan on Monday reaffirmed a joint commitment made last year that the protection of Taiwan is a "common strategic objective" of both countries, as they pledged to further strengthen their bilateral military cooperation.

SOLVENCY

1. China will not be deterred from action on Taiwan

William S. Lind (Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation), 3 June 2006, "The Perils of Threat Inflation," [www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084](http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084)

Taiwan is vastly important to China, because the great threat to China throughout its history has been internal division. If one province, Taiwan, can secure its independence, why cannot other provinces do the same? It is the spectre of internal break-up that forces China to prevent Taiwanese independence at any cost, including war with America.

2. Taiwan will not accept any regional alliance

GORDON ADAMS (Director, Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington Univ.), "In defense of defense spending" ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Fall 2005, <http://www.issues.org/22.1/forum.html>

There is no Middle Eastern or north or Southeast Asian security arrangement like NATO, and only a few bilateral agreements in which the United States plays a role (such as with Australia, South Korea, and Thailand). Taiwan has no other security guarantor but the United States and will not accept a regional alternative.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Outside intervention in China/Taiwan disputes is an act of evil aggression

A. Link: Outside intervention for Taiwan is an act of aggression, not defense

William S. Lind (Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation), 3 June 2006, "The Perils of Threat Inflation," [www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084](http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084)

Under its "one China" policy, the U.S. recognizes that Taiwan is part of China. So the "Chinese threat" is that China may be able to deter or counter American intervention in a Chinese civil war. Who is the attacker here? If Britain or France had intervened on behalf of the Confederacy after the American South declared its independence, would the Union have seen such action as defensive?

B. Impact: Aggressive war violates international standards of behavior

US Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, 12 Aug 1945, "Statement by Justice Jackson on War Trials Agreement" <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jack02.htm>

And we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a trial of the causes of the war, for our position is that no grievances or policies will justify resort to aggressive war. It is utterly renounced and condemned as an instrument of policy.

2. Devastating war with China

A. Link: Cross apply Solvency #1 evidence above. If China is not going to attack Taiwan then there is no need to worry about defending it. If China is going to attack Taiwan, they will do it "at any cost" and cannot be deterred.

B. Link: Commitment to defend Taiwan is dangerous and unwise

**Cross-apply to Inherency: US already has a commitment to defend Taiwan - don't need NATO**

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 15 May 2006, "The Bush Administration Snubs Taiwan," <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6392>

Washington maintains an implicit commitment to defend the island if China ever decides to use force to compel reunification. That is an increasingly dangerous and unwise commitment–especially as China’s economic and military power continues to mount.

C. Impact: War with China over Taiwan would devastating and unnecessary

William S. Lind (Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation), 3 June 2006, "The Perils of Threat Inflation," [www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084](http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9084)

A strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China points to an obvious parallel, the strategic rivalry between England and Germany before World War I. That parallel should give Washington pause. If the rivalry – completely unnecessary in both cases – leads to war, as it then did, the war will have no victor. Germany and Britain destroyed each other. While Britain finally won, the British Empire died in the mud of Flanders. A war between China and the United States could easily result in a similar fatal weakening of the U.S. (perhaps after a strategic nuclear exchange), while a defeated Chinese state may dissolve, with China becoming a vast region of stateless, Fourth Generation instability. Is Taiwan worth risking such an outcome?

3. US hegemony disad link: Defense commitment to Taiwan increases US meddling

Ted Galen Carpenter (vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 15 May 2006, "The Bush Administration Snubs Taiwan," <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6392>

At the same time, U.S. leaders seem to believe that the defense commitment entitles Washington to meddle in Taiwan’s political affairs, seeking to affect the outcome of the island’s next presidential election in 2008.

TERRORISM

INHERENCY

1. NATO already setting up new programs to deal with terrorism: Military transformation and NRF

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm)

But, in Prague, we also embarked upon a comprehensive programme of military transformation to meet the new threats, and to defeat them. Today, that transformation is well underway. We are implementing a leaner command structure, in which Alliance Command Transformation here in Norfolk occupies a central role. Our NATO Response Force has been stood up, and it is on course to achieve full operational capability by October 2006.

2. NATO has already made major advances in protecting against WMD

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm)

We have also made major advances in protecting ourselves against Weapons of Mass Destruction, including through the launch of a special CBRN defence battalion last year. And both individual Alliance members and several groups of Allies are developing the kind of modern capabilities we need to face the new threats together.

3. NATO is building wider partnerships to expand the war on terrorism

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2004, at the NATO Russia Council (NRC) conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm)

But the Alliance also recognises that any effective response to the terrorist threat needs to be broad-based and inclusive. As our geographic horizons have broadened, we have deepened our relations with other major organisations like the UN, the EU and the OSCE. We have reached out to our Partners in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia; and intensified our dialogue with countries in the Mediterranean region.

4. NATO is committed to anti-Islamic extremism policy

Mike Purzycki, Oct 2005, "The North Atlantic's Tenuous Organization," THE GLOBE, International Affairs Society, [www.gwias.com/globe/archive/000075.html](http://www.gwias.com/globe/archive/000075.html)

So where does NATO fit into this war against Islamic extremism? Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington-based think-tank, has suggested that the United States press the Atlantic alliance to make anti-terrorism its number one priority. NATO has already taken steps in this direction in recent years: since 2001, alliance members have participated alongside the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom, and in 2003 the alliance agreed to take command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, whose mission is key to preventing that country from becoming a terrorist haven once again.

5. Individual European countries are already increasing cooperation on terrorism

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department, 28 Apr 2006, Country Reports on Terrorism, "Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview," [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm)

The year was also marked by successes as terrorist networks were broken up by arrests in countries ranging from Denmark to Italy. European nations continued to work in close partnership with the United States in the global counterterrorism campaign and continued to enhance their abilities, both individually and collectively, to deal with a terrorist threat increasingly seen as an internal one. The contributions of European countries in sharing intelligence, arresting members of terrorist cells, and interdicting terrorist financing and logistics were vital elements in the war on terrorism.

6. European Union is increasing cooperation on terrorism

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department, 28 Apr 2006, Country Reports on Terrorism, "Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview," [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm)

European Union (EU) member states remained strong and reliable partners. International judicial cooperation advanced as EU members continued to enact and implement legislation for U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. The United States and EU states developed more comprehensive, efficient border security processes to ensure close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to improve information sharing capabilities.

7. UN is fighting terrorism

Paul Heinbecker (Director of Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy at Wilfrid Laurer Univ., former Canadian ambassador to the UN), Feb 2005, "Can The World Be Governed?" p. 3

For example, although some have reflexively deprecated the UN's counter-terrorism capacity, the UN has passed a dozen counter-terrorism treaties. As those treaties have been progressively absorbed into domestic legislation, they have facilitated the establishment of norms and standards of international behaviour.

SOLVENCY

1. NATO is too slow to respond to terrorism

Ambassador Robert Hunter, 3 June 2005, NATO's Evolving Role in the Middle East: The Gulf Dimension, "NATO and the Future of the Arab World -- How is NATO contributing to the new dynamic of reform and change in the region?," Panel 3 transcript, Henry L. Stimson Center, p. 9

The fact that we did not use NATO after 9-11 when the first time ever it declared an Article 5 situation, not at the request of the United States Government, it was thought up by the Canadian who happened to be the Dean of the Council, went to the Secretary General, [went] to Nicholas Burns, came back here, and people said, "We're busy -- if you want to do it, fine, that's your business," in effect. But we did what we had to do in Afghanistan with the people who could do it, and that meant some of the allies, including the French and the British and some of the others, but it didn't mean using NATO because it would have been too cumbersome and too slow -- we had to get the job done.

2. NATO members don't give unconditional support against terrorism

Peter Rudolf (analyst with the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik specialising in transatlantic relations), Spring 2004, NATO REVIEW, "Should the Middle East be NATO's new central front?" <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/debate.html>

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO did invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, yet no member state interpreted this action as obliging it to provide unconditional military support. Moreover, as you will recall, Washington clearly preferred to build a coalition of the willing for its war on terror to risking becoming entangled in Alliance decision-making.

3. NATO's response after 9/11 was insignificant

Amin Tarzi, 23 May 2006, " Analysis: NATO Sizes Up The Task In Southern Afghanistan," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, [www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/d903acf2-b360-4005-a0a2-fa086848914c.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/d903acf2-b360-4005-a0a2-fa086848914c.html)

Article 5 states that an armed attack against one or more NATO member states is considered an attack against all of them. While the gesture was historic, what followed was not a NATO-wide involvement in the U.S.-declared war on terror, but rather assistance from some members in the military campaign in Afghanistan. Whether the alliance would have -- under any circumstances -- acted according to Article 5 and participated in the Afghan campaign as one force is still a matter of debate.

4. No international coalition can effectively deal with terrorism

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 18

Thus, for example, it is gratifying to note that in the fight against terrorism, law enforcement officials from the European Union and the United States are working together to enhance information-sharing while exchanging experts, training and best practices. But can transgovernmental networks really be

relied on to perform the functions that any viable world order is supposed to do, namely to constrain nations in their pursuance of power and interests, to enforce international rules, and to secure the supply of collective goods by taking effective action against the free riders in the world? In all likelihood they cannot. It is hard to imagine that such channels can serve as the vehicle for reaching agreement in political arenas where vital national interests clash and, for instance, military campaigns must be staged in order to outlaw aggressors.

5. NATO cannot solve the root cause of terrorism: Discrimination

Yevgeny Primakov, (former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation), Feb 2005, The United Nations: Challenges of Our Time, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/826.html> (ellipses in original)

Third, it is counterproductive to build a hierarchy of threats, or set them into opposition; threats are interrelated. Although international terrorism is not directly rooted in poverty, which is the fate of the majority of people on the planet, it is, to a large extent, the result of the past, or present, discriminatory policies toward those who live beyond the ‘golden billion’ countries. Discrimination – whether it is political, economic or cultural in nature – nurtures terrorism.

TURKEY - DOING FINE

INHERENCY

1. Turkey is already making political reforms

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Stimulated in large part by a desire to qualify for membership once its candidacy was secured, Ankara began implementing a series of economic and political reforms. The country also faced a severe financial crisis in 2001, which brought an end to the corrupt and ineffective political parties that governed during the 1990s. Quick and effective action taken under new finance minister Kemal Dervis and backed by the International Monetary Fund restored economic stability.

HARMS

1. Turkey's problems with the West are the fault of US policy in Iraq

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

The Kurdish population of Turkey is about 15 million, 3 to 4 times more than Iraq’s Kurdish minority. Despite U.S. government protestations to the contrary, most Turks believe that a civil war in Iraq will be followed by the creation of a de facto if not *de jure* independent Kurdistan. In that sense, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ensuing disorder in the country threaten 50 years of U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership.

2. Stop blaming Turkey: Kurdish terrorism caused the Kurdish problem

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

The most important challenge was the Kurdish question. Between 1984 and 1999, Ankara had to confront a violent Kurdish insurrection in southeast Anatolia. The separatist challenge posed by the PKK, a terrorist guerrilla movement with considerable regional support, proved extremely costly in political, economic, and foreign policy terms. In addition to a death toll of 35,000, the conflict cost up to $150 billion in military expenditures.

3. Democratic reform in Turkey would have brought radical Islam to power

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Political Islam emerged as a second internal threat after the electoral victories of the Islamic Welfare Party in 1995 and 1996. Because they were in essence major challenges to the foundations of the republic, these dynamics exacerbated Turkey’s sense of insecurity. The same threats that came close to disrupting Ataturk’s nationalist and secular reforms in the 1930s were now reemerging in the post–Cold War era, just when Turkey needed to demonstrate its democratic credentials to a skeptical EU. Compromise with the Kurdish and Islamist enemies of the republic was not an option for Turkey, and the result was military confrontation, political polarization, authoritarianism, and economic crisis during the "lost decade" of the 1990s.

4. Turkey does not discriminate against Kurds

Soner Cagaptay (senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, Fall 2004, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?" [www.meforum.org/article/657](http://www.meforum.org/article/657)

Despite European propaganda to the contrary, Turkey does not discriminate against Kurds as such. Shi‘ite Iran discriminates against the predominantly Sunni Kurds on the basis of religion. Syria and Iraq have histories of ethnic discrimination against the Kurds. But, Turkey embraces Kurds so long as they take pride in their Turkish citizenship.[44] At least two of Turkey's ten presidents and more than a few generals and politicians who fought against the PKK were themselves of Kurdish origin.

5. Defeat of PKK leader has changed Turkey's policy towards respecting Kurdish rights

Soner Cagaptay (senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, Fall 2004, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?" [www.meforum.org/article/657](http://www.meforum.org/article/657)

All this began to change, however, in 1999. First, Turkey caught PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. His capture decapitated and demoralized the PKK and its leader-driven rank and file.[11] The subsequent decline in violence allowed the Turkish military to relax. Long hostage to the PKK's destructive nihilism, Turkish politicians could, for the first time since Turgut Özal's presidency (1989-93) discuss critical reforms, such as cultural rights for the Kurds.

6. EU cooperation with Turkey has brought respect for Kurdish rights and democratic reforms

Soner Cagaptay (senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, Fall 2004, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?" [www.meforum.org/article/657](http://www.meforum.org/article/657)

The Helsinki decision opened political floodgates in Turkey. Now that the EU took Turkey seriously, the Turkish leadership would treat the EU likewise. The impossible became possible. Ankara abolished capital punishment, enabled Kurdish language education and broadcasting and, last but not least, limited the executive powers and responsibilities of the country's powerful National Security Council, subjecting it to civilian authority.

7. European standards of democracy are hypocritical: They criticize Turkey and accept others who are worse

Soner Cagaptay (senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, Fall 2004, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?" [www.meforum.org/article/657](http://www.meforum.org/article/657)

The "yes, but only if ..." answer—demanding full implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, something the EU has not asked from other countries—could cause many Turks to accuse the EU of hypocrisy. After all, the EU admitted several eastern Europe states despite serious human rights issues. Even after EU membership, some of these states are not yet in full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Latvia, for example, which entered the EU on May 1, 2004, continues to disenfranchise its large Russian minority.

8. NATO support promotes democracy in Turkey

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 6 Feb 2005, "Remarks With Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul After Meeting," US State Department, [www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41862.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41862.htm)

Obviously, in the relationship with Turkey, we have together stood together through the Cold War, as members of NATO to face down imperial communism and to see the development of a vibrant and prospering democracy here in Turkey. The United States has been a supporter of the now accession of that vibrant democracy into the European Union, when Turkey has met the conditions that are necessary for that. We’ve been active with Turkey in supporting its economic reforms and its relationship to the International Monetary Fund.

9. NATO military cooperation helped restore civilian rule to Turkey

Szechy Balazs, 2002, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and State Administration, THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY, p. 49

Turkey is a mixed case; several military coups occurred while Turkey was a NATO member, although contact with NATO militaries probably helped to restore civilian rule.

SOLVENCY

1. Democracy turn: Sanctions are the wrong policy -- Working with Turkey produced democracy improvements in the past

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

The impact of improved relations between Turkey and the EU became most evident during these elections. For the first time in Turkish history, the AKP, a political party with Islamic roots whose moderation was born at least in part to lessons learned from the Welfare Party’s ousting, won the national elections in a landslide. More importantly, the AKP won by adopting an aggressively pro-EU political platform.

2. Status Quo dialogue is the best way to resolve differences with Turkey

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 6 Feb 2005, "Remarks With Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul After Meeting," US State Department, [www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41862.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41862.htm)

So, I believe that if we continue to talk about not just the differences that we have, while working on those differences, but also the many positive elements of the Turkish-American friendship, the many times that Turkey has supported America, and America-Turkey, that any sense that this relationship is somehow not worth sustaining will simply go away. The Turkish population and the American population have to know that this is a critical relationship for both our futures.

3. Turks don't care about NATO - sanctions won't matter

Mustafa Kibaroglu, Ph.D, 20 Dec 2004, "Iran’s Nuclear Program May Trigger the Young Turks to Think Nuclear ," PROLIFERATION NEWS AND RESOURCES, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16284>

A third reason is the perceived weakness of NATO, which is seen as being in a protracted process of soul searching since the end of the Cold War. NATO, which used to be the most trusted international organization by the Turks, has turned down Turkey’s request in the days leading up to the US-led Coalition’s war on Iraq to enact Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which would have paved the way to taking necessary measures envisaged in Article 5 (i.e., Alliance solidarity) against a possible Iraqi aggression. Almost the same happened back in 1991 during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Destruction of Islamic democracy model for peaceful coexistence

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

The staunchly secularist Turkish Republic is, of course, an exception in the Islamic world, and one would normally not expect Turkey to become a symbol or model of compatibility between Islamic tradition and Western democracy. Yet, Turkey’s current experiment with moderate Islam is a promising exercise in political moderation and democratic maturity. With the right policies, Turkey could become an inspiring example for Islamists and secularists interested in peaceful coexistence.

2. Turkish nationalist backlash

Link: Turkey has all the ingredients for a nationalist backlash against the US & Europe

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

For the first time in its history, Turkey has a strained relationship with the United States and the EU at the same time. Combined with issues such as Turkish resentment over the West’s failure to deliver on its promises to do more to ease Turkish Cypriots’ isolation following their approval of a settlement plan that the Greek side rejected, the revival of violence and terrorist attacks by the separatist Kurdish Workers’ Party (known by the Kurdish acronym PKK) now partly based in northern Iraq, and Western pressure for the recognition of the Armenian "genocide," all the ingredients for a Turkish nationalist backlash are in place.

Brink: Turkey is on the brink of turning against the West

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Today, the problem Turkey faces is not Islamization but rather a growing nationalist frustration with the United States and Europe. A majority of Turks still want to see their country firmly anchored in the West, but because of what they perceive as European double standards and the United States’ neglect of Turkish national security interests, their patience is wearing thin.

Impact 1: Turkish economic collapse

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

With the potential of further chaos and even civil war in Iraq, an even grimmer scenario may arise in which Turkey opts for unilateral action to stop large-scale ethnic violence between Turcoman, Kurdish, and Arab communities in northern Iraq. A unilateral Turkish intervention in northern Iraq, even if presented as a legitimate attempt to prevent further bloodshed, would present a catastrophic scenario for Turkish foreign policy. Such an intervention would amount to a potential confrontation with the United Kurdish separatist pressure is rising. States and, because Turkey would be perceived as invading a sovereign country, would probably end Turkey’s hope of joining the EU. In Turkey, anger, isolationism, and probably economic collapse would follow.

Impact 2: European economic impacts + loss of stability in Iraq and Afghanistan

Philip Gordon (director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution) and Omer Taspinar ( research fellow and director of the Turkey program at Brookings), Summer 2006, "Turkey on the Brink," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Ultimately, a stable, Western-oriented, liberal Turkey on a clear path toward EU membership would serve as a growing market for Western goods, a much needed contributor to European labor forces, a democratic example for the rest of the Muslim world, a stabilizing influence on Iraq, a valuable actor in Afghanistan (where Turkey has already led the International Security and Assistance Force twice), and a critical ally for the United States in the war on terrorism. A resentful, unstable, nationalist Turkey would be the opposite in every case.

Impact 3: Reduced Western ability to respond to Middle East crises

Soner Cagaptay (senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY, Fall 2004, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?" [www.meforum.org/article/657](http://www.meforum.org/article/657)

At the beginning of the 2003 Iraq war, many people predicted that Washington did not need Turkey anymore to implement its Middle East policy. Events now indicate the contrary. In the post-Saddam world, Ankara's support is crucial, not only because it provides the United States with easy access to Iraq and elsewhere in the crisis-ridden Middle East, but also because a secular, democratic Turkey remains a source of inspiration for the region.

UNITED NATIONS IS BAD

UN is deeply flawed: Promotes dictatorships and human rights violators

Laura Rozen, 1 July 2004, "Building a Better UN," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=7859>

There was, in fact, something deeply flawed about an institution that could pass more than a dozen resolutions against a tyrannical government like Saddam Hussein's and enforce them only haphazardly; that could name a state like Libya to head its human-rights arm, as the UN did in January 2003; and whose chief governing body, the Security Council, was as open to dictatorships as to democracies.

UN is politically paralyzed: Can't do anything about world problems in times of crisis

Dan Goure, MSNBC Contributor, 20 Mar 2003, "First casualties? NATO, the U.N.," MSNBC, [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3070285/from/RL.2/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3070285/from/RL.2/)

The debate over disarming Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is hardly the first crisis to raise questions about the continued ability of the U.N. to face down aggression. During the Cold War, the U.N.’s ability to enhance the security of the international system was nearly paralyzed by the rival political systems that marked that era. What is surprising, however, is the trouble the U.N. has had acting effectively even after the U.S.-Soviet rivalry ended. Again and again during the 1990s, the U.N. appeared helpless to meet "unsanctioned" aggressions in places like Rwanda, Liberia, the Horn of Africa and, especially, in the Balkans.

"Legitimacy" from the UN is meaningless

Prof. Seth Weinberger (international relations and political philosophy, Univ. of Puget Sound), 28 Feb 2006, " The Irrelevance of the UN and the Source of International Legitimacy," SECURITY DILEMMAS, <http://securitydilemmas.blogspot.com/2006_02_26_securitydilemmas_archive.html>

The UN does not in any way represent a consensus of values or ideals; it represents the triumph of procedural process over everything. That is, what the UN does it legitimate so long as it follows its own institutional procedural rules. So, the new commission will bear the imprimatur of international law and rectitude, even as it continues to accomplish nothing and allow gross violators of human rights to sit in judgment of themselves and others. This is disgusting, or in the word of my friend Geoff, "Another reason the UN should be taken out and shot."

NATO is better than the UN

RICHARD PERLE (Chairman, U.S. Defence Policy Board and Consultant to the U.S. Secretary of Defence), 20 Oct 2002, THE STATE OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP, <http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=4865>

I'm very troubled at the idea that the United Nations is the solely legitimising institution when it comes to the use of force. Why the United Nations? Is the United Nations better able to confirm legitimacy than, say, a coalition of liberal democracies? Does the addition of members of the UN, like China for example, or Syria, add legitimacy to what otherwise might be the collective policy of countries that share our values? I don't think so. It is a dangerous trend to consider that the United Nations, a weak institution at best, an institution that includes a very large number of nasty regimes, is somehow better able to confirm legitimacy than institutions like the European Union or NATO.

UN is not as good as NATO for many missions: capabilities, use of force, and credibility

James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

Even if significantly strengthened, UN peacekeeping can never fully meet the need for collective military action. The United Nations has never deployed more than a reinforced division in any single operation. It has never itself conducted a forced entry, although it has authorised many. There will remain occasions where the North Atlantic Council and/or the EU Council are agreed on the need for action while the UN Security Council is not. There will remain instances where Corps or Army-sized forces are required for such operations. There will remain occasions where the initial entry of international forces must be forced. There will also remain circumstances where a NATO or EU force will have more credibility with the local parties and be more welcomed by neighbouring states than one under UN command.

UN incompetence doomed thousands in Srebrenica

Nikola Krastev, 8 July 2005, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Coming To Grips With The UN's Failure At Srebrenica," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO FREE LIBERTY, [www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/8d160e07-dd3e-4cad-9765-6501a1630905.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/8d160e07-dd3e-4cad-9765-6501a1630905.html)

Ignorance, slow action, and erroneous political calculations, the panelists said, gave Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces in July 1995 the opportunity to slay over 7,000 Muslim men and boys after they took over the town designated by the UN Security Council as a "safe area." The massacre in Srebrenica is widely considered a major fiasco in UN peacekeeping efforts.

UN mistakes in Srebrenica will be repeated in future missions

Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (of Jordan, was a UN official in Zagreb with responsibilities tied to Srebrenica), quoted in 8 July 2005, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Coming To Grips With The UN's Failure At Srebrenica," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO FREE LIBERTY, [www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/8d160e07-dd3e-4cad-9765-6501a1630905.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/8d160e07-dd3e-4cad-9765-6501a1630905.html) (brackets in original)

"There has never been a discussion in the UN on this issue. When the report of the Secretary General was produced there was a perfunctory discussion of it or rather there was series of statements in the [UN] General Assembly and that was it, we put it to rest. We’ve never had a thorough discussion on the conclusions reached on the assessment of the Srebrenica report. And are we liable to commit the same mistakes and errors when faced with complex situations like this in the future? I think absolutely [yes]," Zeid said.

UN is not effective against terrorism

RICHARD PERLE (Chairman, U.S. Defence Policy Board and Consultant to the U.S. Secretary of Defence), 20 Oct 2002, THE STATE OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP, <http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=4865>

We need the UN to get a consensus in the fight against terrorism, but the UN includes countries that harbour terrorists. So we certainly need co-operation if we're going to deal with terrorism, but that means the co-operation of nations, frankly, and not the co-operation of the UN per se.

UN is not effective at solving civil wars

Prof. Michael J. Glennon (international law at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University), Feb 2005, "Idealism at the U.N.," POLICY REVIEW, <http://www.policyreview.org/feb05/glennon.html>

Readers are assured, further, that in "the last 15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation than in the previous two centuries in large part because [of] the United Nations." But between 1945 and 1990, the report also reveals, the number of ongoing civil wars increased by over 400 per cent. Of course more civil wars could end through negotiation: There were more civil wars.

UNITED NATIONS IS GOOD

INHERENCY

1. US already bypasses the UN when they want to

Laura Rozen, 1 July 2004, "Building a Better UN," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=7859>

Just as Annan was working toward these goals, George W. Bush came into office, staking out a starkly unilateralist position and signaling disdain for nation building and the kinds of post-conflict activities the UN had successfully undertaken in postwar Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. After the attacks of September 11, Washington felt increasingly entitled to bypass the UN and ignore world opinion in pursuit of national security, plunging the UN further into existential crisis.

2. NATO already acts without UN approval

Dick A. Leurdijk (Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'), 23 Nov 2005, "UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link," p. 3

It was only in the Balkans in the 1990s, when the UN and NATO started their cooperation in the field, that NATO had to define its relationship with the UN under operational circumstances. It would take until 1999 before the Alliance finally defined the bottom line of this relationship, preserving its right to decide autonomously on the use of force, without a formal authorization by the UN Security Council, given its character as a collective defence organization.

3. NATO bypassed the UN in Kosovo and Bosnia

Dan Goure, MSNBC Contributor, 20 Mar 2003, "First casualties? NATO, the U.N.," MSNBC, [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3070285/from/RL.2/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3070285/from/RL.2/)

As a voluntary association of sovereign and equal states, the U.N. is at the service of each member. In effect, it cannot take sides, but must await a consensus of its members. In Bosnia and again in Kosovo, the United States and a coalition of like-minded states under the NATO umbrella bypassed the U.N. and initiated hostilities against Serbia.

HARMS

1. Security Council is effective: It has proven it can respond to international threats

Yevgeny Primakov, (former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation), Feb 2005, The United Nations: Challenges of Our Time, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/826.html (ellipses in original)

For example, following 9/11 the Security Council provided an essentially new interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter which provides for the use of force in self-defense in case of an attack by a non-state entity. Furthermore, the UN Security Council endorsed sanctions against the Taliban movement and created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). It has made decisions on the use of force in support of democracy and human rights (for example, in its Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, the Security Council authorized all member countries "to form a multi-national force… and use all necessary means" to restore democracy in Haiti). The Security Council has demonstrated its ability to adapt to new challenges and threats, and this international body has a major responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. So, there is no need to bypass the Security Council in taking decisive steps or implementing use-of-force actions.

2. Security Council should approve all international use of force

Yevgeny Primakov, (former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation), Feb 2005, The United Nations: Challenges of Our Time, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/826.htlml> (ellipses in original)

The preventive use of force should be preceded by a UN demand that the government of the state in question should take urgent measures to stop activities that threaten the global community. A refusal or inability to meet this demand should be taken by the Security Council as the basis for sanctioning coercive – use-of-force or non-use-of-force – measures. Accepting the possibility of using force in principle, the world community should specify that any intervention by force is permissible in strictly limited situations as a last resort and only following a decision by the UN Security Council.

3. NATO-UN cooperation is working well

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), 11 Nov 2004, speech at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, NATO on-line library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041111a.htm>

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most successful proof of the effectiveness and potential of the United Nations and NATO working together for peace and stability. We have developed an effective operational relationship between our two organisations there. And we have adopted the model of our cooperation to other operations.

4. Minor Repair: UN can make Security Council work more effectively

Yevgeny Primakov, (former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation), Feb 2005, The United Nations: Challenges of Our Time, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/826.html> (ellipses in original)

Opponents to the UN argue that the permanent members of the Security Council are often unable to reach a consensus on questions concerning the use of force in response to the most acute security threats. Such arguments are unfair with regard to situations which undeniably threaten international security. In order to increase the potential for coordinating steps on fundamental security issues within the Security Council, it is expedient to amend its working procedure to a certain extent. The existing procedural innovations should be used on a wider scale, particularly as regards the expansion of cooperation between the UN Security Council members and the leading states providing peacekeeping contingents for UN operations.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lives lost: NATO cannot successfully go it alone: the UN saves lives

Paul Heinbecker (Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Wilfrid Laurier University, former Canadian ambassador to the UN), 16 Feb 2005, "Can the World Be Governed?" presentation at the Canada In The World Conference, p. 3

I am not asserting that the UN alone prevented major wars--the emergence of strategies of nuclear deterrence by the US and the Soviet Union played a central role, as did the NATO alliance. But there is equally no doubt that without the UN, the world would have been a much bloodier place.

2. Difficult missions will fail without trust and neutrality generated by the UN

Laura Rozen, 1 July 2004, "Building a Better UN," THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=7859>

Regardless of the cynicism of this embrace, Iraq presents an important moment for the UN as it tries to reform itself and its relationship with the United States. "The UN can't do this without the U.S., but I'm going to modestly suggest -- or immodestly suggest -- that the U.S. can't do it without the UN," Mark Malloch Brown, the head of the United Nations Development Program, said at a May 5 conference at the American Enterprise Institute. "The partnership is absolutely indispensable, not least because it needs the political authority of the world's leading power, but it often needs the trust and neutrality of the UN to undertake these difficult, difficult, sensitive tasks of building the new institutions in a way that all parties to a conflict trust."

3. Unilateral action bypassing the UN = mission failure

Yevgeny Primakov, (former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation), Feb 2005, The United Nations: Challenges of Our Time, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/826.html (ellipses in original)

Second, the ongoing events in Iraq graphically demonstrate the shortcomings of those tactics that ignore the UN and rely, instead, on unilateral actions. It is noteworthy that after the failure of the U.S. operation in Iraq, those who only recently were obsessed with the idea of unilateralism – that is, the independent and preventive use-of-force actions that ignore the UN and are regarded as "legitimate" – are now returning to this international organization. It has become obvious that the U.S. has no chance of extricating itself from the Iraqi deadlock without assistance from the UN.

EUROPEAN UNION COUNTERPLAN

The Negative position in today's debate is that there are disadvantages to the Affirmative's approach to solving the problems presented in their case, and a much better approach is available. We will deny the resolution and offer you a counterplan that achieves the goals of the Affirmative plan but without the risks and disadvantages of their plan. Our counterplan is simple: The European Union should do the work instead of NATO. First, we begin with a definition:

European Union: "The European Union is an association of 25 states in Europe that have agreed to integrate and coordinate much of their economic policy and some other policy areas." (Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior, European Section, 27 July 2005, European Union - History - The beginning, <http://eu.mvr.bg/en/EU_institution/history.htm>)

Now let's look at: COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES OF NATO VERSUS E.U.

DISADVANTAGE 1. Mission failure from lack of public support

Link: NATO mission will not be as well supported by Europeans

William Drozdiak (President of the American Council on Germany), Jan/Feb 2005, "The North Atlantic Divide," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 92

For fear of disrupting this stability, many Europeans now seem reluctant to get dragged into distant, misbegotten conflicts in Iraq or Iran by their entangling military commitments with the United States. Coupled with disdain for Bush's leadership, that fear has prompted Europe to question the wisdom of entrusting troops and military resources to a security agenda driven by Washington.

Impact: Missions fail or become distorted when public support is lacking

Roger Howard (British defense journalist), Apr 2003, "The Dangers of Warfare in a Media Age" IN THE NATIONAL INEREST, Vol 2 Issue 16, <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue16/vol2issue16howard.html>

Another danger is a consequence of the greater volatility of public opinion that will characterize future conflicts as a result of a powerful media focus. Governments that wage future wars will find that the public support they depend upon is more likely to waver if graphic images are screened of, for example, the massive civilian casualties that may eventuate during such a campaign. As a result they are more likely to cave into public pressure in an act that amounts to a "half-measure"- one that mixes all the disadvantages of a military strike with all those of having done nothing at all.

DISADVANTAGE 2. Problems with Russia

A. Link: Russians trust the EU but not NATO

All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, 2006, HOW THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC VIEWS NATO, An analytical report based on sociological research commissioned by the NATO Information Office in Russia , p. 54

Unlike other international bodies - in particular the European Union - NATO is not seen in terms of cost-effectiveness, as the perception of foreign military threat has diminished considerably. So young people might just as well accept the views passed down to them by the older generation, who have been left with a stereotype attitude to NATO from the long years of Soviet propaganda. The organisation is in no way seen as their own, but rather as a body hatching secret plans against Russia.

B. Impact: NATO seriously needs to improve relations with Russia now

Liliana Proskuryakova, YaleGlobal, 24 Jan 2005, "Putin's Wary Reconciliation - Russia faces stiff challenges in repairing relations with US and Ukraine," <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5167>

In addition, the Russia-US partnership, rife with tension and mistrust, must be overhauled. After supporting the US campaign for NATO enlargement and the global fight against terrorism, Moscow was enraged when the United States backed Yushchenko during the Ukrainian elections and criticized Russia's lack of democracy in its policy reforms. Considering Russia's waning regional and international influence, it would behoove the administration to mend its US relations.

Because of these problems, we offer the following Counterplan, to be implemented by any necessary legal means, exclusively and instead of the Affirmative's plan:

Plank 1: Agency: The member nations of the European Union, the European Parliament, and any other necessary European Union political agency.

Plank 2: Mandates: The European Union and any necessary European military forces will carry out the Affirmative plan.

Plank 3: Enforcement shall be through the EU member governments. Any public official not in compliance with the counterplan shall be removed from office.

Plank 4: Funding shall come from existing EU budgets and cuts in agriculture subsidies.

Plank 5: Timeline. This plan takes effect the same date as the proposed date of the Affirmative plan.

Plank 6: All Negative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the Counterplan.

Now let's look at SOLVENCY: The EU has the resources to do the plan instead of NATO

1. EU has the troops

William Drozdiak (President of the American Council on Germany), Jan/Feb 2005, "The North Atlantic Divide," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 96

The 25 EU states have 1.9 million in their armed forces, and although today only about 50,000 can be sent abroad, that figure is expected to reach 200,000 over the next decade.

2. EU has the money and equipment

William Drozdiak (President of the American Council on Germany), Jan/Feb 2005, "The North Atlantic Divide," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 96-97

The $175 billion combined annual defense budget of EU members may seem paltry against the United States' nearly $500 billion budget for the current fiscal year, but it exceeds the military budgets of China, Japan, and Russia combined. Moreover, several key projects have been launched to rectify Europe's shortcomings and equip it with a long-range air transport fleet, an autonomous satellite reconnaissance system, new precision-guided weapons, and hundreds of light transport helicopters.

ADVANTAGES: The EU counterplan achieves advantages over the NATO plan

ADVANTAGE 1: Ending the European "Free Ride"

William Drozdiak (President of the American Council on Germany), Jan/Feb 2005, "The North Atlantic Divide," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 96

Diplomatic burden-sharing would relieve the United States of carrying the lion's share of responsibilities for regional peacekeeping. It would also help disprove the reputation for "free riding" that Europeans have earned, critics say, by sometimes shirking difficult military missions knowing that the United States would pick up the slack. In the Balkans, where the EU will soon take control of all international peacekeeping, this kind of recalibration is already underway.

ADVANTAGE 2: US interests and world security are strengthened by a more active EU

William Drozdiak (President of the American Council on Germany), Jan/Feb 2005, "The North Atlantic Divide," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 94

He [EU high representative for foreign and security policy Javier Solana] has claimed that the EU is striving to align its foreign policy and security priorities with those of the United States. In December 2003, European leaders endorsed a new security strategy that places a higher premium on projecting power abroad as a forward defense against the threat posed by failed states, terrorism, and WMD. They also approved broader intelligence sharing, better coordination of antiterrorism efforts, and the creation of a pan-European arrest warrant that would expedite the extradition of terrorist suspects. As Europe builds greater capability to deal with global threats, the United States will find that its own resources can be used more effectively in tandem with a stronger European partner.

ADVANTAGE 3: Repair US/European relations and ensure support for the mission by letting Europe take the lead

William Drozdiak (President of the American Council on Germany), Jan/Feb 2005, "The North Atlantic Divide," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, p. 92

Yet the breach in transatlantic relations is not beyond repair. A recent survey of public attitudes conducted in June 2004 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States found that, for the first time since polling began in 2001, 58 percent of nearly 10,000 Europeans interviewed in nine countries believed it was undesirable to have strong American leadership in the world. At the same time, the Transatlantic Trends survey found that 79 percent of nearly 4,000 Americans interviewed wanted to see the EU exercise more global leadership. Taken together, these results reflect a rise both in Europe's dismay at Washington's management of global affairs and in American popular support for a more assertive EU partner.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE: EU COUNTERPLAN

Funding: European agriculture subsidies = $133 billion

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty specializing in the study of Europe and sub-Saharan Africa), Cato Institute, 6 Dec 2005, "Who Pays for Farm Subsidies?" <www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5233>

The EU's agricultural support amounted to about $133 billion, Japan's to $49 billion, America's to $47 billion, South Korea's to $20 billion and Canada's and Switzerland's to $6 billion each.

Lack of public support sabotages military missions

Roger Howard (British defense journalist), Apr 2003, "The Dangers of Warfare in a Media Age" IN THE NATIONAL INEREST, Vol 2 Issue 16, [www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue16/vol2issue16howard.html](http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue16/vol2issue16howard.html)

But the Afghan war provides the best example of how nerve can crack: as the Kabul regime continued to resist Western bombing after four weeks of action, a rebel leader, Abdul Haq, was captured and executed, some stray bombs took a toll on innocent lives, and important allies made pronouncements as to how "we cannot accept what we see every day on the television screens-the killing of innocent civilians, hundreds of them dying every day", signs of pessimism crept into allied capitals, prompting some calls for a cease-fire and a rethink of the whole operation.

Exclusivity: Can't do EU + NATO at the same time for the same mission

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2005, "NATO and the European Union," p. 7

Some analysts worry that NATO and the EU might "compete" for the use of more mobile, high-readiness forces. The EU is developing its own rapid reaction forces for crisis management. Some of these units are "double hatted" for use either by the EU or by NATO. The EU also has embarked on an initiative to enhance its military capabilities and equipment procurement, including, for example, greater strategic lift and weapons for suppression of enemy air defenses. The issue of which organization, NATO or the EU, could use national forces if there were simultaneous crises has not been resolved.

EU is a viable alternative to NATO

Jocelyn Mawdsley, PhD (post-doctoral researcher on the European Commission funded project entitled ‘Bridging the Accountability Gap in European Security and Defence Policy’ ) and Gerrard Quille, PhD (Deputy Director and Post-Doctoral Researcher, International Security Information Service), 2003, "The EU Security Strategy: A new framework for ESDP and equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force" p. 12

Whilst the EU is more deeply involved in the political and economic fabric of its neighbourhood, in particularly the Balkans, it is also a *de facto* global political actor in other spheres such as through its special representatives, its role in the Middle East through the Quartet, and in Africa under the Cotonou Agreement (and recently militarily in operation Artemis). Whist France has traditionally envisaged an EU military function as an alternative to NATO, the UK has traditionally opposed such a vision. However, this is complicated recently by US ambivalence towards NATO as a military actor (ignoring its adoption of Article V on 12 September 2001) and a UK and French realization that competition over visions for European defence must be overcome if Europe is not to become irrelevant and perhaps even ‘out of business’ altogether in defence terms. This has meant that the EU Security Concept has not emerged simply to state that ESDP is a ‘neighbourhood’ policy, an ‘alternative’ to NATO, or a ‘global’ security instrument –quite simply it is being shaped to provide a framework for all three functions.

EU can borrow NATO military assets

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2005, "NATO and the European Union," p. 15

The NATO-EU link was formalized in December 2002; this paved the way for the implementation in March 2003 of "Berlin Plus," an arrangement allowing the EU to borrow Alliance assets and capabilities for EU-led operations and thereby prevent a needless duplication of NATO structures and wasteful expenditure of scarce European defense funds. "Berlin Plus" gives the EU "assured access" to NATO operational planning capabilities and "presumed access" to NATO common assets for EU-led operations "in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged."

EU can conduct missions independently of NATO

Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis (Specialists in European Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2005, "NATO and the European Union," p. 17-18

The Congo mission was requested by the United Nations and headed by France in a "lead nation" capacity. This mission came as a surprise to many EU observers, NATO officials, and U.S. policymakers because it was geographically farther afield than they had thought the EU would venture, and because it was conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The Congo operation was planned by French military planners in national headquarters. Some NATO and U.S. officials were annoyed, asserting that the EU should have first formally asked NATO whether it wished to undertake the Congo operation. EU officials did consult with NATO about the mission, but maintain they were not obliged to ask NATO for its permission given that the EU was not requesting to use NATO assets.

EU has proven its capabilities by successful mission in Congo

Richard Gowan, 14 Jan 2005, "Can Europe Build a NATO for Africa?" THE GLOBALIST, <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4328>

In the summer of 2003, the EU launched Operation Artemis — its first autonomous military operation outside Europe — in north-eastern Congo. The mission's aim was to reassert order in a region where a UN force had effectively lost control — a welcome opportunity for Brussels to assist New York. Carried off without casualties, Artemis was a short, sharp military success.

U.N. COUNTERPLAN

The Negative position in today's debate is that there is a better way to solve the harms or achieve the advantages of the Affirmative plan. By relying on NATO, the Affirmative team makes a crucial mistake that will lead to disadvantages. Those disadvantages could be avoided by having the United Nations carry out the same or similar mandates. This would achieve all the benefits of the Affirmative's plan, but avoid the disadvantages, and thus be a better policy.

DISADVANTAGES TO NATO INTERVENTION

1. Global resentment and terrorism

A. Link: NATO action without the UN is simply US unilateralism

Sabeel Rahman, 2002, "Another New World Order? Multilateralism in the Aftermath of September 11" HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/953/3/>

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, NATO has been increasingly viewed as a proxy for advancing US interests and hegemony in Europe. This waning legitimacy for the organization becomes even more tenuous when US action takes place beyond the geographical boundaries of NATO itself.

B. Impact: Global resentment and terrorism

Charles V. Pena, July/Aug 2004, "Strategy for the War on Terrorism," CATO Policy Report, p. 16

As a 1998 study for the Department of Defense reported, much of the anti-American resentment around the world, particularly the Islamic world, is the result of interventionist U.S. foreign policy. Such resentment is the first step to hatred, which can lead to violence, including terrorism. Therefore, the United States needs to stop meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and regions, except where they directly threaten U.S. national security interests, that is, when the territorial integrity, national sovereignty or liberty of the United States is at risk.

2. NATO action without the UN encourages evil dictators to disregard international law

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 35

Second, it creates the risk of tempting ruthless dictators to disregard international law. Apparently, this danger was also recognized by the NATO allies that had used military force in the spring of 1999 to stop Serbia from committing violence in Kosovo. The military action was taken without prior approval of the Security Council but once the relations with Russia had improved, the Western countries deliberately and successfully sought authorization by the Council afterwards.

3. Regional solutions like NATO undermine the UN and create a new apartheid

A. Link: Regional intervention without the UN undermines the principle of equal protection to all UN members

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 44

Additionally, there is the risk that regionalization might undermine the moral authority of the UN. After all, the UN’s authority is based on the principle of indivisibility of peace. The world organization is supposed to offer equal protection to all member states, regardless of their geographic location.

B. Impact: Regional solutions are unethical and produce "Peacekeeping Apartheid"

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 45 (brackets added)

In Marrack Goulding’s opinion, the ethics of universalism is hard to reconcile with having the quality of protection for people in particular regions depend on the widely divergent capacity of regional organizations in those regions. Radical regionalization in the domain of peace and security could lead to – what has been called – "peacekeeping apartheid". It may nourish the thought that it is not worthwhile to shed [one's] own people’s blood in far-away countries where conflicts are often believed to be endemic.

To avoid these disadvantages, we offer the following Counterplan, to be implemented exclusively instead of the Affirmative plan:

Plank 1: Agency: The UN Security Council and UN General Assembly will authorize any necessary action to carry out this plan

Plank 2: Mandates:

UN troops will be dispatched and will carry out the mandates of the Affirmative plan.

The UN Security Council will pass a resolution denying NATO the authority to implement their plan.

Plank 3: Funding: All money that would have been spent on the Affirmative plan will be donated to the UN and used for this Counterplan.

Plank 4:Enforcement shall be through the UN Security Council and its member governments. Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5: Timeline: This counterplan takes place the same date as the date proposed in the Affirmative plan.

Plank 6: All Negative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the Counterplan.

Next we see that the Counterplan can provide SOLVENCY: The UN has a very successful track record when it intervenes

Lee Feinstein (Deputy Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) , 18 May 2006, "Key Challenges in Today’s UN Peacekeeping Operations," Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key\_challenges\_in\_todays\_un\_peacekeeping\_operations\_rush\_transcript\_federal\_news\_service\_inc.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key_challenges_in_todays_un_peacekeeping_operations_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html)

The U.N. success rate among missions studied—seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic—substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, ensuring against their recurrence, and promoting democracy.

And finally, the Counterplan provides unique ADVANTAGES TO UN ACTION over the Affirmative plan:

1. Benefits of UN approval, in the long term, outweigh the costs: Avoid use of hard power, less resentment, reduced risk of opposing coalitions

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 25

The price of collective legitimization by the world organization may be high: loss of time and watering down of its own position as a result of concessions to others. But the price of unilateralism is likely to be higher in the long run: loss of global respect, the necessity of using hard power instead of soft power, and the outburst of international resentment and envy. By far the greatest risk for the hegemony that refuses to multilateralize its power is the ganging-up of potential rivals.

2. Using the UN instead of NATO increases legitimacy and gets better cooperation to solve serious problems

Sabeel Rahman, 2002, "Another New World Order? Multilateralism in the Aftermath of September 11" HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/953/3/>

The use of NATO in place of the United Nations thus becomes an expression of the form of false multilateralism against which both Braumoeller and Hagel have warned. In order to capitalize on the prospects for true international cooperation against terrorism and other global issues, the United States must do more to engage the United Nations, an organization with ironclad international legitimacy.

3. The UN works with lower cost, less risk, and more experience

James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

For a variety of reasons, the United Nations should remain the West's nation-builder of first resort. The United Nations is cheaper; it is more experienced; it is more widely acceptable in most circumstances; and the risks and burdens of UN-led operations are shared among a much broader base of countries.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE: UN COUNTERPLAN

NATO action = US aggression

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 44

Conversely, an organization like NATO, having prepared for such operations, can be expected to sustain the capability for rapid and effective action. But this organization enjoys limited legitimacy since non-members may see it as a vehicle of particularly the lead-nation, i.e. the US, to expand its sphere of influence over politically uncharted territories. At any rate, this was Russia’s perception of one of the drivers behind NATO’s Kosovo operation (Allied Force) in 1999.

NATO is simply another form of US unilateral policy

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 35

To base the legitimacy of the application of military force on decisions of exclusive groups of countries like the Western Alliance under US leadership, is likely to entail more political damage than advantage. First of all, it is a form of unilateralism. A limited group of nations belonging to the most prosperous countries would be taking the law into their own hands.

Long term impact of global resentment will outweigh short-term benefits of NATO intervention

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 40

While short-term considerations of the national interest may lead to the conclusion that the cost of infringements on the national freedom to act outweighs the advantages of international legitimacy, in the long run the balance of cost and benefits might change as resentment throughout the world to the unilateral use of American power grows

Unilateral power is inherently dangerous

A. Link: Cross-apply 1A Link above. NATO intervention = US unilateralism

B. Impact: Unbalanced power is dangerous

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 58

The view that American leaders can be trusted to use a monopoly of power has never been shared outside the US. Sensible Americans have been mindful of this sobering fact. Thus, Kenneth Waltz, the leading representative of the neo-realist school of international relations, thoughtfully observed: "I believe that America is better than most nations but fear that it is not as much better as many Americans believe. In international politics, unbalanced power constitutes a danger even when it is American power that is out of balance".

The UN acts with more legitimacy and moral authority than NATO because it represents all nations, not just a few

Alfred van Staden, Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, p. 35

While the nature of their constituent parts (democratic or not) may be an important source of legitimacy of international organizations, no less important or even more important is the scope of their representation. As a world organization the UN derives its legitimacy first and foremost from its universality, that is to say from the fact that it can speak and act on behalf of all nations in the world and that all those nations are answerable to it on matters of international peace and security.

U.S. UNILATERAL COUNTERPLAN

The Negative position in today's debate is that there is a better way to achieve the goals of the Affirmative plan. We will deny the resolution and show you that the alternative of US unilateral action avoids some disadvantages and provides better solvency than the Affirmative's plan for NATO action. The criterion for judging between the Resolution and the Counterplan is simple: Solvency. Which plan is more likely to achieve the benefits: NATO, or US unilateral action?

First, let's see how NATO fails on COMPARATIVE SOLVENCY

1. European NATO members cannot operate successfully outside of Europe like the US can

Anthony H. Cordesman (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, former member of the NATO International Staff), Spring 2005, NATO REVIEW, "Rethinking NATO's force transformation," [www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art4.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art4.html)

NATO Europe is spending more than US$220 billion on military forces, and has some 2.2 million active military and 2.6 million reservists. Virtually all defence analysts agree, however, that most of its procurement efforts are scarcely properly coordinated and interoperable and are not coming close to providing US levels of technology and war-fighting capability. More generally, only a tiny fraction of NATO’s total manpower is deployable outside Alliance territory, and much of it is only really usable if Europe goes to war with itself.

2. European military forces are irrelevant

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., 4 Oct 2004, "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," HERITAGE FOUNDATION, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1803.cfm>

Despite a market that is slightly larger than that of the United States, Europe spends only two-thirds of what the U.S. spends on defense and pro­duces around 20 percent of America’s deployable fighting strength. German defense spending has dropped to a laughable 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Given Europe’s eco­nomic malaise, even the current level of spending and capability is in peril. As Richard Perle bluntly put it, Europe’s armed forces have already "atro­phied to the point of virtual irrelevance."

3. National caveats cripple NATO forces' effectiveness

Carl Robichaud (program officer at The Century Foundation, where he directs the Afghanistan Watch program) Spring 2006, "Remember Afghanistan? A Glass Half Full, On the Titanic," Volume XXIII, No 1, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, [www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj06-2/robichaud.html](http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj06-2/robichaud.html)

The effectiveness of these units is hobbled by "national caveats" that various governments have issued with respect to their military deployments in Afghanistan. Madrid, for example, restricted Afghan personnel from traveling on Spanish aircraft, while Berlin prohibited its troops from leaving camp after dark or without a mobile medical unit, making patrols virtually impossible. The list of such caveats—reportedly ten pages long—exasperates ISAF commanders, whose orders must be relayed to national capitals and back before action can be taken.

4. More countries reduce effectiveness through loss of surprise

Seyom Brown, March 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, "MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE: A REASSESSMENT," p. 13

Loss of secrecy (and the Effectiveness That Comes with Surprise). The greater the number of countries involved, obviously the greater the risk of loss of secrecy. This is more than the issue of enlarged opportunities for espionage, which the information technology of fencing off communications through encryption and other devices can help counter. It is also a question of the political willingness of the parent multilateral organization to delegate sufficient military discretion to the operational commanders over multinational fighting units for devising and directing surprise and deceptive actions that need to be held very tightly in order to succeed.

This leads us to offer the following Counterplan, to be implemented by any necessary legal means and in exclusion to the Affirmative plan:

Plank 1:Agency: The US government and any necessary US diplomatic action and military forces.

Plank 2:Mandates: The United States shall carry out the mandates of the Affirmative plan unilaterally without involving NATO in any way.

Plank 3:Funding: General Federal Revenues plus cuts in School Improvement Programs, Head Start, the National Institute on Aging, and the federal subsidy for the Center of Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law.

Plank 4:Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5:Timeline: This plan takes effect the same date as was proposed in the Affirmative plan.

Plank 6:All Negative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the Counterplan.

Now let's look at the COMPARATIVE SOLVENCY ADVANTAGES of the Counterplan:

1. US troops cost only half of NATO forces to deploy

Prof. Genevieve Schmeder, (Conservatoire Des Arts et Metiers, Paris [Conservatory of Arts and Trades]) 2005, "Equipment and resources," p. 17

In Bosnia, where NATO deployed 50,000 peace-keeping troops at a total cost of $10 billion per year, the average cost was thus $200,000 (€166,600) per peace-keeper and per year ($160,000 or €133,000 when excluding transportation). In Kosovo, the estimate average cost for an army peace-keeper was around $250,000 (€208,000) per annum, more than the cost per capita of a US soldier in Desert Storm ($117,000, less than €100,000 when excluding air and sealift).

2. US unilateral action without NATO works well

Anthony H. Cordesman, Spring 2005, NATO REVIEW, "Rethinking NATO's force transformation," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art4.html>

Moreover, a study carried out after the Gulf War by the Center for Naval Analysis found that the United States had used power-projection forces outside the NATO area more than 240 times between the founding of NATO and the end of the Cold War, and the list of contingencies involved was one where more than three-quarters of the US actions did not involve any European role.

3. Unilateral US action increases the chance of success by avoiding political hassles with Europe

Seyom Brown, March 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, "MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE: A REASSESSMENT," p. 12

The need to expend political capital in order to obtain the necessary Council consensus; the pressures to compromise and accept lowest-common-denominator and/or vague mandates to operational commanders; the likelihood that such mandates will be burdened by numerous national caveats that can inhibit unity of command and restrict tactical military flexibility—all of these inherent costly features of working through NATO have led U.S. policymakers to seek out smaller coalitions or to act unilaterally when engaging in major military action such as the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE: US UNILATERAL COUNTERPLAN

NATO cannot successfully project power -- recent reforms and improvements have not worked

Anthony H. Cordesman, Spring 2005, NATO REVIEW, "Rethinking NATO's force transformation," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art4.html>

NATO has made some progress along these lines, but much of it is more cosmetic than real. Institution building is not force transformation. Ministers may agree to force modernisation priorities and to creating power-projection capabilities, but most country defence plans and budgets reflect slow progress, a continuing lack of interoperability, and the inability to move and sustain more than a small fraction of national forces much beyond national boundaries.

US unilateral action works better: European weakness is a drag on mission effectiveness

CATO Handbook on Policy, 8 Dec 2004, CATO INSTITUTE, [www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb\_109-53.pdf](http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb_109-53.pdf).

Third, Washington has deliberately chosen to bypass the alliance, because it wants to maximize its own strategic freedom of action and it regards the European NATO military capabilities as a drag on American power, rather than as a contributor to it.

Divergent interests make NATO more costly and risky

Seyom Brown, March 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, "MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE: A REASSESSMENT," p. 12

The removal of the common threat to NATO members from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the emergence of divergent national and subcoalition interests among the widely-enlarged membership (turning the organization into a quasi United Nations for the transatlantic region) increases the costs and risks of running a NATO military operation.

Political negotiating and hassles sabotage NATO success -- US unilateral action is more effective

Anthony H. Cordesman, Spring 2005, NATO REVIEW, "Rethinking NATO's force transformation," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art4.html>

A NATO in which Europe focuses on Europe, and the United States focuses on the rest of the world with contingency-driven support from individual European states may in fact be the only way in which the West can act in most out-of-area contingencies. NATO does not create common interests and perceptions. In many cases, Alliance-wide consensus is a recipe for paralysis, and Alliance-wide force transformation of any kind will never happen at more than token levels because many – if not most – European states have no clear motive to become involved and pay the cost.